United States v. Kwai Fun Wong. United States
The Court ruled that the Federal Tort Claims Act's filing deadlines are ordinary time limits, not strict jurisdictional walls, so judges can excuse a late filing when a person had a good reason for missing the deadline.
The decision resolves a split among lower courts and means people suing the federal government for injuries won't automatically lose their case just because they filed a few days or weeks late, as long as they were diligent and faced genuine obstacles.
“The time limits in the FTCA are just time limits, nothing more.”
The majority's summary conclusion that the deadlines don't strip courts of jurisdiction.
How it got here: Lower courts split on tolling; the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in Wong and applying that ruling in June, held the deadlines aren't jurisdictional, and the government sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Kwai Fun Wong claimed immigration officials falsely imprisoned her for five days in 1999 and filed her federal lawsuit a few weeks after a six-month deadline while a judge was still deciding whether to let her amend her complaint. Marlene June sued after a highway barrier failure killed Andrew Booth in a 2005 crash, but she filed her claim against the Federal Highway Administration more than five years later, after learning the agency had approved the barrier despite knowing it wasn't properly crash tested.
The question before the Court
If someone misses one of the government-claims deadlines in the Federal Tort Claims Act for a good reason, can a court still excuse the late filing?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that both of the FTCA's filing deadlines (the two-year deadline to file with the agency and the six-month deadline to sue in court afterward) are ordinary time limits, not jurisdictional walls, so they can be paused for a good reason. The government argued the deadlines' strict "forever barred" wording, borrowed from an older law that courts had always treated as jurisdictional, showed Congress meant the same for the FTCA.
The Court disagreed, explaining that Congress must clearly say a deadline strips courts of power before courts will read it that way, and nothing in the FTCA's text, structure, or history does so. Because the deadlines don't take away a court's authority to hear a case, judges may excuse a late filing when someone diligently pursued her rights but faced extraordinary obstacles beyond her control.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People injured by federal employees or federal negligence — like a woman falsely imprisoned by immigration officials or a family suing over a poorly designed highway barrier — can now ask a court to overlook a missed filing deadline if they can show they tried hard and were blocked by real obstacles, rather than being shut out automatically.
What changes now
Both cases return to the lower courts. In Wong's case, the Ninth Circuit's finding that tolling was justified stands. In June's case, the district court must now decide, applying the ordinary tolling standard, whether her specific circumstances — including her claim that the government concealed key facts — justify excusing her late filing. This is a final merits ruling on the legal question, though factual tolling determinations continue below.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Marlene June is actually entitled to equitable tolling on the facts of her case — only that the deadline can legally be tolled. That factual question goes back to the district court to resolve.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Kagandelivered (author).
Dissent — Justice Alito
“"Shall be forever barred" is not generally understood to mean "should be allowed sometimes."”The dissent's argument that the statute's absolute language leaves no room for tolling.
Justice Alito argued the FTCA's deadlines are jurisdictional and allow no tolling at all, because Congress borrowed the exact 'shall be forever barred' language from the Tucker Act, which courts had treated as jurisdictional for over a century before the FTCA was written. He argued Congress meant to import that established meaning, and even if not jurisdictional, the absolute wording shows Congress meant to prohibit tolling regardless. He would have reversed and enforced the deadlines strictly.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied its established presumption that time limits on lawsuits against the government can be paused for good reason (equitable tolling) unless Congress clearly said otherwise, a rule from a 1990 case called Irwin.
- To overcome that presumption, the government needed to show Congress made the deadline 'jurisdictional' — meaning a court has no power at all to hear a late claim, no matter how good the excuse. The Court has said this requires a clear statement from Congress, not just a strict-sounding deadline.
- The Court found the FTCA's text simply says late claims 'shall be forever barred,' language that speaks only to whether a claim is timely, not to a court's power to hear it, and the deadline provision is written in a separate part of the law from the provision granting courts jurisdiction over these claims.
- The Court rejected the government's argument that identical 'forever barred' language in an older law, the Tucker Act, proved Congress meant the FTCA deadline to be jurisdictional too, noting the Court had previously said that same phrase does not carry special jurisdictional weight and has allowed tolling under similarly worded statutes.
- The Court also rejected the argument that all older deadlines conditioning a waiver of the government's immunity from suit were automatically understood as jurisdictional in 1946, noting it had already rejected that reasoning for a similarly-aged law in the Irwin case.
- Because Congress gave no clear signal that the deadlines strip courts of power, the Court concluded the FTCA's two filing deadlines are ordinary time limits that can be tolled when a person diligently pursued her rights but faced extraordinary obstacles.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs (498 U.S. 89)
The Court relied on Irwin's rule that suits against the government presumptively allow tolling unless Congress clearly says otherwise.
Distinguishes John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States (552 U.S. 130)
The Court said stare decisis kept the Tucker Act deadline jurisdictional, but that reasoning doesn't apply to the FTCA, which had no prior ruling.