Crowe v. Trickey
Headline: Court upholds denial of a broker’s commission when sellers died and an escrow option lapsed, allowing estate administrators to complete a later sale without owing the broker.
Holding:
- Brokers cannot claim commissions if a sale was not completed before the sellers’ deaths ended selling authority.
- Estate administrators may sell property without paying earlier brokers unless bad faith is shown.
Summary
Background
A broker, George W. Crowe, said he arranged an option to sell mining interests held by two owners, N. H. Chapin and Jerry Neville. On April 1, 1899, a deed was placed in escrow to be delivered to a buyer, Arthur R. Wilfley, on payment of $100,000 within a year. Crowe had a verbal promise of a ten percent commission. Chapin and Neville died in January 1900. Administrators later negotiated separate sales with Wilfley, and Crowe later claimed $5,000 from the administrator of Chapin’s estate as his commission.
Reasoning
The central question was whether Crowe was entitled to a commission even though the buyer did not complete payment before the sellers’ deaths ended Crowe’s authority to sell. The Court explained that a broker generally must produce a purchaser ready and willing to finish the deal to earn commission. Deaths of the owners terminated Crowe’s authority, and Wilfley did not complete the original payment within the option period. There was no evidence of bad faith by the sellers or their administrators, and Crowe did not work for the administrators or complete a binding sale before the agency ended. The Court therefore found no legal basis for Crowe’s claim.
Real world impact
The ruling leaves brokers without a commission when a sale is not completed before the seller’s authority ends, unless the seller acts in bad faith. It confirms that estate administrators who later sell property are not automatically liable for earlier brokers’ claims when the original agency has expired.
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