Crossman v. Burrill
Headline: Shipping dispute over demurrage: Court rules charterers can't use a cesser clause to avoid demurrage but wartime enemy fire can be a valid defense; case sent back for factual proof.
Holding: The Court reversed the appellate decree, holding the cesser clause does not bar demurrage claims but that a wartime enemy interruption (vis major), if proved, can fully excuse charterers and the case must be retried on those facts.
- Prevents charterers escaping demurrage solely via cesser clauses if lien is not equivalent.
- Allows wartime or enemy action to be a valid defense if proven.
- Sends case back to trial to decide disputed facts about delay and payment.
Summary
Background
The owners of the bark Kate Burrill sued the charterers to recover 53 days’ demurrage after unloading lumber at Rio Janeiro took far longer than the charter allowed. The charter required unloading at a set daily rate, set a demurrage sum for delay, required bills of lading to be signed, gave the ship an absolute lien on cargo, and stated charterers’ responsibility would “cease when vessel is loaded and bills of lading are signed.” The charterers countered that their responsibility ended when bills were signed and that the delay was caused by wartime firing in the harbor or by payment and settlement with consignees.
Reasoning
The Court first held that the cesser clause cannot be read alone to defeat the shipowners’ rights where the charter also creates a lien; bills of lading that only refer to freight do not automatically bind a consignee to demurrage terms not mentioned in the bill. But the Court also concluded that the charter made the charterers liable only for detention “by default” of the charterers or their agents. The answer pleaded that enemy warships were firing on harbor forts and made discharge impossible. The Court said that such a direct wartime interruption (a vis major, or superior force) is not a “default” by the charterers and can be a full defense.
Real world impact
The decision keeps open shipowners’ ability to claim demurrage despite cesser clauses and ordinary bills of lading, while recognizing that armed conflict or similar direct interruptions can excuse delay if proved. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decree and the dismissal and sent the case back for factual proof on the wartime-interruption and payment issues.
Dissents or concurrances
Mr. Justice McKenna did not take part in the argument or decision.
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