Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that North Carolina's House Speaker and Senate president pro tempore were entitled to join a federal lawsuit defending the state's voter ID law, reversing a lower court that had blocked their participation.
The decision makes it easier for state legislatures to send their own attorneys into federal court to defend state laws when they believe other state officials may not be vigorous enough advocates — with significant implications for future challenges to election laws and other contested statutes.
“Ordinarily, a federal court must respect that kind of sovereign choice, not assemble presumptions against it.”
The majority's bottom-line rule: federal courts must respect a state's decision about who defends its laws in court.
How it got here: The NAACP sued the NC Board of Elections in federal district court; the legislative leaders' motion to intervene was denied; a Fourth Circuit panel reversed but the full en banc Fourth Circuit reinstated the denial; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
The North Carolina NAACP sued the State Board of Elections, alleging the state's 2018 voter ID law discriminated against Black and Latino voters in violation of the Constitution and federal law. The Board was appointed by the Governor — who had vetoed the law — and was defended by the attorney general, who had previously opposed similar voter ID measures. The leaders of the state legislature, who had passed the law over the Governor's veto, asked to join the lawsuit to ensure its vigorous defense. Both the trial court and, ultimately, the full Fourth Circuit refused to let them in.
The question before the Court
Did the leaders of North Carolina's state legislature have the right to join a federal lawsuit as full parties to defend the state's voter ID law, even though the State Board of Elections was already defending it?
The Court's answer
Yes — the legislative leaders were entitled to join the lawsuit as parties. North Carolina law expressly authorizes the House Speaker and Senate president pro tempore to intervene on the General Assembly's behalf in any federal case challenging a state statute, and the Court held that federal courts must respect that sovereign choice. The legislative leaders satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2): their motion was timely, they had a protectable interest in the law's survival that could be harmed without their participation, and the Board did not adequately represent that interest.
The lower courts were wrong to apply a "presumption" that the Board already adequately spoke for the legislative leaders' interests. Rule 24(a)(2) imposes only a minimal burden on proposed intervenors, and that burden is even lighter — not heavier — when a duly authorized state agent seeks to defend a state law. On the facts here, the Board's defense was shaped by competing administrative priorities, while the legislative leaders sought to focus solely on defending the law's constitutionality on the merits.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
State legislatures across the country may now more readily join federal lawsuits defending state laws whenever they believe other state officials are insufficiently committed advocates. This is especially significant in politically divided states where the governor, attorney general, and legislature may be at odds — giving lawmakers a stronger seat at the table in challenges to election rules, abortion restrictions, and other contested legislation.
What changes now
The case goes back to the federal district court, which must now allow the legislative leaders to participate as full parties. The underlying constitutional question — whether North Carolina's voter ID law violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act — has not been decided and will be litigated on the merits with the legislative leaders at the table. The Court's ruling sets a precedent that will guide intervention disputes in other states' cases going forward.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide whether North Carolina's voter ID law is constitutional — that merits question remains open in the lower courts. The Court also left open whether a presumption of adequate representation could ever be appropriate when a private citizen (rather than a state official) seeks to join a government's defense of a law.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued that Rule 24(a)(2) is federal law, and state law cannot override it by effectively guaranteeing intervention whenever a state statute names additional officials as representatives. She contended the attorney general had been actively and successfully defending the voter ID law — winning reversal of the preliminary injunction — and that a mere difference in litigation strategy does not make representation inadequate. She warned the majority's logic would flood federal courts with multiple state representatives and leave judges with no principled way to stop the proliferation.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), which requires courts to allow someone to join a lawsuit as a party when their motion is timely, they have an interest in the outcome that could be practically harmed if they stay out, and no existing party adequately represents that interest. Only the last two requirements were in dispute.
- On the interest requirement: North Carolina law explicitly grants the House Speaker and Senate president pro tempore standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assembly in any case challenging a state statute — and the State even designates them 'necessary parties' to such suits. The Court held that federal courts should rarely question whether a state's interests will be harmed when its own duly authorized representatives are kept out of federal litigation. Allowing plaintiffs to strategically select which officials they face would risk an incomplete adversarial testing of the state's interests.
- The Court also noted broader institutional reasons for respecting state choices about who defends state law: it promotes accurate federal-court decision-making, avoids setting aside state statutes based on an incomplete record, and preserves the balance between state and federal authority that the constitutional system depends on.
- On the adequacy requirement: the lower courts applied a 'presumption' that the Board already adequately represented the legislative leaders' interests. The Court rejected that approach, pointing to its earlier ruling in Trbovich v. Mine Workers (1972) — which held that when an intervenor's interests are related but not identical to an existing party's, the burden to show inadequate representation should be treated as minimal, not elevated.
- A presumption of adequate representation gets things exactly backward when the proposed intervenor is a duly authorized state agent. The Court held such a presumption is flatly inappropriate in those circumstances; state representatives should be welcomed into federal court, not met with adverse assumptions.
- Applying the minimal standard to these facts, the Court found the legislative leaders' interests were genuinely distinct from the Board's. The Board's defense was consistently shaped by its need to administer upcoming elections and its desire for clarity about which law would apply — not by a single-minded focus on defending the law's constitutionality. The legislative leaders sought to do exactly that, unburdened by those crosscutting administrative concerns.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Trbovich v. Mine Workers (404 U.S. 528)
The minimal burden standard for showing inadequate representation is reaffirmed and applied to state-agent intervenors.
Reaffirms Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill (587 U.S. ___)
States may authorize their legislatures to litigate on the state's behalf in federal court.
Reaffirms Hollingsworth v. Perry (570 U.S. 693)
State law may designate officials other than the attorney general to speak for the state in federal court.