City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
The Supreme Court ruled that cities may enforce anti-camping ordinances against homeless people even when those people have no access to shelter, finding that such laws do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
The decision reverses a Ninth Circuit rule that had blocked Western cities from clearing encampments whenever homeless populations exceeded available shelter beds, returning primary responsibility for homelessness policy to elected officials — though other constitutional challenges to anti-camping laws remain open.
How it got here: A federal district court certified a class and enjoined Grants Pass's camping laws; the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part; Grants Pass petitioned the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Grants Pass, Oregon (population roughly 38,000) had about 600 homeless residents on any given day and ordinances banning camping on public property. Violations could result in civil fines, temporary exclusion from city parks, and up to 30 days in jail. A class of homeless residents sued, arguing that these ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment because the city's homeless population far exceeded available shelter beds, making their camping effectively unavoidable.
The question before the Court
Does the Constitution's ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" stop cities from enforcing public camping ordinances against homeless people who have nowhere else to sleep?
The Court's answer
No — the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not stop cities from enforcing public camping laws against homeless people. The Clause limits the method of punishment a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not what conduct governments can criminalize in the first place. The fines and short jail terms Grants Pass imposes are neither cruel nor unusual — they have been standard criminal penalties throughout American history.
The Court also refused to extend a 1962 precedent (Robinson v. California) that barred criminalizing the mere status of being a drug addict. Grants Pass's ordinances punish actions — setting up a campsite, sleeping outside with bedding — that anyone can commit regardless of housing status. The argument that homeless people cannot help but do what the law forbids was already rejected in 1968 (Powell v. Texas): the Eighth Amendment protects only against laws that punish pure status, not acts, even acts that may flow from a person's circumstances.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Cities and counties across the country — especially in the American West — can now enforce anti-camping ordinances and clear encampments without automatic Eighth Amendment injunctions blocking them. Local governments regain a legal tool they say is essential for managing public spaces and encouraging homeless residents to accept shelter services. Homeless advocates retain the ability to challenge these ordinances on other constitutional grounds, including due process and excessive fines.
What changes now
The Ninth Circuit's judgment is reversed and the case is sent back to the lower courts. The Eighth Amendment claim against Grants Pass's ordinances is gone, and cities across the country are now free to enforce similar public camping laws without automatic Eighth Amendment injunctions. Homeless residents can still challenge these ordinances on other grounds — including due process, excessive fines, selective prosecution, or Oregon's own state law — and those questions remain open.
What this does not decide
The ruling addresses only the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. It leaves open challenges based on due process, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, selective prosecution, and other constitutional theories. It also does not decide whether Oregon's newer state law limits how Grants Pass may enforce its ordinances, nor does it require cities to adopt camping bans.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's result but wrote separately to argue that Robinson v. California was wrongly decided from the start — its holding rested on contemporary public opinion rather than the Eighth Amendment's text and original meaning, and the Court should overrule it in an appropriate future case. He also raised a separate concern that the civil fines and park exclusion orders at issue may not even constitute 'punishment' under the Eighth Amendment, since that term historically referred to penalties imposed for criminal offenses, not civil infractions.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued that Grants Pass's ordinances effectively criminalize the status of being homeless, because the conduct they ban — sleeping outside with bedding to maintain a temporary place to live — is inseparable from what it means to be homeless. Robinson v. California should resolve the case: someone with no shelter cannot comply with the ordinances short of leaving the city entirely. She distinguished Powell v. Texas as involving voluntary conduct (getting drunk) rendered involuntary by a status, whereas here the ordinances directly target the status-defining conduct of sleeping outside. She also argued the majority overstated the line-drawing difficulties Martin had created, and warned that the decision leaves the most vulnerable with no Eighth Amendment protection.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was adopted to prevent barbaric forms of punishment — like torture and public dissection — after a criminal conviction. By its history and text, it addresses what method of punishment may follow a conviction, not whether a government can criminalize particular behavior in the first place.
- The punishments Grants Pass imposes — a civil fine for a first offense, a temporary park exclusion order for repeat offenses, and a maximum of 30 days in jail for violating an exclusion order — are neither cruel nor unusual. They do not 'superadd terror, pain, or disgrace,' and similar fines and short jail terms have been standard criminal penalties across the country throughout American history.
- The homeless residents' main argument relied on Robinson v. California (1962), where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars criminalizing the pure status of being a drug addict. The Court said Robinson does not apply here because Grants Pass's ordinances criminalize actions — setting up a campsite, sleeping outside with bedding to maintain a temporary place to live — not the status of being homeless. The same laws apply to backpackers, protesters, and anyone else who camps on public property.
- The residents argued the Court should extend Robinson to cover 'involuntary' acts — conduct homeless people cannot help but engage in. The Court rejected this, pointing to Powell v. Texas (1968), which had already refused the same theory: Robinson's narrow holding prevents States from criminalizing pure status, but says nothing about conduct that, 'in some sense,' flows from a person's circumstances. The Eighth Amendment does not provide an involuntariness defense.
- Extending Robinson to cover involuntary acts would force federal judges to answer questions the Eighth Amendment provides no guidance for — such as what makes someone 'involuntarily' homeless or what shelter beds count as 'practically available.' The Ninth Circuit's framework had already produced years of conflicting, unworkable rulings across the West, illustrating Justice Marshall's warning in Powell that going down this path turns courts into roving arbiters of criminal responsibility with no constitutional compass.
- The Court stressed that complex social questions like homelessness policy are best resolved through democratic deliberation by elected officials, not frozen into place by federal courts under a constitutional provision that simply does not address them. States, cities, and counties retain broad authority to adopt — or decline to adopt — public camping laws, and many other constitutional provisions continue to protect people in the criminal justice system.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Robinson v. California (370 U. S. 660)
Its ban on criminalizing pure status does not extend to laws that punish actions, even when those actions flow from homelessness.
Reaffirms Powell v. Texas (392 U. S. 514)
Reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment does not protect against criminal laws targeting conduct, even 'involuntary' conduct flowing from a person's status.