OCTOBER TERM 2022 · DECIDED JUNE 29, 2023 · 6–3

600 U.S. ___ · No. 20-1199 and 21-707 · Argued October 31, 2022

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Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College

ReversedFinal ruling
affirmative actioncollege admissionsracial equalityequal protectiondiversity in education

Opinion of the Court by Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett

The Supreme Court struck down race-conscious admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina, ruling 6–3 that using an applicant's race as a factor in college admissions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The decision effectively ends affirmative action in college admissions at American universities, overturning nearly 45 years of precedent that allowed schools to consider race in order to build diverse student bodies.

How it got here: District courts upheld both admissions programs after bench trials; the First Circuit affirmed in the Harvard case; the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harvard and certiorari before judgment in UNC, bypassing the Fourth Circuit.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), a nonprofit organization, challenged the admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina. Both schools used race as one factor among many in highly selective processes that considered grades, essays, extracurricular activities, and personal background. Harvard explicitly weighed race at multiple stages, including a final "lop" list that showed each finalist's race. UNC required readers to consider race and allowed it to serve as a significant "plus" in individual cases. SFFA argued these programs unconstitutionally discriminated against Asian American and white applicants.

The question before the Court

Did Harvard's and UNC's college admissions programs — which considered an applicant's race as one factor among many — violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection?

The Court's answer

No — both universities' race-conscious admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found the programs deficient on three independent grounds: the educational benefits they pursued (training future leaders, fostering dialogue, etc.) were too vague and unmeasurable for courts to review under the demanding strict-scrutiny standard; race inevitably functioned as a penalty for students not in favored groups, since admissions seats are finite and a tip for one race is a disadvantage for others; and neither program had a genuine end point — both tracked racial percentages year to year in a way that amounted to unconstitutional racial balancing.

The Court preserved one narrow pathway: universities may still consider how race shaped an applicant's individual life — for instance, an essay about overcoming racial discrimination — as long as the discussion is tied to that person's specific character or contributions, not to the applicant's racial category alone.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

College applicants can no longer receive an admissions boost based on their race at any American university. Schools must now rely entirely on race-neutral methods — such as socioeconomic status, geography, or first-generation status — to build diverse classes. The ruling is expected to reduce the enrollment of Black and Latino students at selective institutions, based on the experience of states that previously banned race-conscious admissions.

What changes now

Harvard and UNC — and every other American college and university — must immediately stop using race as a factor in admissions decisions. Schools may still pursue diversity through race-neutral means: socioeconomic preferences, geographic recruiting, first-generation college status, and similar tools. Applicants may still discuss how their racial identity shaped their lives in essays, but universities cannot use race as a standalone plus factor. The ruling does not cover military academies, which the Court noted may present distinct interests. Experts widely expect a significant decline in Black and Latino enrollment at selective institutions in the near term.

What this does not decide

The ruling explicitly does not apply to military academies, which the Court noted may present "potentially distinct interests." It also does not prohibit applicants from writing about how race affected their individual lives in essays, as long as any admissions benefit is tied to demonstrated personal qualities — not to racial identity alone.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas wrote separately to offer an originalist defense of the 'colorblind Constitution,' arguing the Fourteenth Amendment always forbade all racial classifications regardless of benign intent, and that Grutter was wrongly decided from the start. He detailed the history of the Amendment's enactment to show the framers sought color-blind equality for all citizens. He also argued that race-conscious admissions programs harm their intended beneficiaries through academic 'mismatch' and by stigmatizing the accomplishments of all minority graduates.

Concurrence — Justice Gorsuch

Justice Gorsuch argued that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, read according to its plain text and the Court's own precedent in Bostock v. Clayton County, independently prohibits the universities' race-conscious admissions without any need to reach the constitutional question. He criticized the Bakke precedent for wrongly fusing Title VI with the Equal Protection Clause rather than enforcing Title VI's straightforward prohibition: no person may be subjected to discrimination based on race under any federally funded program, period.

Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh

Justice Kavanaugh wrote to explain that today's decision faithfully applies — rather than departs from — Grutter v. Bollinger. He argued that Grutter's 25-year time limit on race-conscious admissions was a genuine and carefully considered holding, not mere dictum, and that every separate Grutter opinion engaged with it. After roughly 50 years of race-conscious admissions programs and 20 years since Grutter, that limit has now been reached, and equal protection principles require the Court to honor it.

Dissent — Justice Sotomayor

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan (and Justice Jackson as to the UNC case), argued the majority overrules four decades of settled precedent without meeting the demanding standard stare decisis requires. She contended the Equal Protection Clause permits — and Brown v. Board of Education's legacy demands — race-conscious measures in a society still marked by deep racial inequality. She warned the decision will sharply reduce minority enrollment at selective universities, diminish the diversity pipeline to leadership positions across society, and entrench racial segregation in higher education for generations.

Dissent — Justice Jackson

Justice Jackson, writing only as to the UNC case, traced centuries of state-sponsored policies — from slavery and sharecropping through discriminatory federal housing and lending programs — that created today's stubborn race-linked gaps in wealth, health, and educational opportunity. She argued UNC's holistic process accurately assesses individual merit precisely because it considers how race has shaped each applicant's life and opportunities, and that forcing universities to ignore race will widen, not narrow, those inherited gaps and delay the day race stops mattering.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. Under the Equal Protection Clause, any government use of race must survive 'strict scrutiny' — the most demanding constitutional test, requiring both a compelling reason for using race and proof that the use is narrowly tailored (no more than necessary). This standard applies equally to classifications meant to benefit minority groups and those meant to burden them.
  2. The Court accepted that the educational benefits of a diverse student body can qualify as a compelling interest — as held in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) — but found that both universities' stated goals (training future leaders, promoting a marketplace of ideas, preparing engaged citizens, etc.) were too vague and unmeasurable. Courts cannot tell when those goals are reached or when racial preferences can stop, so the programs cannot be meaningfully reviewed under strict scrutiny.
  3. Both programs also failed strict scrutiny because race functioned as an impermissible negative factor. College admissions are zero-sum: awarding a racial tip to some applicants necessarily disadvantages others. The First Circuit found Harvard's use of race resulted in 11% fewer Asian American admissions, and UNC's program similarly reduced admission of students from non-preferred racial groups — a result that cannot be squared with the rule that race may never count against an individual.
  4. Both programs engaged in unconstitutional racial stereotyping by treating race as predictive of what perspectives or contributions an applicant will bring — assuming, for example, that 'a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.' Equal protection forbids the government from judging people as products of their racial group rather than as individuals.
  5. Finally, both programs lacked the 'logical end point' that Grutter required as a precondition for any race-conscious admissions. Their proposed end points — achieving 'meaningful representation' or 'diversity' — amounted in practice to maintaining consistent racial percentages year to year, which the Court has long held constitutes prohibited racial balancing. Neither university had set any sunset date, and Harvard acknowledged its approach to race had not changed in nearly 50 years.
  6. The Court preserved a narrow opening: universities may still consider how race affected an individual applicant's life — through discrimination faced or culture experienced — provided any benefit the school grants flows from the applicant's demonstrated individual qualities such as resilience or leadership, not from their racial identity as such.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Constitutional rule requiring states to treat all people equally under law, prohibiting racial classifications unless they survive the strictest judicial scrutiny.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Federal statute barring racial discrimination in any program or activity that receives federal financial assistance.

Cases affected by this decision

Abrogates Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306)

The majority applies Grutter's own requirements so strictly that no race-conscious admissions program can satisfy them, ending the permission Grutter established.

Distinguishes Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (579 U.S. 365)

The Court says Fisher II upheld a unique 'critical mass' program neither Harvard nor UNC claims to use, so it does not control here.

Reaffirms Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483)

The majority repeatedly invokes Brown's principle that racial separation in education is inherently unequal to support its colorblind rule.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College | SCOTUS Reporter