Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co
Headline: States may treat a company’s registration to do business as consent to be sued, allowing Pennsylvania courts to hear out-of-state injury claims against Norfolk Southern despite no local connection.
Holding: The Court held that Pennsylvania’s law making registration to do business a sufficient basis for general jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause and permits Pennsylvania courts to hear Norfolk Southern’s suit.
- Lets states treat corporate registration as consent to be sued on any claim.
- Makes it easier for out-of-state plaintiffs to sue companies where they operate, even without local injuries.
- Leaves open Commerce Clause challenges on remand.
Summary
Background
Robert Mallory is a former Norfolk Southern freight-car mechanic who worked about 20 years in Ohio and Virginia, later lived for a time in Pennsylvania, and was diagnosed with cancer. He sued his former employer under a federal railroad workers’ law in Pennsylvania state court even though he lived in Virginia when the suit was filed and his complaint said exposures happened in Ohio and Virginia. Norfolk Southern is incorporated and headquartered in Virginia but has long-running operations in Pennsylvania and registered there to do business, and Pennsylvania law ties registration to answering any suit in its courts (15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301).
Reasoning
The Court asked whether a State may require out-of-state corporations that register to do business to submit to general suits in the State. Relying on its 1917 decision in Pennsylvania Fire, the majority held that Pennsylvania’s registration-and-consent scheme falls within longstanding precedent and does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court rejected Norfolk Southern’s argument that later cases like International Shoe implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire, vacated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s contrary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Real world impact
The decision means States can in some circumstances treat corporate registration as consent to suit, making it possible for out-of-state plaintiffs to bring claims in States where companies operate even if the harm happened elsewhere. The ruling is not a final merits decision about Mallory’s claim; one Justice noted that dormant Commerce Clause challenges remain for the lower courts to consider on remand.
Dissents or concurrances
A concurrence emphasized waiver and consent as decisive; another concurrence warned of Commerce Clause problems and urged remand to consider them. A dissent argued the ruling clashes with later cases limiting general jurisdiction and warned it lets States reach beyond traditional bounds.
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