OCTOBER TERM 2012 · DECIDED MAY 28, 2013 · 5–4

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McQuiggin v. Perkins

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
habeas corpusactual innocencewrongful convictioncriminal appealsstatute of limitations

Opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg

The Supreme Court ruled that a convincing claim of actual innocence can allow a state prisoner to pursue a federal habeas petition even after the one-year filing deadline has passed, extending a rule that previously applied only to procedural roadblocks.

The Court stressed that this 'actual innocence' escape hatch is meant to be rare and demanding, and that judges should weigh how long a prisoner waited to come forward as a sign of whether the new evidence is believable, sending the case back for further review under that standard.

We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations.
Justice Ginsburg

The Court's core holding extending the actual-innocence gateway to statute-of-limitations cases.

How it got here: A federal district court denied Perkins' habeas petition as untimely; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding actual-innocence claims need not show diligence; Michigan sought Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Floyd Perkins was convicted of murdering his friend Rodney Henderson in Flint, Michigan, based largely on the testimony of Damarr Jones, who was with them that night. Years after his conviction became final, Perkins gathered sworn statements from three people pointing to Jones, not himself, as the actual killer, including accounts of Jones confessing and disposing of bloodstained clothing.

The question before the Court

Can a state prisoner get around the one-year deadline for filing a federal habeas petition by presenting new evidence that convincingly shows he is innocent?

Why it matters

Prisoners who discover new evidence of their innocence years after conviction now have a path into federal court even if they missed the usual filing deadline, so long as the evidence is strong enough that no reasonable juror would have convicted them. States must now litigate the merits of some claims they otherwise could have dismissed as simply too late, though the Court says most such claims will still fail.

What changes now

The case returns to the lower courts. Because the district court had already concluded Perkins' evidence did not meet the demanding actual-innocence standard, the Supreme Court said that conclusion should generally control unless the Sixth Circuit finds a reason to revisit it. This is a final ruling on the legal question presented, though Perkins' individual claim still requires further proceedings below.

What this does not decide

The Court did not create a general right to bring innocence claims whenever convenient — it emphasized that qualifying claims are rare and the evidentiary bar is demanding. It also did not resolve whether a prisoner can win habeas relief based purely on a freestanding innocence claim unconnected to any other constitutional violation.

Concurrences and dissents

How the Justices voted

Majority (1). Justice Ginsburg (author).

Dissent (4). Justice Scalia (author), joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.

Dissent — Justice Scalia

The Constitution vests legislative power only in Congress, which never enacted the exception the Court creates today. That inconvenient truth resolves this case.Scalia's central objection that the majority lacked authority to override the statutory deadline.

Justice Scalia argued the Court had no power to invent an exception to a clear statutory deadline that Congress wrote into AEDPA. He distinguished the innocence exception's origins as a tool for softening judge-made barriers (like procedural default) from an attempt to override an actual statute, calling that a breach of the separation of powers. He noted Congress had already built a narrower innocence exception into two neighboring provisions, showing it deliberately chose not to create a broader one for the filing deadline.

Dissent in part — Justice Alito

Justice Alito joined Justice Scalia's dissent only as to its first three parts, agreeing that the Court lacked authority to create an atextual actual-innocence exception to the statute of limitations, but did not join the dissent's final section responding to the majority's footnoted rebuttal. Read the full partial dissent

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court examined its prior 'miscarriage of justice' exception, under which a convincing showing of actual innocence lets a prisoner get past procedural obstacles — like missed deadlines or repeat petitions — that would otherwise block a habeas claim from being heard on the merits.
  2. The Court found nothing in the text of the federal habeas filing deadline that clearly blocks courts from continuing to use this exception, noting that when Congress wanted to limit the exception for certain kinds of claims (like second habeas petitions), it said so explicitly and imposed a tougher 'clear and convincing evidence' standard there.
  3. Because Congress narrowed the exception only for those specific situations, the Court reasoned that the ordinary, less restrictive innocence exception must still apply to a first-time habeas petition filed after the ordinary deadline.
  4. The Court rejected the idea that a prisoner must first prove he acted diligently before even being allowed to make an innocence argument, reasoning that requiring diligence up front would make the innocence exception meaningless for the very prisoners who most need it.
  5. Instead, the Court held that how long a prisoner waited to present new evidence should be treated as one factor a judge weighs in deciding whether the evidence is credible enough to meet the demanding standard that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.
  6. Applying that framework, the Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's earlier conclusion that Perkins' evidence fell short of that demanding standard.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)

Sets the one-year deadline for state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)

Starts the filing clock from when new evidence could have been found with due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)

Lets a second habeas petition proceed only with clear and convincing new innocence evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)

Limits when federal courts can hold evidentiary hearings for state prisoners' habeas claims.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Schlup v. Delo (513 U.S. 298)

The Court relies on Schlup's demanding no-reasonable-juror standard as the test for actual-innocence claims.

Reaffirms House v. Bell (547 U.S. 518)

The Court reaffirms House's explanation that timing bears on the reliability of innocence evidence.

Reaffirms Holland v. Florida (560 U.S. 631)

The Court relies on Holland's rule that courts won't assume Congress erased traditional equitable habeas powers without a clear statement.

Supreme Court Opinion

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