Murphy v. Collier
The Supreme Court stayed the execution of a Buddhist death-row inmate in Texas after finding that the state let Christian and Muslim chaplains into the execution chamber but barred ministers of other faiths, including his own.
Days later Texas rewrote its policy to bar all outside clergy from the execution room, and two justices wrote separately — one defending the stay as a needed fix for religious inequality, three others dissenting that the request came far too late to justify blocking the execution.
How it got here: Texas trial and appellate courts denied Murphy a stay as untimely; hours before his scheduled execution, he asked the Supreme Court to block it.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Patrick Murphy, a Buddhist inmate convicted of capital murder in a 2000 prison escape that killed a police officer, was scheduled for execution in Texas. Texas's policy let more than 100 prison chaplains — Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Native American — into the execution chamber, but had no Buddhist chaplain, so Murphy's own Buddhist minister could only wait in an adjoining viewing room.
The question before the Court
Could Texas execute a Buddhist inmate without letting a minister of his own faith into the death chamber, when it allowed Christian and Muslim inmates that access?
Why it matters
The ruling pressured Texas to overhaul how it handles clergy access during executions nationwide, prompting the state to bar all outside ministers rather than choose among faiths. It also set up a sharp disagreement among the justices over how much delay by death-row inmates' lawyers should be tolerated before a stay is refused, a recurring issue in capital cases.
What changes now
Days after the stay, Texas changed its policy to bar all outside clergy — not just those of certain faiths — from the execution chamber, mooting the specific discrimination problem in Murphy's case. The underlying free-exercise and RLUIPA claims about clergy access were not resolved on the merits, and this was not a final decision on Murphy's broader religious-liberty claims.
What this does not decide
The opinions do not decide whether Texas's revised policy of excluding all outside clergy from the execution chamber satisfies RLUIPA or the Free Exercise Clause, nor do they resolve Murphy's or Ray's underlying religious-liberty claims on the merits.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
“That discriminatory state policy violated the Constitution's guarantee of religious equality.”Kavanaugh explains why Texas's original chaplain policy was unconstitutional.
Kavanaugh defended the March 28 stay, arguing Texas's chaplain policy discriminated among religions in violation of religious-equality principles, and that Texas's quick five-day fix confirmed the stay was well-timed. He distinguished Murphy's case from Dunn v. Ray, noting Ray never raised an equal-treatment claim and gave far less notice than Murphy did, so denying Ray's stay while granting Murphy's was consistent.
Dissent — Justice Alito
“If the tactics of Murphy's attorneys in this case are not inexcusably dilatory, it is hard to know what the concept means.”Alito's central objection that Murphy's lawyers waited far too long to raise the claim.
Alito argued the Court should have denied Murphy's stay because his lawyers inexcusably delayed for years before raising a claim they could have brought long before the execution date, undermining the state's interest in finality and orderly proceedings. He also argued the underlying religious-liberty claims were far more complicated than the concurrence suggested, since prisoners' rights are limited under Turner v. Safley and the record was too thin to resolve the claims on an emergency basis.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The dispute centered on whether Texas's practice of admitting chaplains of some faiths into the execution chamber while excluding ministers of other faiths amounted to unconstitutional religious discrimination, a form of unequal treatment courts scrutinize closely.
- In deciding whether to pause the execution, the Court weighed the traditional equitable factors for a stay: whether there is a reasonable chance the Court would eventually review the issue, a fair prospect the inmate could win, and whether the balance of harms favored delay.
- The concurrence distinguished this case from Dunn v. Ray, a similar dispute decided weeks earlier where a Muslim inmate's stay was denied, noting that Ray never raised an equal-treatment argument and gave the state only about ten days' notice, while Murphy raised the equal-treatment claim and gave Texas roughly a month's notice.
- Because Texas had ample time to address the unequal treatment but never responded to Murphy's request, the Court concluded the equities favored pausing the execution unless the state gave his Buddhist minister comparable access to the chamber.
- The dissent applied the same stay factors but concluded that Murphy's lawyers had inexcusably delayed asserting a claim that had been available to them for years, so the strong presumption against last-minute stays should have controlled instead.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Dunn v. Ray (139 S. Ct. 661)
Kavanaugh explains Ray's stay was properly denied because, unlike Murphy, Ray never raised an equal-treatment claim and gave far less notice.