Campos-Chaves v. Garland
The Court ruled 5-4 that immigrants ordered deported after skipping a scheduled hearing cannot challenge that order based on a defective initial notice, as long as they received a valid follow-up notice specifying exactly when and where to appear.
The decision — notable for Justice Gorsuch joining the three liberal justices in dissent — could insulate hundreds of thousands of past deportation orders from being reopened, and it removes a key legal consequence of the government's long-standing practice of issuing incomplete initial notices.
How it got here: Three immigrants challenged their in absentia removal orders in federal appeals courts; the Fifth Circuit ruled against them while the Ninth Circuit ruled in their favor; the Supreme Court agreed to hear all three cases together.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Three immigrants — from El Salvador, India, and Mexico — were served initial removal notices that left the hearing time and date blank (listed as "TBD" or "to be set"), which made those notices legally defective. The government later sent each person a separate follow-up notice with the specific hearing date and time. All three skipped their hearings and were ordered deported in their absence. Each then tried to cancel the deportation order by pointing to the defective first notice.
The question before the Court
Can an immigrant challenge a deportation order issued after they missed a hearing, if the government's original notice was defective but a valid follow-up notice was sent for the hearing they skipped?
The Court's answer
No — immigrants ordered deported after missing a scheduled hearing cannot undo that order based solely on a defective initial notice if the government sent them a valid, complete follow-up hearing notice for the specific proceeding they skipped. The statute allowing immigrants to reopen removal cases says they must show they did not receive notice under either of two forms — the initial notice to appear or a follow-up notice of hearing. The Court read the word "or" as a true alternative: receiving either type of valid notice for the missed hearing blocks a rescission request.
Because all three immigrants here received follow-up notices that stated the exact time and place of the hearings they skipped and warned of the consequences of not appearing, those notices satisfied the legal requirements for the second form of notice. The defective initial notices did not give the immigrants a permanent right to reopen their cases.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Immigrants who received a defective first removal notice but a valid follow-up hearing notice — and then skipped their hearing — cannot use the defective first notice to indefinitely reopen their deportation cases. This potentially shields hundreds of thousands of existing in absentia deportation orders from challenge while reducing legal pressure on the government to fix its practice of issuing incomplete initial notices.
What changes now
The three immigrants' deportation orders stand and cannot be rescinded on defective-notice grounds. The case involving Singh was sent back to the Ninth Circuit to address a separate legal argument it had not yet reached. The ruling potentially affects hundreds of thousands of similar in absentia deportation orders, though each affected immigrant would still need to have received a valid follow-up hearing notice. The government retains a legal obligation to issue proper initial notices, but faces reduced legal consequences for past failures to do so.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not say the government may skip proper initial notices — those remain legally required. It does not address what happens if the follow-up notice itself was also defective, or resolve other types of defects in initial notices (such as omitting the charges or the right to counsel). Singh's separate rescission argument was sent back to the lower court, not decided here.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson argued that a follow-up notice under paragraph (2) cannot legally exist without a prior, fully compliant initial notice — it is a 'change order' that only works if there is an original order to modify. Because none of the immigrants received a valid initial notice, the follow-up notices were also legally invalid, meaning none received proper notice at all. She warned that the majority's reading rewards the government's years-long, systemic failure to comply with Congress's clear notice requirements, removes any incentive to fix that practice, and shifts the burden of the government's mistakes onto immigrants facing removal.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court started with the statute's text: to reopen a deportation case, an immigrant must show they 'did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)' of the notice statute. The word 'or' is almost always disjunctive — meaning one or the other — so receiving either the first type of notice (the initial 'notice to appear') or the second type (a follow-up 'notice of hearing') satisfies the requirement and blocks rescission.
- Nearby statutory language reinforced this reading. A separate provision allowing the government to order someone deported in the first place also hinges on 'paragraph (1) or (2)' notice, and in that context 'or' is unambiguously disjunctive — only one type of notice is needed to obtain the deportation order. The Court found it would be inconsistent for rescission to require both types when removal itself requires only one.
- The Court held that the specific notice that 'counts' is whichever one informed the immigrant of the time and place of the hearing they missed. When the government sends a follow-up notice changing the time or date, that notice supersedes the original and becomes the operative one. It is that follow-up notice — not the initial one — that the immigrant must show was defective to seek rescission.
- The Court rejected the argument that a valid follow-up notice under paragraph (2) is legally impossible without a prior valid initial notice. Although paragraph (2) speaks of a 'change or postponement' in the hearing's time and place, the Court read 'change' broadly enough to cover replacing a 'TBD' date with an actual date — even where no valid date had been previously set.
- All three immigrants received follow-up notices that specified the exact time and place of the hearings they missed and warned them of the consequences of not showing up. Those notices met all the requirements for a paragraph (2) follow-up notice. Each immigrant thus 'received notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)' and could not seek rescission of the in absentia removal order on defective-notice grounds.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Pereira v. Sessions (585 U.S. 198)
Prior language saying paragraph (2) presupposes a valid initial notice was limited to the 'stop-time rule' issue and treated as non-binding dicta here.
Distinguishes Niz-Chavez v. Garland (593 U.S. 155)
Language suggesting the government must issue a compliant initial notice before sending a follow-up was distinguished as limited to the stop-time rule context.