Turner v. Rogers
The Supreme Court ruled that South Carolina did not have to provide a free lawyer to a father facing jail for falling behind on child support, even though he could not afford one, because the parent seeking the payments was also unrepresented.
But the Court said the father's jailing still violated due process because the state never gave him clear notice that his ability to pay was the key issue, never collected information about his finances, and never made a finding that he could actually pay before locking him up.
“We consequently hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year).”
The Court's core holding rejecting an automatic right to counsel in these hearings.
How it got here: Turner appealed his civil contempt jailing to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected his right-to-counsel claim, and he asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Michael Turner repeatedly fell behind on court-ordered child support payments to Rebecca Rogers, the mother of their child, who was unrepresented at his contempt hearings. After a hearing where the judge never asked about his ability to pay, Turner was jailed for twelve months for civil contempt without ever having a lawyer.
The question before the Court
If a state jails a parent for not paying child support, does the Constitution require the state to give that parent a free lawyer?
The Court's answer
No — the Due Process Clause does not automatically entitle an indigent parent to a government-paid lawyer at a civil contempt hearing over unpaid child support, at least where the parent owed the money (here, the mother) is also unrepresented. Requiring the state to pay for the father's lawyer while the mother had none could unfairly tilt the proceeding against her and delay support she needs.
But the Court did not stop there. It held that due process still requires the state to use substitute safeguards — clear notice that ability to pay is the central issue, a financial disclosure form, a chance to respond, and an express court finding on ability to pay. Because none of those safeguards were used in Turner's case, his jailing violated due process anyway, and the Court sent the case back.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Millions of parents held in civil contempt for unpaid child support are not automatically entitled to a government-paid lawyer, easing the burden on state courts and budgets. But states enforcing these orders must now use notice, financial forms, and explicit ability-to-pay findings, or risk having contempt jailings thrown out as unconstitutional.
What changes now
The Supreme Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, since Turner had already served his sentence. Going forward, family courts in child-support contempt cases involving unrepresented custodial parents must adopt safeguards like notice, financial disclosure forms, and explicit ability-to-pay findings, or their contempt jailings risk being struck down. The decision is final on the right-to-counsel question but leaves open how courts should handle cases where the government itself is owed the support.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide whether counsel is required when the support is owed to the government (such as welfare reimbursement) rather than to the other parent, and it did not address unusually complex cases where a defendant could fairly be represented only by a trained lawyer.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Thomas
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings. Therefore, I would affirm.”Thomas's opening statement of his disagreement with the majority's decision to vacate on other grounds.
Justice Thomas agreed there is no right to counsel but objected that the majority went further, striking down Turner's jailing on an 'alternative procedural safeguards' theory that no party ever raised — it came only from the federal government's amicus brief. He argued the Court should not decide constitutional questions neither preserved below nor briefed by the parties, and that the majority's fairness balancing improperly ignored the interests of children and custodial parents who depend on support payments.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which weighs the private interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous decision without added safeguards, and the government's interest in avoiding those safeguards, to decide what fairness requires in a civil proceeding.
- It found the private interest — loss of physical liberty through jailing — weighs heavily in favor of protections, since freedom from bodily restraint sits at the core of what due process protects.
- It weighed against a categorical right to counsel because the question at the heart of these hearings, whether the parent can actually pay, is often straightforward enough to resolve without a lawyer, and because the parent owed the money is frequently also unrepresented, so giving the paying parent a lawyer could unbalance the hearing and slow down payments the family needs.
- The Court concluded that a set of substitute safeguards — notice that ability to pay is the critical issue, a financial disclosure form, a chance to respond to financial questions, and an express court finding on ability to pay — could sufficiently reduce the risk of wrongly jailing someone who genuinely cannot pay.
- Applying that framework, the Court held that due process does not automatically require appointed counsel when the person owed support is also unrepresented and these substitute safeguards are in place.
- Turning to the facts, the Court found none of those substitute safeguards were used — no clear notice, no financial form, and no finding on ability to pay — so the father's jailing did not meet the fairness the Due Process Clause requires.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319)
The Court relies on its three-factor fairness balancing test to decide what due process requires here.
Distinguishes Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. (452 U.S. 18)
The Court reads Lassiter's presumption narrowly, saying it doesn't require counsel in every liberty-loss case.
Reaffirms Gagnon v. Scarpelli (411 U.S. 778)
The Court relies on Gagnon's holding that counsel isn't automatically required even when liberty is at stake.