Cargill, Inc. v. United States

Background

The dispute involves a private landowner, the successor to Leslie Salt Company, who owns a 153-acre tract southeast of San Francisco beside a national wildlife refuge. The company dug basins for salt production and stopped in 1959, leaving shallow basins that form temporary ponds in wet seasons. In 1985 the owner dug a feeder ditch and siltation pond and discharged fill. The Army Corps of Engineers issued a cease-and-desist order under the Clean Water Act. A district court first found no Corps jurisdiction; the Ninth Circuit reversed and, after remand, the lower courts concluded that the presence or potential presence of migratory birds crossing state lines gave the Corps authority.

Reasoning

The central question is whether occasional or potential use of seasonal ponds by migratory birds that cross state lines creates enough of a connection to interstate commerce to justify Corps regulation. Justice Thomas’s dissent argues the Corps relies on a rule treating such waters as 'waters of the United States' and that this stretches the Commerce Clause in light of Lopez. He notes the ponds were never used in commerce, there was no evidence people visited the site to hunt or observe birds, and regulation based solely on bird presence is constitutionally suspect. Because the Supreme Court denied review, the lower-court outcome allowing Corps jurisdiction stands.

Real world impact

The practical result leaves the Corps’ authority to require permits for filling or altering seasonal ponds where migratory birds might land. That affects private landowners, property use decisions, and local land management near wetlands. This denial of review is not a final constitutional ruling; the dissent urged the Court to take the case to resolve broader questions.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Thomas dissented from the denial, arguing the Court should decide whether bird habitat alone can trigger federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.