United States v. Lara
The Court ruled that Congress has the constitutional power to let tribes prosecute Indians who belong to a different tribe, treating that authority as the tribe's own inherent power rather than power borrowed from the federal government.
Because the tribal prosecution and the later federal prosecution came from two separate sovereigns, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not block the federal government from prosecuting the man a second time for the same incident.
“the Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”
The Court's central holding on Congress's power over tribal sovereignty.
How it got here: A federal magistrate and an Eighth Circuit panel rejected the double jeopardy claim, but the en banc Eighth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court took the case due to a conflict with the Ninth Circuit.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Billy Jo Lara, a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa, lived with his wife's Spirit Lake Tribe on their reservation in North Dakota. After repeated misconduct, the Spirit Lake Tribe barred him from the reservation; when he defied the order and struck an arresting federal officer, the tribe convicted him in tribal court. The federal government then separately charged him with assaulting a federal officer for the same incident.
The question before the Court
If a tribe prosecutes a member of another tribe for a crime, can the federal government also prosecute him for the same act without violating double jeopardy?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Congress has the constitutional power to relax the restrictions earlier decisions had placed on tribes' inherent authority, and that Congress did exactly that when it amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to recognize tribes' inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians. Because the tribe exercised its own restored sovereign power rather than federal power delegated to it, the tribal prosecution and the federal prosecution came from two genuinely separate sovereigns.
Under the long-standing dual-sovereignty rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns for the same conduct. So the federal government's prosecution of the man for assaulting a federal officer, after the tribe had already convicted him for a similar tribal offense, was constitutionally permitted.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People who are Indian but not members of the tribe whose land they're on can now be prosecuted by that tribe's court, and a later federal prosecution for the same conduct isn't automatically barred. Tribes gain expanded criminal authority over nonmember Indians, and Congress's power to adjust the scope of tribal sovereignty over time is confirmed.
What changes now
The ruling is final on the double jeopardy question, so Lara's federal prosecution may proceed. The decision leaves tribes with expanded criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians nationwide, subject to habeas review in federal court. The Court explicitly did not decide whether tribal proceedings without a right to appointed counsel violate due process or equal protection, leaving those questions open for future cases.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses bar tribes from prosecuting nonmember Indians in courts lacking certain protections, such as appointed counsel for indigent defendants. It also did not address more sweeping potential changes to tribal status or any effect on state authority.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens joined the majority in full but wrote to emphasize the historical basis for tribal sovereignty, noting tribes governed this continent long before European colonization, unlike most states which were never truly independent. He found it unremarkable that Congress can relax restrictions on this ancient inherent tribal power just as it can authorize states to exercise otherwise-forbidden powers.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome but argued the Court should fundamentally reexamine its tribal sovereignty doctrine, calling the underlying assumptions incoherent. He could not find constitutional authority for Congress to adjust tribal sovereignty in either the Treaty Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause, and worried that treating the statute as a delegation of federal prosecutorial power would raise serious separation-of-powers problems.
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed with the narrow result—accepting Congress's stated theory that it restored inherent tribal sovereignty rather than delegating federal power—but strongly objected to the majority's broader holding that the Constitution lets Congress expand tribal sovereignty beyond its historical limits. He warned this subjects U.S. citizens to an 'extraconstitutional sovereign' without adequate justification.
Dissent — Justice Souter
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the tribes' lack of inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers was a constitutional consequence of their dependent status, not something Congress could simply legislate away. He would have held that Congress could only grant such power as a delegation of federal authority, meaning the tribal prosecution was effectively federal and barred the second prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court framed the case around the 'dual sovereignty' rule: successive prosecutions by two truly separate sovereigns don't violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, but a second prosecution stemming from the same sovereign's delegated power does.
- The Court examined the text and legislative history of the amended Indian Civil Rights Act and found Congress meant to 'recognize and affirm' the tribes' own inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians, not to hand the tribes a slice of federal power.
- The Court then asked whether Congress has constitutional authority to loosen restrictions that earlier decisions and treaties had placed on tribal sovereignty, relying on Congress's long-recognized 'plenary' power over Indian affairs rooted in the Indian Commerce Clause and the historical practice of treaty-making.
- The Court noted that Congress has repeatedly readjusted tribal status before—terminating and later restoring tribes, expanding tribal courts' sentencing power, and granting citizenship—showing that adjusting the 'metes and bounds' of tribal sovereignty is a familiar, not novel, congressional function.
- The Court found this particular change limited: it concerns only misdemeanor jurisdiction over Indians on the tribe's own land, akin to the already-recognized inherent power tribes have to prosecute their own members.
- Concluding that Congress validly restored the tribes' inherent (not delegated) power, the Court held the tribal prosecution was an exercise of separate tribal sovereignty, so the subsequent federal prosecution came from a distinct sovereign and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Duro v. Reina (495 U.S. 676)
The Court held Congress could legislatively reverse Duro's limit on tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
Reaffirms United States v. Wheeler (435 U.S. 313)
The Court relied on Wheeler's recognition that tribes retain inherent power to prosecute their own members.
Distinguishes Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe (435 U.S. 191)
The Court said Oliphant reflected sovereignty as it stood at the time, not a permanent constitutional bar Congress cannot change.