Jones v. Perkins
Headline: Affirms constitutionality of the federal Selective Draft Law’s registration duty, upholding a conviction and allowing continued enforcement of the draft-registration requirement against those who fail to register.
Holding:
- Allows enforcement of federal draft-registration rules against non-registrants.
- Makes early habeas relief before trial harder in ordinary criminal cases.
- Affirms lower courts’ authority to hold persons awaiting trial for draft offenses.
Summary
Background
Jones was arrested under a warrant charging failure to register under the Act of May 18, 1917, known as the Selective Draft Law. After a hearing before a United States Commissioner he was committed to custody to await the next term of the United States District Court. Jones petitioned the lower court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute under which he was held was repugnant to the Constitution, and the district court denied the petition (243 Fed. Rep. 997). Jones appealed directly to this Court.
Reasoning
The Court noted the general rule that habeas corpus should not normally be granted before a criminal trial except in exceptional circumstances, and cited prior decisions supporting that rule. The Court explained that it was not necessary here to decide whether this case fits any exceptional class because the same constitutional questions were decided that day in Arver v. United States. The Arver decision held those constitutional challenges to the draft law to be without merit, and the Court applied that ruling here.
Real world impact
By applying the Arver decision and affirming the denial of habeas corpus, the Court allowed continued enforcement of the federal draft-registration requirement against a person held for failing to register. The ruling reinforces limits on seeking pretrial habeas relief in ordinary criminal cases and confirms that the district court’s commitment in this matter must stand.
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