Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach
The Supreme Court ruled that Fane Lozman's floating home was not a "vessel" under federal maritime law, because nothing about its design showed it was meant to carry people or things over water in any practical way.
The decision narrows when a floating structure counts as a ship for purposes of federal admiralty law, meaning cities, marinas, and lenders now have a clearer test for telling houseboats and floating homes apart from vessels subject to maritime liens and jurisdiction.
“We believe that a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, would not consider it to be designed to any practical degree for carrying people or things on water.”
The Court's core test for deciding whether a floating structure counts as a vessel.
How it got here: The district court found the home a "vessel," ruled for the city, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed; Lozman asked the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split over the term "capable."
The Case in Depth
What happened
Fane Lozman bought a 60-by-12-foot floating home—a plywood house with French doors, kept afloat by an empty bilge space—and had it towed to various marinas before docking it at a marina owned by the city of Riviera Beach. After disputes and failed eviction efforts, the city sued the floating home itself in federal court, seeking a maritime lien for unpaid dockage fees and damages for trespass.
The question before the Court
Was a floating home—a plywood house with no motor, rudder, or steering, kept afloat by an empty bilge and towed occasionally—a "vessel" under federal law?
The Court's answer
No — the Supreme Court ruled that Lozman's floating home was not a "vessel" under federal law. The Court held that a structure only counts as a vessel if a reasonable observer, looking at its physical features and how it has actually been used, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water. Lozman's home had no rudder, no steering, no power generation of its own, and looked like an ordinary house inside.
The Court also rejected the city's fallback argument that the home had actually been used for water transportation, since it moved only a handful of times over seven years and carried nothing but its own furnishings and the owner's belongings. Because neither its design nor its actual use showed a real transportation purpose, the home fell outside the statutory definition, and the lower court's ruling was reversed.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Floating-home owners moored at marinas will generally no longer be subject to admiralty lawsuits, maritime liens, or Coast Guard vessel-safety inspections. Marinas, lenders, and local governments dealing with houseboats and floating homes gain a more predictable, physical-characteristics-based test for deciding whether a structure counts as a ship under federal law.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision reversing the Eleventh Circuit. Because the home had already been destroyed after being sold at auction, the case proceeds on the bond the city posted to secure Lozman's monetary interest, meaning he can seek compensation without the home itself being available. No remand for further factfinding was ordered, despite the dissent's request. Lower courts applying the "vessel" definition will now use the reasonable-observer, practical-design test the Court announced.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide that all floating homes are automatically non-vessels, nor did it disturb precedents finding self-propelled houseboats or other watercraft with genuine transportation features to be vessels. It also left open how the test applies to structures later altered or used differently than Lozman's.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
“The majority fails to explain how a craft that apparently did carry people and things over water for long distances was not “practically capable” of maritime transport.”The dissent's objection that the majority's reasoning was internally inconsistent.
Justice Sotomayor agreed that ownership intent shouldn't matter and that purpose is relevant, but argued the majority invented an unnecessary and vague "reasonable observer" test that improperly relies on irrelevant aesthetic features like windows and doors. She contended the record was too underdeveloped to know whether Lozman's home had a genuine transportation function, especially given its documented long-distance tows, and would have remanded for further factfinding rather than declaring it a non-vessel outright.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court focused on the statutory phrase "capable of being used ... as a means of transportation on water," holding that "capable" means practically, not merely theoretically, capable — a standard drawn from the Court's earlier decision in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.
- Building on that practical-capability standard, the Court announced that a structure counts as a vessel only if a reasonable observer, looking at its physical features and how it has actually been used, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water — an objective test that excludes the owner's subjective intentions.
- Applying that test to the facts, the Court found Lozman's home lacked a rudder or steering mechanism, had an unraked hull sitting low in the water, could not generate its own electricity, and looked like an ordinary house inside — features showing no practical design for water transport.
- The Court distinguished this case from Stewart's dredge, which regularly carried a crew and equipment over water as part of its work, and instead likened it to Evansville v. Chero Cola's wharfboat, which merely sat moored at a dock and was not designed to carry cargo from place to place.
- The Court also rejected the city's argument that the home's actual voyages under tow — carrying only its own furnishings and the owner's belongings a handful of times over seven years — amounted to genuine transportation use, concluding this was far too little to satisfy the statute.
- Having found no objective evidence of a transportation purpose or sufficient actual use, the Court concluded the floating home fell outside the statutory definition of "vessel."
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co. (271 U. S. 19)
The Court relied on this case's finding that a wharfboat wasn't a vessel to support its own reasoning.
Reaffirms Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co. (543 U. S. 481)
The Court applied and clarified this precedent's practical-versus-theoretical capability standard.