Millbrook v. United States
The Court ruled that federal prisoners can sue the government over assault and battery by correctional officers even when the misconduct did not happen during a search, seizure, or arrest, so long as the officer was acting within the scope of the job.
The decision resolves a split among appeals courts over how narrowly to read a key exception in the federal law that lets people sue the government for certain wrongs, and it removes a legal roadblock that had shielded prison officers accused of sexual assault and abuse from federal lawsuits.
How it got here: A federal trial court granted the government summary judgment, the Third Circuit affirmed under its own precedent, and the Supreme Court took the case to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Kim Millbrook, a federal prisoner, alleged that Bureau of Prisons correctional officers forced him to perform oral sex, choked him, and threatened to kill him while in custody. He sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for assault, battery, and negligence, seeking compensation for his injuries.
The question before the Court
Does a federal law protecting officers from certain intentional-tort lawsuits only apply when the officer was in the middle of a search, seizure, or arrest?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the law enforcement proviso is not limited to misconduct occurring during a search, seizure of evidence, or arrest. Instead, it covers any of six listed intentional torts, including assault and battery, committed by a qualifying law enforcement officer acting within the scope of employment, regardless of what specific task the officer was performing at the time.
The Court based this on the statute's plain text: the reference to searches, seizures, and arrests appears only in a separate definition describing which officers count as 'investigative or law enforcement officers,' not in any limit on the type of activity covered. Because Congress did not add language restricting the waiver to law-enforcement or investigative activity, the Court declined to read that limitation into the statute itself.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Federal prisoners and others harmed by law enforcement officers gain a clearer path to sue the government for assault, battery, false arrest, and similar intentional wrongs, even outside the context of an actual search or arrest. Prison officials and other federal law enforcement agencies now face potential liability for on-the-job misconduct more broadly than some appeals courts had allowed.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts for further proceedings under the broader reading of the law. Millbrook's assault and battery claims can now proceed on the merits rather than being barred solely because the misconduct did not occur during a search, seizure, or arrest. The ruling also settles the interpretation of this FTCA provision nationwide, ending the disagreement among federal appeals courts.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the correctional officers actually committed the alleged assault, whether they were acting within the scope of their employment, or whether they qualified as law enforcement officers — those points were conceded by the government and not before the Court.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court examined the FTCA's 'law enforcement proviso,' which restores the government's liability for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, when committed by an 'investigative or law enforcement officer.'
- The Court read the proviso's plain text: it applies whenever a claim involves one of the six listed torts and the acts occurred while the officer was acting within the scope of employment, as required by a separate cross-referenced provision.
- The Court found nothing in the statute limiting the waiver to conduct occurring during an actual search, seizure of evidence, or arrest — those terms appear only in a separate definition describing which officers qualify, not what activities are covered.
- The Court concluded that the statute ties liability to an officer's legal authority and job status, not to whether the officer happened to be executing a specific law-enforcement task at the moment of the misconduct.
- Because Congress could have written a narrower rule limiting the waiver to law-enforcement or investigative activity but did not, the Court declined to add that limitation itself, and held the broader reading of the statute controls.