Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney
The Supreme Court ruled that when the National Labor Relations Board asks a federal court to temporarily restore the status quo — such as ordering a company to reinstate fired workers — while the Board's own slow-moving proceedings play out, the court must apply the same demanding four-part test used for all other requests for such temporary orders.
The decision overturns a more lenient standard used by several federal appeals courts that made it easier for the NLRB to win those temporary orders, and sends the case involving fired Starbucks union organizers back to the lower court for a fresh look under the stricter rules.
“In fact, it is hard to imagine how the Board could lose under the reasonable-cause test if courts deferentially ask only whether the Board offered a minimally plausible legal theory, while ignoring conflicting law or facts.”
The majority explaining why the Sixth Circuit's lenient 'reasonable cause' standard sets a bar so low it is nearly impossible for the NLRB to fail.
How it got here: The NLRB's regional director filed a Section 10(j) injunction petition in federal court in Tennessee; the district court granted it under the Sixth Circuit's lenient two-part standard; the Sixth Circuit affirmed; Starbucks asked the Supreme Court to step in, and the Court agreed to resolve a split among the federal appeals courts.
The Case in Depth
What happened
In 2022, several Starbucks employees in Memphis, Tennessee who were forming a union invited a local TV news crew to their store after hours to publicize their organizing effort. Starbucks found out and fired multiple employees involved, including members of the organizing committee. The National Labor Relations Board investigated and filed an administrative complaint against Starbucks, then asked a federal court to temporarily order the employees reinstated and the organizing effort protected while the Board's own proceedings — which can take years — continued.
The question before the Court
When the National Labor Relations Board asks a federal judge to freeze a labor dispute while its own lengthy proceedings continue, must the judge use the same demanding four-part test applied to all other requests for such temporary orders?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court held that when the NLRB asks a federal court for a temporary order under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, the court must apply the traditional four-part test used for all other such requests, established in a 2008 case called Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That test requires the Board to make a clear showing that it is likely to win on the merits, that serious harm will occur without the temporary order, that the balance of hardships favors the order, and that granting it serves the public interest.
The Court rejected the more lenient "reasonable cause" standard used by several circuits, including the Sixth Circuit here, which let the Board win a temporary order by showing only that its legal theory was not clearly frivolous and that returning to the status quo was necessary to protect the Board's remedial power. The Court found nothing in Section 10(j)'s text that displaces the centuries-old default rules of equity, and sent the case back to the Sixth Circuit to re-evaluate the Board's injunction request under the proper standard.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Workers who claim their employer retaliated against union organizing may now wait years for the NLRB's slow administrative process to conclude without the benefit of a court order temporarily restoring their jobs. The Board must now clear a higher bar to secure that protection in court, which could leave union campaigns vulnerable to employer interference during the often years-long gap before the Board issues a final ruling.
What changes now
The Sixth Circuit must now reconsider whether the NLRB was entitled to a temporary injunction ordering Starbucks to reinstate the fired Memphis workers, this time applying the full four-part Winter test rather than the lenient reasonable-cause standard. The Board's underlying unfair labor practice case against Starbucks continues in its own separate administrative proceedings. Other federal appeals courts that used a similar lenient standard for Section 10(j) injunctions will also need to apply the stricter Winter framework going forward.
What this does not decide
The Court does not address how courts should specifically apply each of the four Winter factors in light of the NLRB's unique role as the primary adjudicator of labor disputes — the exact question Justice Jackson argues at length the majority should have answered. The Court also does not decide whether Starbucks actually committed unfair labor practices or whether the fired employees should ultimately be reinstated.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson agreed that courts must use the four-part Winter test and concurred in sending the case back to the Sixth Circuit. But she argued the majority stops halfway: after correctly rejecting the old lenient standard, the Court fails to explain how courts should actually apply the Winter factors in light of Congress's deliberate choice to make the Board — not courts — the primary resolver of labor disputes. She would hold that on the likelihood-of-success factor, a court evaluating a Section 10(j) petition need only find 'some evidence to support the unfair labor practice charge, together with an arguable legal theory,' because the Board, not the court, will ultimately decide the merits.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- When Congress gives federal courts power to grant equitable relief — like a temporary court order — the courts carry a strong presumption that they must use traditional equitable principles, not a different standard invented for the specific statute. For preliminary injunctions, those traditional principles are captured by the four-part Winter test: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without the order, a balance of hardships favoring the order, and a public interest in granting it.
- Nothing in Section 10(j)'s text overcomes that presumption. The provision simply tells courts to grant temporary relief as they 'deem just and proper' — language that invokes, rather than displaces, the discretion courts have always exercised in equity. The Court contrasted Section 10(j) with statutes that unmistakably alter the equitable rules, such as a provision in the same law requiring a special showing before courts can enjoin strikes that threaten national health or safety.
- The Sixth Circuit's 'reasonable cause' standard is far more than a modest adjustment of the Winter test to the NLRB context — it substantially lowers the bar. Under that standard, courts ask only whether the Board's legal theory is 'substantial and not frivolous,' cannot resolve conflicting evidence, and must defer to the Board's preliminary factual and legal views. The Court found it hard to imagine the Board losing under a test that essentially asks only whether the complaint could survive an initial motion to dismiss.
- The Board argued that courts should apply a deferential standard because the Board — not the district court — is the primary adjudicator of labor disputes, and because courts of appeals must defer to the Board's final decisions. The Court rejected both points: whatever the district court decides on the temporary order does not bind the Board's own proceedings, and the views the Board advances in a Section 10(j) petition are just preliminary positions of its in-house attorneys, not formal agency conclusions entitled to deference.
- The Court also rejected the Board's concern that a rigorous merits review by a district court would improperly intrude on the Board's adjudicatory authority. Because the Board runs its administrative proceedings independently, a district court's preliminary assessment of the merits cannot displace or constrain what the Board ultimately decides. Factors like irreparable harm and the balance of equities are not even part of the unfair-labor-practice claim, so a court's view on those has no bearing on the Board's adjudication at all.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (555 U. S. 7)
Confirmed as the governing four-factor test for all preliminary injunctions, including those sought by the NLRB under Section 10(j).