Culley v. Marshall
The Supreme Court ruled that when police seize a car as part of a civil forfeiture case, the Constitution requires a prompt forfeiture hearing but does not require an additional, earlier hearing on whether the owner should get the car back while that main case plays out.
The 6-3 decision resolves a split among the federal courts of appeals and means car owners in most states have no constitutional right to a quick, initial chance to argue for their car's return — they must wait out the full forfeiture process, which can stretch months or years.
“The Constitution requires a timely forfeiture hearing; the Constitution does not also require a separate preliminary hearing.”
The majority's plain statement of its central holding on what due process demands after police seize a car.
How it got here: Two Alabama car owners filed separate federal lawsuits for damages; both district courts ruled against them; the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Two Alabama women — Halima Culley and Lena Sutton — each loaned their car to a family member or friend who was then arrested on drug charges. Police seized both cars under Alabama's civil forfeiture law, which lets the state permanently take property connected to drug crimes. Neither woman was accused of any crime, yet their cars were held for more than a year while civil forfeiture cases played out in state court. Both women argued they had a constitutional right to a prompt, separate hearing — before the full forfeiture trial — where they could argue for their cars' return in the meantime.
The question before the Court
When police seize a car through civil forfeiture, does the Constitution require a separate, earlier hearing — before the main forfeiture trial — on whether the car should be returned in the meantime?
The Court's answer
No — the Constitution does not require a separate preliminary hearing before the main forfeiture trial. The two women argued they were entitled to a fast, adversarial hearing where a judge would decide, at the outset, whether the car should be returned while the full forfeiture case was still going on. The Court held that two of its earlier decisions — United States v. $8,850 and United States v. Von Neumann — already settled this question.
Those cases established that the Constitution requires only that the full forfeiture hearing happen within a reasonable time, not that courts must also hold an earlier hearing first. Because both women had access to a timely forfeiture hearing and could have pressed for a faster one if they believed the process was dragging, the Court ruled their due process rights were fully satisfied without any additional preliminary proceeding.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Car owners whose vehicles are seized by police through civil forfeiture — including people who had no involvement in any crime — have no constitutional right to a fast, separate hearing on whether their car should be returned while the full case plays out. They must pursue their case through the standard forfeiture process, potentially waiting months or years even when the car is essential to their work and daily life.
What changes now
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in favor of Alabama is affirmed, and the two women's damages claims are dismissed. Going forward, car owners whose vehicles are seized through civil forfeiture have no constitutional right to a separate retention hearing; they must challenge the seizure through the standard forfeiture process, which must remain timely. States and Congress remain free to provide retention hearings by statute — and several already do — but the Constitution does not compel them. Other due process challenges to civil forfeiture, such as claims of unreasonable delay, remain available.
What this does not decide
The ruling covers only whether the Constitution requires a separate retention hearing. It does not resolve other due process questions about civil forfeiture — such as notice requirements, the standard of proof needed to hold property, the need for a neutral adjudicator, or whether specific state schemes are constitutionally adequate in other ways. Those challenges remain open, as does the broader question Justice Gorsuch raised about whether modern civil forfeiture practices are historically grounded.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch agreed with the outcome but wrote separately to flag deep questions about whether modern civil forfeiture practices — which largely arose during the War on Drugs era — are consistent with the Constitution's original promise of due process. He questioned whether the historical traditions that justified post-deprivation forfeiture in admiralty, customs, and revenue cases extend to today's far broader drug-and-offense forfeiture statutes. He noted that police agencies have strong financial incentives to pursue forfeitures and that innocent owners often suffer most, and he called for future cases to examine whether current forfeiture practices genuinely comport with constitutional guarantees.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor would not have decided whether the Constitution categorically never requires a retention hearing. She would have answered only the narrower question the Court accepted — which due process test governs retention-hearing claims — and sent the cases back for lower courts to apply it. She argued the majority misread its earlier customs cases, neither of which involved innocent owners or police financial incentives, and that due process doctrine requires case-by-case analysis rather than a blanket rule. She documented widespread abuses in civil forfeiture systems and warned the decision would hamstring lower courts.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The starting legal principle: when police seize personal property like a car subject to civil forfeiture, the government does not need a hearing before taking it — because the car could otherwise be moved or hidden — but must provide a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing so the owner can challenge the government's case.
- The Court looked to two prior rulings to decide whether the Constitution also requires an earlier, separate 'retention hearing' on top of that. United States v. $8,850 (1983) held that forfeiture proceedings must not be unreasonably delayed and supplied a four-factor test — drawn from the criminal speedy-trial context — for judging whether the delay was reasonable: length of delay, reason for delay, whether the owner pushed for a faster hearing, and whether the delay caused harm.
- United States v. Von Neumann (1986) went further, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing 'without more' provides all the process the Constitution requires after personal property is seized for civil forfeiture. The Court read this language as a controlling holding — not mere commentary — that directly foreclosed any claim for a separate preliminary hearing.
- The women argued that the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test — which weighs the private interest at stake, the value of added procedures, and the burden on the government — should govern instead and would require a preliminary hearing. The Court rejected this: $8,850 and Von Neumann were both decided after Mathews and neither applied that balancing test, so those specific precedents already set the governing standard for civil forfeiture.
- The Court also dismissed a comparison to Fourth Amendment rules requiring police to bring arrested people before a judge within 48 hours. Those hearings are non-adversarial and only test probable cause for detention. The women were asking for fully adversarial hearings that could include an 'innocent owner' defense — more procedural protection than the Constitution provides even for the temporary restraint of a person's liberty, which would be an incongruous result.
- Historical practice reinforced the holding: from the founding era through the late twentieth century, federal and state forfeiture laws routinely allowed seized personal property to be held until the final forfeiture hearing without any separate preliminary hearing, and neither the women nor their supporters could identify a single pre-modern statute that required one.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms United States v. $8,850 (461 U. S. 555)
Reaffirmed as the governing standard for measuring whether a civil forfeiture hearing was held within a reasonable time.
Reaffirms United States v. Von Neumann (474 U. S. 242)
Reaffirmed as holding that a timely forfeiture hearing — without any added preliminary hearing — provides all the process the Constitution requires.
Distinguishes Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U. S. 319)
Held not to govern civil forfeiture due process claims because $8,850 and Von Neumann, decided after Mathews, already set the applicable standard.