Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

Background

Petitioners are family fishing businesses and vessel owners who challenged a National Marine Fisheries Service rule that lets fishery managers require fishermen to pay for at‑sea observers. Lower courts applied the long‑standing Chevron two‑step rule and sided with the Government, treating the agency’s reading of the Magnuson‑Stevens Act as controlling when the statute was viewed as unclear. The Supreme Court agreed to decide only whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified.

Reasoning

The Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires judges to exercise independent judgment about what statutes mean and to “decide all relevant questions of law.” Because Chevron told courts to defer to agencies whenever a law was ambiguous, the Court found that Chevron conflicts with the APA and with the Judiciary’s role in saying what the law is, so Chevron is overruled. The majority explained that agencies can still inform courts and that courts must respect clear congressional delegations to agencies, but they may not yield simply because a statute is ambiguous. The Court vacated the lower courts’ Chevron‑based rulings and remanded for further proceedings under the Court’s clarified approach.

Real world impact

Going forward, judges—not agencies by default—will decide the legal meaning of ambiguous regulatory statutes. That change will increase judicial review of many agency rules, introduce new litigation over long‑standing agency readings, and require agencies or Congress to secure clearer statutory text or stronger administrative procedures. The ruling does not automatically invalidate every past agency action, but it does mark a major shift in administrative law.

Dissents or concurrances

Two Justices filed separate concurrences emphasizing constitutional concerns, and a dissent argued Chevron was settled, workable, and entitled to stare decisis protection.