Blueford v. Arkansas
The Supreme Court ruled that a man charged with murdering a child can be retried on capital and first-degree murder charges, even though the jury foreperson had reported the jury was unanimously against convicting him of those crimes before it deadlocked on a lesser charge and was discharged.
The Court held that the foreperson's mid-deliberation report was not a final verdict of acquittal, and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by declaring a mistrial instead of asking for a partial verdict, so the double jeopardy protection against being tried twice does not apply here.
“The foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of anything.”
The majority's core reason for rejecting the acquittal argument.
How it got here: A trial court denied Blueford's motion to dismiss the murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed on interlocutory appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Alex Blueford was charged with capital murder after his girlfriend's one-year-old son died from a head injury while in his care. Arkansas alleged Blueford intentionally caused the injury; Blueford said it was an accident. The jury was instructed to consider capital murder, then first-degree murder, then manslaughter, then negligent homicide in order, convicting on one or acquitting on all.
The question before the Court
If a jury reports it unanimously voted against guilt on the top charges but then deadlocks and is discharged, can prosecutors retry the defendant on those top charges?
The Court's answer
No — the Supreme Court ruled that Blueford can be retried on the murder charges. The jury foreperson's mid-deliberation report that jurors were unanimously against guilt on those charges wasn't a final verdict, because deliberations continued afterward and nothing stopped jurors from reconsidering their earlier votes.
The Court also rejected the argument that the trial judge should have offered new partial-verdict forms before declaring a mistrial. Judges have never been required to try particular fixes for a deadlocked jury, so declaring a mistrial here was not an abuse of discretion, and a second trial does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Prosecutors in jurisdictions that use step-by-step 'acquittal-first' jury instructions can retry defendants on top charges even after jurors report voting unanimously against those charges, so long as deliberations continue afterward. Defendants gain no double-jeopardy shield from such informal, mid-deliberation reports unless a final verdict is actually recorded.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, not a temporary order. Arkansas can now retry Blueford on all four original charges, including capital and first-degree murder. The ruling does not address what would happen if a jury actually deadlocked on a lesser offense after acquitting on a greater one, leaving that question open for future cases.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide what the Double Jeopardy Clause requires when a jury genuinely deadlocks on a lesser offense after actually completing deliberations and acquitting on a greater offense — it resolved this case by finding the jury's report was not final, sidestepping that broader question.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued the foreperson's report that the jury was 'unanimous against' the murder charges was a real acquittal in substance, because Arkansas law required the jury to essentially acquit on a greater offense before considering a lesser one. She would have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause required the trial judge to ask the jury to confirm or give effect to those votes through a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial, and that failing to do so was an abuse of discretion.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court asked whether the foreperson's mid-deliberation report of the jury's vote counts as a final acquittal, since only a truly final decision triggers double jeopardy protection against a second trial.
- Because the jury continued deliberating for another half hour after the report and nothing in the instructions barred jurors from reconsidering earlier votes, the Court concluded the report was not final and so was not an acquittal.
- The Court distinguished this case from prior rulings (Green and Price) where a jury's verdict was truly final, reasoning that those cases don't apply when the reported vote could still change before deliberations ended.
- The Court then applied the 'manifest necessity' standard, which asks whether special circumstances justified stopping a trial without barring a retry; a jury's genuine inability to reach a verdict has long counted as satisfying this standard.
- The Court held that trial judges are never required to consider alternative ways of breaking a jury deadlock, such as offering new partial-verdict forms, before declaring a mistrial.
- Because Arkansas law only gave the jury the choice to convict on one offense or acquit on all, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by declining to create a new partial-verdict option before declaring a mistrial.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Green v. United States (355 U. S. 184)
The Court said this case differs because the earlier jury verdict there was final, unlike the mid-deliberation report here.
Reaffirms Renico v. Lett
The Court relied on this decision for the rule that judges need not consider alternatives before declaring a mistrial for a hung jury.