Maracich v. Spears
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal privacy law's litigation exception does not cover lawyers using DMV records to solicit new clients, even when the solicitation is tied to an existing lawsuit.
Because the lower court never asked whether the lawyers' mass mailings were predominantly aimed at drumming up business rather than investigating the case, the Court sent the case back for that inquiry, potentially exposing the lawyers to significant civil liability.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled for the lawyers; the Fourth Circuit affirmed on different grounds; the car buyers asked the Supreme Court to review the ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Lawyers suing South Carolina car dealerships for allegedly illegal fees got names and addresses of thousands of car buyers from the state DMV, using a public-records request that cited an exception for litigation-related purposes. They mailed over 34,000 letters describing the lawsuit and inviting recipients to join as plaintiffs. Some of those car buyers then sued the lawyers for misusing their private DMV information.
The question before the Court
Could lawyers use car buyers' private DMV information, obtained for a lawsuit, to send mass mailings drumming up new clients for that suit?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that soliciting new clients is not a use "in connection with" litigation or "investigation in anticipation of litigation" under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act's litigation exception, even when the solicitation is tied to a real, pending lawsuit. Reading the exception to cover client recruitment would gut the law's separate rule requiring people's express consent before their DMV information is used for solicitation.
Because the lower appeals court had excused the letters simply because solicitation was "inextricably intertwined" with legitimate litigation activity, the Court sent the case back. On remand, courts must ask whether recruiting new clients was the predominant purpose of the letters; if so, the lawyers are not shielded by the litigation exception, regardless of how helpful the solicitation was to the underlying case.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Attorneys nationwide who rely on state DMV records to find plaintiffs for lawsuits will need to be far more careful about sending mass solicitation letters, since doing so without recipients' consent can now trigger steep statutory damages under a federal privacy law, even when a real lawsuit is already pending.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, which must determine whether the lawyers' letters were predominantly aimed at soliciting new clients rather than investigating the case. If solicitation was the main purpose, the lawyers could face liability, including steep statutory damages, for tens of thousands of letters sent without recipients' consent. The courts may also still consider a separate government-function defense the lawyers raised but which was not addressed by this decision.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the lawyers' letters actually violated the law — only that solicitation itself falls outside the litigation exception. It also left open whether a separate exception for government functions might still protect the lawyers, and did not address how damages should ultimately be calculated.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Ginsburg
“This Court’s holding, exposing respondents not only to astronomical liquidated damages, §2724(b)(1), but to criminal fines as well, §2723(a), is scarcely what Congress ordered in enacting the DPPA.”Ginsburg's warning that the ruling exposes lawyers to unwarranted, severe liability.
Justice Ginsburg argued the lawyers' use of DMV data fell squarely within the plain text of the litigation exception because it was tied to a real, ongoing lawsuit with identified parties on both sides. She said the majority invented a solicitation-specific limit found nowhere in the statute, that the resulting 'predominant purpose' test would be unworkable for lower courts and lawyers alike, and that the rule of lenity should resolve any ambiguity against imposing massive civil and potential criminal liability on lawyers who followed state ethics rules.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the DPPA's litigation exception, which allows use of DMV records 'in connection with' a lawsuit or 'investigation in anticipation of litigation,' as needing a limiting principle, since read too broadly it would swallow the law's general ban on disclosing private DMV information.
- Because the exception carves out an exception to a privacy-protecting statute, the Court applied the interpretive rule that exceptions to a general protective rule are read narrowly so the underlying protection still does most of the work.
- The Court distinguished a lawyer's business-getting activity (soliciting new clients) from a lawyer's role as an officer of the court, noting that state bar rules already treat solicitation as separate, specially regulated conduct distinct from litigation tasks like serving papers or investigating facts.
- The Court reasoned that a separate provision of the same law, which allows bulk solicitation only with a person's express consent, would be undermined if the litigation exception could be stretched to cover solicitation without any consent requirement.
- Applying these principles, the Court held that sending mass letters whose predominant purpose is recruiting new clients is not protected 'investigation' or a permissible litigation-related use, even where a real lawsuit is already underway.
- Because the lower appeals court had excused the lawyers' letters as an exempt use without asking whether recruiting clients was their main goal, the Court concluded that question must be answered before liability could be resolved.