United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.

1921-02-28

Headline: Court strikes down a vague wartime law banning 'unjust or unreasonable' charges and affirms quashing of an indictment, limiting federal power to criminally prosecute merchants for high prices.

Holding: The Court held that the statute’s prohibition on making 'unjust or unreasonable' rates was unconstitutionally vague and affirmed the lower court’s quashing of the indictment against the grocery dealer.

Real World Impact:

Limits federal criminal prosecutions under vague price-control provisions.
Requires clearer statutory standards before punishing merchants’ pricing.
Protects individual dealers from criminal charges based on vague law.

Topics: price controls, merchant prosecutions, criminal law vagueness, wartime economic regulation

Summary

Background

A St. Louis grocer, the Cohen Grocery Company, was indicted under a reenacted 1919 provision of the Lever Act for charging allegedly "unjust or unreasonable" prices for sugar — about 50 pounds sold for $10.07 and a 100‑pound bag sold for $19.50. The 1919 reenactment added a penalty clause and broader exemptions to §4. The company demurred, arguing the counts and the statute were too vague to inform it what conduct was forbidden, that Congress had improperly delegated lawmaking to judges and juries, and that wartime authority no longer applied. The trial court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the statute fixed an ascertainable standard of guilt and complied with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections that laws be definite and give notice. The majority concluded the text forbade no specific act, left the inquiry unbounded, and invited varied and conflicting judicial and administrative standards. Because the provision failed to give an intelligible standard or adequate notice, the Court held it unconstitutionally vague and affirmed the quashing of the indictment.

Real world impact

The decision limits the government's ability to use that §4 provision to criminally prosecute individual dealers for prices without clearer statutory standards. Enforcement agencies and prosecutors must rely on clearer, more specific statutes or other parts of the law when addressing excessive pricing. The opinion also reinforces that constitutional protections apply even in the wartime context considered here.

Dissents or concurrances

Two Justices (Pitney and Brandeis) agreed with the outcome but not the majority's reasoning. They would have avoided the constitutional question, concluding instead that §4 did not criminalize a single dealer’s exacting of excessive prices.