Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co
The Supreme Court ruled that Norfolk Southern Railway could be sued in Pennsylvania for a former worker's cancer claim, even though neither the worker nor his alleged injuries had any Pennsylvania connection, because the company had long registered to do business there under a state law that treats registration as consent to answer any lawsuit.
The 5-4 decision reaffirms that states may require corporations to accept suit on any claim as the price of doing business within their borders — a ruling likely to shape where injured workers, consumers, and others choose to file lawsuits against large companies.
How it got here: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled the state's registration-based jurisdiction statute unconstitutional; Mallory petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Robert Mallory worked as a freight-car mechanic for Norfolk Southern railroad for nearly 20 years in Ohio and Virginia, where he was exposed to asbestos and other chemicals. After leaving the company, he moved briefly to Pennsylvania before returning to Virginia, where he was diagnosed with cancer. He sued Norfolk Southern in Pennsylvania state court under a federal law allowing railroad workers to recover damages from a negligent employer. His hook for suing in Pennsylvania: the company had registered to do business there since 1998, and Pennsylvania law makes registration equivalent to consent to answer any lawsuit filed in the state.
The question before the Court
Can a state require out-of-state corporations to accept being sued there on any claim — no matter where it arose — as a condition of registering to do business in the state?
The Court's answer
Yes — a state can require out-of-state corporations to consent to being sued there on any claim as a condition of registering to do business, and courts may hold companies to that consent without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court relied on its 1917 ruling in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., which directly controls these facts. Norfolk Southern registered to do business in Pennsylvania in 1998, knowingly agreeing under a state law that expressly links registration to general personal jurisdiction — meaning the company accepted the power of Pennsylvania courts over it on any claim. The Court rejected Norfolk Southern's argument that International Shoe Co. v. Washington, a 1945 landmark ruling allowing courts to exercise power over non-consenting corporations based on their in-state activities, had swept away this older consent-based form of jurisdiction. The Court held that International Shoe added an additional path to jurisdiction; it did not eliminate the pre-existing consent-based path.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Companies that register to do business in states with laws like Pennsylvania's can now be sued there for claims with no connection to that state. This may draw more lawsuits to plaintiff-friendly venues, influence how corporations structure their business registrations, and prompt other states to adopt similar laws — or prompt Congress or courts to set limits on the practice under a different constitutional theory.
What changes now
The case returns to the Pennsylvania courts, where Mallory's lawsuit against Norfolk Southern may now proceed. However, the constitutional story is not over: Justice Alito's separate opinion flagged that Pennsylvania's registration scheme may violate the dormant Commerce Clause by unduly burdening interstate commerce, and that question was not decided by the Supreme Court. Norfolk Southern can raise that challenge on remand, meaning the lawsuit's ultimate fate may depend on a separate constitutional theory.
What this does not decide
The Court explicitly left open whether Pennsylvania's law violates the dormant Commerce Clause — a constitutional doctrine limiting states from burdening interstate commerce — and that challenge remains available on remand. The ruling also declines to say whether any other registration statute, in any other state, on different facts, would produce the same result.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson joined all parts of Justice Gorsuch's opinion and wrote separately to emphasize that personal jurisdiction is an individual, waivable right — confirmed by the Court's 1982 ruling in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee. In her view, Norfolk Southern clearly waived its personal-jurisdiction rights by voluntarily registering under a Pennsylvania statute that expressly linked registration to general jurisdiction. She stressed that there is nothing unique about personal jurisdiction that prevents a corporation from relinquishing it voluntarily, just as defendants can waive other constitutional protections.
Concurrence in part — Justice Alito
Justice Alito joined only the portions of Justice Gorsuch's opinion that directly resolved the due-process question (Parts I and III-B) and agreed that Pennsylvania Fire controls. He wrote separately to flag a concern the majority did not reach: Pennsylvania's registration scheme may violate the dormant Commerce Clause — the constitutional principle limiting states from unduly burdening interstate commerce — by forcing out-of-state companies to accept unlimited litigation exposure as the price of doing business in Pennsylvania. He urged the lower courts to address that question on remand, noting that holding Norfolk Southern to its registration-based consent was not so unfair as to be unconstitutional given its massive Pennsylvania operations.
Dissent — Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Kavanaugh, argued that the majority's consent theory allows states to manufacture personal jurisdiction by simply renaming their long-arm statutes. In her view, the Court's modern decisions — especially International Shoe, Daimler, and Goodyear — firmly established that merely doing business in a state is not enough for general jurisdiction, and the pre-International Shoe decision in Pennsylvania Fire should be treated as having been swept away. She warned that if states take up the Court's invitation, Daimler and Goodyear will be rendered meaningless, leaving specific jurisdiction 'superfluous' for corporations.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The governing question was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars a state from conditioning the right to do business there on a corporation's agreement to be sued in the state's courts on any claim. The Court identified this as a question already answered — not a new constitutional puzzle but a very old one.
- The Court's 1917 precedent, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., unanimously held that a state may require an out-of-state corporation to consent to suit on any claim as a condition of obtaining a license to do business there. A corporation that complies with such a law has voluntarily agreed to that jurisdictional consequence, so holding it to that agreement does not violate due process.
- Pennsylvania's modern registration statute mirrors the Missouri law upheld in Pennsylvania Fire: it expressly provides that 'qualification as a foreign corporation' gives Pennsylvania courts authority over the registrant on any claim, just as over a domestic company. Norfolk Southern registered in 1998, knowing this consequence, and has renewed its registration ever since — agreeing for over two decades to appear in Pennsylvania courts on any suit.
- Norfolk Southern argued that the Court's landmark 1945 ruling in International Shoe Co. v. Washington — which holds that states may exercise jurisdiction over corporations based on their in-state contacts and 'minimum contacts' with the forum — had effectively overruled Pennsylvania Fire. The Court rejected this. International Shoe addressed states' authority over non-consenting corporations and expanded that authority; it did not address, let alone limit, jurisdiction over corporations that had already consented to suit.
- A corporation's right to resist personal jurisdiction is a personal defense that can be waived. When a corporation knowingly registers under a statute that makes registration the equivalent of consent to general jurisdiction, it has waived that defense — just as defendants can waive the right to object to jurisdiction through contract, court appearance, or procedural default.
- Lower courts have no authority to declare a directly applicable Supreme Court precedent implicitly overruled by later decisions — only the Supreme Court itself can overrule its own cases. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did exactly that, treating Pennsylvania Fire as obsolete, its ruling was error and had to be vacated.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. (243 U.S. 93)
Explicitly held to still control and to require the judgment below to be vacated.
Distinguishes International Shoe Co. v. Washington (326 U.S. 310)
Held to govern only jurisdiction over non-consenting corporations, leaving consent-based jurisdiction untouched.