Hammer v. Dagenhart
The Supreme Court struck down a federal law that barred goods made with child labor from crossing state lines, ruling that Congress had overstepped its power to regulate interstate commerce.
The Court said the law wasn't really about regulating shipping at all -- it was an attempt to control working conditions inside factories and mines, something the Constitution leaves to the states, not the federal government.
How it got here: A federal district court in North Carolina ruled the child labor law unconstitutional and blocked its enforcement; the government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A father sued on behalf of himself and his two young sons, who worked in a cotton mill in Charlotte, North Carolina -- one son under fourteen, the other between fourteen and sixteen. He wanted to stop enforcement of a federal law banning interstate shipment of goods made in factories or mines that employed children below certain ages or worked them beyond set hours.
The question before the Court
Could Congress stop factories from shipping goods across state lines if the factory employed young children or worked them too many hours?
Why it matters
Factories and mines that employed young children or worked them long hours could keep shipping their products across state lines, and Congress lost a tool it had used to pressure states into raising child-labor standards. States were left to set their own rules on child labor, meaning protections could vary widely from state to state.
What changes now
The federal child labor law was struck down and its enforcement remained blocked, leaving states free to set their own child labor standards without a federal floor tied to interstate shipping. Congress would later try other approaches to limit child labor, but this decision meant the interstate-shipment method was closed off unless the Constitution was reinterpreted or amended.
What this does not decide
The decision does not question Congress's power to ban interstate shipment of goods that are themselves harmful, like lottery tickets or impure food and drugs -- it addresses only laws aimed at controlling how goods are made, not what is shipped.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Holmes
“It would not be argued today that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.”Holmes's argument that Congress's power to regulate commerce includes the power to forbid shipments.
Justice Holmes argued that if a law is within Congress's commerce power when judged by its direct effect, it does not become unconstitutional merely because it also indirectly affects matters normally left to the states. He pointed to prior decisions upholding bans on oleomargarine, lottery tickets, and interstate transport for prostitution despite similar objections, and argued child labor was, if anything, a stronger case for federal action. He would have upheld the law as a valid exercise of the commerce power.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court framed the question as whether the power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to forbid the shipment of ordinary, harmless goods simply because of how they were made, rather than because of anything dangerous about the goods themselves or their movement.
- It reviewed earlier cases upholding bans on shipping lottery tickets, impure food and drugs, and women transported for prostitution, and concluded those bans were valid because interstate transportation itself was a necessary tool for the harm -- the shipment was part of the evil.
- The Court found that element missing here: cotton goods are harmless in themselves, and the labor conditions that troubled Congress were already finished by the time the goods were ready to ship, so transportation was not doing any of the harmful work.
- Because the true target was the working conditions inside factories and mines -- not the movement of goods -- the Court held that regulating those conditions is a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment, not a power granted to Congress over commerce.
- The Court rejected the argument that Congress could use its commerce power to pressure states into matching each other's child-labor standards, reasoning that equalizing economic conditions between states was not among the purposes of the commerce power.
- Applying this reasoning, the Court concluded the child labor law reached beyond Congress's commerce authority and improperly invaded a subject left to state control.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Champion v. Ames (188 U. S. 321)
The Court said this lottery-ticket ban worked because shipment itself spread the harm, unlike harmless cotton goods here.
Distinguishes Hoke v. United States (227 U. S. 308)
The Court distinguished this case because transportation itself enabled the harm, unlike child-made goods that are harmless.
Distinguishes Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. (242 U. S. 311)
The Court said liquor's exceptional nature justified prohibition there, unlike ordinary cotton goods in this case.