Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
The Supreme Court ruled that key protections in the Indian Child Welfare Act do not apply to a biological father who never had physical or legal custody of his child, clearing the way for a South Carolina couple's adoption to proceed.
The decision means a toddler who had lived with her adoptive family for the first two years of her life, then was given to a biological father she had never met, will have her custody dispute sent back for further proceedings under a narrower reading of the federal law.
“The phrase "continued custody" therefore refers to custody that a parent already has (or at least had at some point in the past).”
The majority's core reasoning for why the heightened custody-termination standard did not apply to this father.
How it got here: A South Carolina family court denied the adoption and gave custody to the biological father; the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, and the adoptive couple asked the Supreme Court to review the ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A baby girl who is a small fraction Cherokee was placed for adoption by her birth mother with a non-Indian South Carolina couple after the biological father, who lived far away and had provided no support during the pregnancy, said by text message that he relinquished his parental rights. Months later he contested the adoption, and a state court awarded him custody of the child, who was then 27 months old and had never met him.
The question before the Court
Could a federal Indian child welfare law block a South Carolina couple from adopting a baby, and instead hand her over to a biological father who had never had custody of her?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the two federal provisions the father relied on did not block the adoption, because he had never actually had custody of the child. One provision requires a heightened showing before ending a parent's "continued custody," but the Court read "continued" to mean custody that already exists or once existed, so it does not apply to a parent who never had custody at all. The other provision requires efforts to prevent the "breakup" of an Indian family, which the Court found meaningless where no custodial relationship existed to break up.
The Court also held that a separate provision favoring Indian families in adoptive placements does not apply here, because no other family or relative had formally come forward seeking to adopt the child. The case was sent back to the South Carolina courts for further proceedings under this narrower reading of the law.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling narrows when a federal law meant to protect Indian families can override a state adoption proceeding, affecting biological fathers who never had custody, adoption agencies working with children who qualify as Indian under the Act, and states that must decide how to handle similar custody disputes going forward.
What changes now
The case returns to the South Carolina courts for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's narrower reading of the federal law. The father's parental rights are no longer automatically protected by the two provisions at issue, though the opinion leaves open whether other parts of the law, such as tribal-preference provisions, could still come into play if relatives or tribal members later seek to adopt the child. This is a final merits ruling, not a temporary order.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide whether the father qualifies as a "parent" under the law at all, assuming it for argument's sake. It also left open how the law applies to fathers with visitation rights, fathers who paid child support, or fathers who were deceived about the child's existence — situations the concurring opinion said the Court was not resolving.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's statutory interpretation but wrote separately to argue that reading the law any other way would raise serious constitutional problems. He argued the Indian Commerce Clause, the only plausible constitutional basis for the law, gives Congress power only to regulate trade with organized tribes, not authority to override state adoption and custody law for any person with Indian ancestry.
Concurrence — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer joined the majority but stressed that the Court was deciding no more than necessary, leaving open how the law would apply to fathers with visitation rights, fathers who paid support, or fathers who were deceived about the pregnancy. He also flagged that a separate provision might let a father re-enter the adoption-preference scheme with tribal support, a question he raised without answering.
Dissent — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia joined Justice Sotomayor's dissent except on one point: he disagreed that 'continued custody' must refer only to custody in the past, reasoning it could just as easily mean future custody. He added that the majority's decision unnecessarily diminished the rights of biological parents to raise their own children.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued the majority twisted the statute's text and purpose, reading a single phrase from one subsection to strip an entire class of parents — those who never had custody — of the law's core protections. She warned the ruling would extend to any Indian parent who never had custody, no matter how devoted, and that it contradicted Congress's clear goal of protecting Indian families and tribes. She would have affirmed the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling for the father.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first read the phrase 'continued custody' in the provision requiring a heightened showing before terminating parental rights, concluding that the word 'continued' refers to a pre-existing state — custody a parent already has or once had — rather than custody in the abstract.
- Applying that reading, the Court concluded this heightened-showing requirement cannot apply where the parent never had physical or legal custody in the first place, because there is no pre-existing custodial relationship for a court to evaluate.
- The Court then turned to a second provision requiring remedial efforts to prevent the 'breakup of the Indian family' before parental rights can be terminated, reasoning that 'breakup' means the ending of an existing relationship or entity.
- Because the father never had legal or physical custody and had not been involved with the child, the Court found there was no existing family relationship left to 'break up,' so this remedial-efforts requirement did not apply either.
- The Court supported both readings by pointing to the law's stated purpose — preventing the unwarranted removal of children from intact Indian families — and to the placement of these provisions alongside another that used the same 'continued custody' language.
- Finally, the Court held that a separate provision giving adoption preference to Indian relatives or families did not apply, because no such alternative party had formally petitioned to adopt the child in the state court proceedings.