DECIDED APRIL 6, 2020 · 8–1

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Babb v. Wilkie

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
age discriminationfederal employeesemployment lawworkplace civil rightsgovernment hiring

Opinion of the Court by Justice Alito

The Supreme Court ruled that the federal government violates its age discrimination law whenever age plays any role in a personnel decision — even if the employee would have gotten the same outcome regardless — setting a stricter standard for the government than for private employers.

Federal workers over 40 can now challenge discriminatory treatment during the hiring or promotion process itself, though getting back pay or reinstatement still requires showing that age actually changed the final result.

The plain meaning of the critical statutory language ("made free from any discrimination based on age") demands that personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of age.
Justice Alito

The majority states its core holding on what the federal age discrimination law requires of government personnel decisions.

How it got here: The district court granted summary judgment to the VA; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed under binding circuit precedent; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a split among federal appeals courts.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Noris Babb, a clinical pharmacist in her fifties at a VA medical center in Florida, claimed the agency discriminated against her because of her age — stripping an eligibility designation that would have qualified her for a pay raise, denying her training and clinic positions, and cutting her holiday pay after a reassignment. She pointed to age-related comments by supervisors as evidence that her age had shaped these decisions.

The question before the Court

Does the federal government's age discrimination law require a worker to prove that age was the deciding factor in a personnel decision, or is it enough to show that age played any role in how the decision was made?

The Court's answer

Yes and no. The Court ruled that the federal government violates the age discrimination law whenever age plays any role in a personnel decision — the statutory language requires that such decisions be "made free from any discrimination based on age," meaning the process itself must be untainted. Age need not be the deciding factor that changed the outcome; it is enough that differential treatment based on age occurred somewhere in the decision-making.

However, the relief a worker can actually obtain turns on whether age changed the result. If age influenced the process but not the outcome, the worker can seek injunctive or other forward-looking relief to stop the discriminatory practice. To win back pay, reinstatement, or money damages, the worker must still prove that age was the deciding factor that actually changed the end result of the employment decision.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Millions of federal employees over 40 now have a lower bar for proving an age discrimination violation — they need to show only that age tainted the process, not that it flipped the outcome. This opens the door to more complaints and injunctions against discriminatory federal personnel practices, even when the affected worker ultimately got hired or promoted.

What changes now

The Eleventh Circuit's ruling against Babb is reversed and the case is sent back to the lower courts. The district court must first determine whether Babb can establish a violation of § 633a(a) — that is, whether age tainted any of the VA's personnel decisions. If she succeeds, the district court will then decide what remedy is appropriate: injunctive relief is available if age influenced the process but not the outcome; stronger relief like back pay or reinstatement would require showing age actually changed the result.

What this does not decide

The ruling does not address whether age discrimination in early preliminary steps (before any final decision point) can trigger liability if age played no role at the moment the actual decision was made. The Court explicitly reserved that question. The opinion also does not resolve the full scope of damages when discrimination affected the process but not the final result — the district court must work that out on remand.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Sotomayor

Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority's core holding but wrote separately to flag two points. First, she noted the ruling leaves open claims arising from discriminatory processes — for example, requiring only older applicants to take a computer test could itself be a violation even if the eventual hire was over 40. Second, she suggested damages may sometimes be available even when discrimination was not the deciding factor, such as when an applicant spends money preparing for a discriminatorily administered test.

Dissent — Justice Thomas

This novel "any consideration" standard does serious damage to our interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes and disrupts the settled expectations of federal employers and employees.Thomas summarizes his central objection to the majority's new causation standard for federal-sector age discrimination claims.

Justice Thomas argued the Court should have applied the established default rule that a plaintiff must prove discrimination was the but-for cause of harm, and that the federal-sector ADEA provision's text does not clearly displace that rule. He also criticized the majority's remedial framework — which ties available relief to whether age changed the outcome — as judicially invented without any basis in the statute or in the legal landscape that existed when Congress enacted the provision in 1974. He warned the 'any consideration' standard is unworkable alongside the federal government's many affirmative action and diversity programs, which by definition inject protected characteristics into personnel decisions.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court began with the exact text of the federal-sector ADEA provision: personnel actions 'shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.' The critical task was figuring out what each phrase modifies grammatically — specifically, whether the but-for causation requirement attached to 'discrimination' or to the 'personnel action' itself.
  2. The phrase 'based on age' is an adjectival phrase modifying the noun 'discrimination' — meaning differential treatment must have a but-for connection to age. Crucially, 'based on age' does NOT modify 'personnel actions' directly. So age must be the but-for cause of differential treatment, not necessarily the but-for cause of the final employment outcome.
  3. The phrase 'free from any discrimination' is an adverbial phrase describing HOW a personnel action must be 'made.' If age plays any part in the making of a decision, that decision is not made in a way untainted by age discrimination — even if the final result would have been identical without the age-based consideration. The word 'any' reinforces this broad reach.
  4. The Court distinguished the private-sector ADEA provision (which uses 'because of such individual's age' to modify action verbs tied to end results) and Title VII's anti-retaliation clause — both impose but-for causation on the outcome. The federal-sector provision's unique phrasing focuses on the process of making a decision, not just the result, creating a meaningfully different standard.
  5. On remedies, the Court applied the principle that relief must actually redress the injury. Workers who can show only that age tainted the process — but not that it changed the outcome — can seek injunctive or forward-looking relief. To obtain remedies tied to the employment outcome (back pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages), the worker must separately prove that age was a but-for cause of that outcome.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

ADEA § 633a(a) (29 U.S.C. § 633a(a))

Federal law requiring that government personnel decisions affecting workers 40 and older be made free from any age discrimination.

ADEA § 623(a)(1) (29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1))

The private-sector ADEA provision making it unlawful for employers to take adverse action against workers 'because of' age.

Cases affected by this decision

Distinguishes Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (557 U.S. 167)

Gross interpreted the private-sector ADEA's 'because of age' language, which the Court says has critically different syntax from the federal-sector provision.

Distinguishes Nassar (570 U.S. 338)

Nassar's but-for requirement applied to end-result statutes whose language differs materially from the federal-sector ADEA provision.

Reaffirms Texas v. Lesage (528 U.S. 18)

Lesage's principle that no damages are available when the government would have made the same decision regardless is applied to shape the remedies framework here.

Supreme Court Opinion

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