Bradley v. Fisher
The Court ruled that a judge cannot be sued for damages over a judicial act — here, striking a lawyer from the roll of attorneys after the lawyer allegedly threatened him — even if the judge acted improperly or in excess of his authority.
The decision establishes that judges of courts with general jurisdiction are shielded from civil liability for their judicial acts, even acts later found erroneous, so long as the court had general authority over the subject matter, protecting judicial independence from being undermined by lawsuits from disappointed litigants.
“judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”
The Court's core holding establishing broad judicial immunity.
How it got here: Bradley sued Fisher in a trial court, which ruled for Fisher after excluding certain evidence; Bradley brought the case to the Supreme Court on writ of error.
The Case in Depth
What happened
During the 1867 trial of John Surratt for conspiring in Lincoln's assassination, defense attorney Joseph Bradley allegedly confronted and threatened the presiding judge, David Fisher, after a court recess. Once the jury deadlocked, Fisher's Criminal Court struck Bradley's name from its roll of attorneys. Bradley sued Fisher personally, claiming the order effectively disbarred him from the broader Supreme Court of the District and caused him damages.
The question before the Court
Could a criminal-trial judge be personally sued for striking a defense lawyer's name from the roll of attorneys after a courtroom confrontation?
Why it matters
The ruling protects judges nationwide from being sued personally every time a disgruntled litigant or lawyer disagrees with a judicial decision, including decisions to discipline or remove attorneys. It means lawyers punished by a judge, even through a flawed process, generally cannot recover damages from that judge and must instead seek other remedies like appeal or impeachment.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision affirming judgment for the judge; there is no remand. The ruling settles, for purposes of this dispute, that Bradley cannot recover damages from Fisher, and it becomes a foundational statement of judicial immunity that later courts would apply broadly to shield judges from civil suits over their official acts, however erroneous or ill-motivated those acts might have been.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the underlying order striking Bradley from the roll was procedurally proper \u2014 it acknowledged the judge erred by not giving Bradley notice and a hearing first. It decided only that this error did not expose the judge to personal liability in a civil suit.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Davis
“If he did so, he is, in my opinion, subject to suit the same as a private person would be under like circumstances.”The dissent's view that malicious or corrupt judges should not be immune.
Justice Davis agreed that judges are generally immune for judicial acts within their jurisdiction, and even for acts in excess of jurisdiction absent malice or corruption. But he would allow a suit to proceed where a judge acted both in excess of jurisdiction and maliciously or corruptly, treating such a judge as subject to suit like any private person. He also objected to the majority reaching the merits of the underlying controversy, which he believed the record did not present for review.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court distinguished between a judge acting in excess of jurisdiction (still protected) and a judge acting with a complete absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter (not protected), a line that determines whether judicial immunity applies.
- It held that judges of courts of superior or general authority are immune from civil suits for their judicial acts even when those acts exceed their jurisdiction, and even when the acts are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly — rejecting a narrower exception suggested in an earlier decision, Randall v. Brigham.
- The Criminal Court of the District, as a court of general criminal jurisdiction, had authority to admit and remove attorneys practicing before it, so the order striking Bradley from its roll was a judicial act within that general subject-matter authority, not a usurped power.
- Although the judge should have given Bradley notice and a chance to explain before removing him — a requirement of natural justice — that procedural defect made the order erroneous but did not strip it of its character as a judicial act.
- Because the act remained judicial and within the court's general jurisdiction, the judge could not be held personally liable in a civil suit for it, regardless of how the underlying facts about the confrontation were characterized.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Randall v. Brigham (7 Wallace, 523)
Removed the earlier suggestion that judges could be sued when acts in excess of jurisdiction were done maliciously or corruptly.
Reaffirms Ex parte Bradley (7 Wallace, 364)
Relies on this earlier ruling that the Supreme Court of the District had no power to punish Bradley for conduct before the separate Criminal Court.