Betterman v. Montana
The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy trial only covers the period from arrest or charge through conviction, not the time a defendant waits to be sentenced afterward.
A Montana man who spent over 14 months in jail between his guilty plea and his sentencing could not use the speedy trial right to challenge that wait, though the Court left open whether a due-process claim might work in a future case.
“The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, however, does not extend beyond conviction, which terminates the presumption of innocence.”
The Court's core holding that the speedy trial guarantee ends at conviction.
How it got here: Betterman appealed his sentence, and the Montana Supreme Court ruled the speedy trial right doesn't cover sentencing delay; he then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Brandon Betterman missed a court date on domestic assault charges and was charged with bail jumping. After he pleaded guilty, he sat in jail for more than 14 months before being sentenced, largely because of delays in preparing his presentence report and scheduling a hearing. He argued the wait violated his right to a speedy trial.
The question before the Court
Does the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee protect a defendant from a long delay between a guilty plea and sentencing?
The Court's answer
No — the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee protects the accused only from arrest or indictment through conviction, and it stops applying once a defendant has pleaded guilty or been found guilty at trial. Betterman's 14-month wait for sentencing therefore fell outside the Clause's protection, because the presumption of innocence that the speedy trial right is designed to protect ends at conviction.
The Court noted that a defendant facing an unreasonably long sentencing delay may still have other options, including a claim under the Due Process Clause in an appropriate case. But because Betterman raised only a Sixth Amendment claim and never preserved a due process argument, the Court expressed no view on how such a claim would be evaluated.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Defendants who face long waits between conviction and sentencing cannot rely on the Speedy Trial Clause to get their charges dismissed. They must instead depend on court rules, state statutes, and — potentially, in an appropriate future case — the more flexible protections of the Due Process Clause, which offers no automatic dismissal remedy.
What changes now
The Montana Supreme Court's judgment affirming Betterman's conviction and sentence stands, and this is a final ruling on the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim. The Court left open — for a future case where the issue is properly raised and preserved — what legal test would apply to a claim that a sentencing delay violates the Due Process Clause instead.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether or how the Due Process Clause might protect defendants against unreasonably long sentencing delays, since Betterman never raised that claim. It also did not decide whether the speedy trial right applies to bifurcated sentencing proceedings involving fact-finding on aggravating factors, such as in capital cases.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Sotomayor
“I write separately to emphasize that the question is an open one.”Sotomayor stresses that the proper due-process test for sentencing delay remains undecided.
Justice Sotomayor agreed that Betterman's Sixth Amendment claim fails but wrote to stress that the proper test for a due-process challenge to sentencing delay remains open. She suggested the four-factor Barker v. Wingo test used for speedy trial claims could sensibly be adapted to sentencing delays, since it is flexible enough to account for differences between trial and sentencing.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, agreed with the majority but declined to endorse Sotomayor's suggestion that the Barker factors should govern due-process sentencing-delay claims. He argued the Due Process Clause might instead be satisfied by adequate state remedies like mandamus or statutory limits, and that the Court should wait for a case that actually presents the issue before choosing a test.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court identified three phases of a criminal case — investigation, the period from arrest/charge through conviction, and post-conviction sentencing — and explained that different constitutional and statutory safeguards apply at each phase.
- It reasoned that the Speedy Trial Clause exists to protect the presumption of innocence, since a person who has not yet been convicted is presumed innocent and should not languish under an unresolved charge.
- Because a defendant's presumption of innocence ends once they are convicted or plead guilty, the Court concluded that the constitutional interest the Speedy Trial Clause protects no longer exists at the sentencing stage.
- The Court supported this reading with the historical and textual understanding that 'accused' meant someone not yet convicted, and that 'trial' was traditionally understood as distinct from the later 'judgment' or sentencing.
- The Court also noted that the sole remedy for a speedy trial violation — dismissal of charges — fits a pre-conviction focus, since it would be an unjustified windfall to vacate a valid conviction just because sentencing was delayed.
- Having concluded the Speedy Trial Clause does not reach this stage, the Court identified other safeguards against sentencing delay, such as court rules requiring sentencing 'without unnecessary delay' and the more flexible protections of the Due Process Clause, without deciding how a due process claim would be evaluated.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Barker v. Wingo (407 U.S. 514)
The Court relies on Barker's reasoning about the harms of pretrial detention to explain the scope of the speedy trial right.