United States v. Taylor
The Supreme Court ruled that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under the federal firearms sentencing law, blocking prosecutors from using that charge to add mandatory prison time on top of a robbery sentence.
The 7–2 decision resolves a split among the federal appeals courts and means the firearms enhancement cannot be stacked onto an attempted-robbery conviction — even when the underlying conduct was actually violent.
How it got here: Taylor filed a federal habeas petition after Davis; the Fourth Circuit vacated his §924(c) conviction; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Justin Taylor took part in a planned robbery of a drug dealer in Virginia. His accomplice pulled a gun, the victim resisted, and was shot and killed. Taylor pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery-related charges and to a separate firearms charge that required his underlying offense to be a "crime of violence" — a designation that added a mandatory decade to his sentence. Years later, after a Supreme Court ruling wiped out one of the two definitions of "crime of violence," Taylor argued neither definition still covered his attempted robbery conviction.
The question before the Court
Can the federal government use a charge of attempted Hobbs Act robbery as the basis for a mandatory firearm enhancement that adds years — or decades — to a defendant's prison sentence?
The Court's answer
No — attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the federal firearms enhancement statute, and it cannot be used to pile additional mandatory prison time onto a defendant's sentence.
The Court applied the "categorical approach," which looks only at what the law always requires the government to prove — not what a particular defendant actually did. To convict someone of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, prosecutors must show two things: the defendant intended to take property by force or threat, and the defendant took a "substantial step" toward that goal. But neither of those elements actually requires proof that force was used, attempted, or even communicated as a threat. A defendant can be convicted of attempted robbery while being arrested before ever threatening anyone. Because the statute does not always demand proof of force as an element, it cannot serve as the predicate "crime of violence" that triggers the firearm enhancement.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Federal defendants convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery can no longer receive an additional mandatory sentence under the federal firearms-violence law based on that charge alone. This affects how prosecutors structure federal robbery-related cases going forward and may open the door for habeas challenges by people already serving extra time based on the same predicate offense.
What changes now
The Fourth Circuit's decision stands: Taylor's firearms conviction under §924(c) is vacated, and the case returns to the lower court for resentencing based solely on his Hobbs Act conviction, which carries up to 20 years. Going forward, federal prosecutors cannot use attempted Hobbs Act robbery as the predicate "crime of violence" needed to impose the firearms sentencing enhancement, and defendants in similar postures may have grounds for habeas challenges to existing convictions.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not decide whether completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, and it does not settle what exactly constitutes a "substantial step." It also leaves open — as Justice Alito's dissent flags — whether the government could prevail in a future case by arguing that alternative elements of attempted robbery satisfy the statute's definition.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed that the categorical approach, faithfully applied, leads to the majority's conclusion — but argued the approach itself is the problem. He would overrule United States v. Davis, revive §924(c)'s residual clause using a conduct-based framework, and hold Taylor accountable for what he actually did: an armed robbery that left the victim dead. He catalogued cases across the circuits where the categorical approach forced courts to rule that kidnappers, bombers, and murderers had not committed 'crimes of violence,' calling the results 'absurd' and a journey 'through the looking glass.'
Dissent — Justice Alito
Justice Alito agreed the categorical approach has produced unrealistic results but took a different path to reversal. He argued that Hobbs Act robbery contains alternative elements — actual force, threatened force, violence, and fear of injury — and that attempted Hobbs Act robbery therefore 'has as an element' the use or threatened use of force, because a defendant must intend to commit some force-involving combination of those elements. He criticized the majority for uncritically accepting the government's concession that the elements clause requires force to be proved in every prosecution, calling that premise unsupported by the statute's text.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the 'categorical approach' — a long-established method for determining whether an offense qualifies as a 'crime of violence' under §924(c)(3)(A). Rather than asking what a particular defendant actually did, the approach asks a single question: does the crime, as defined by its elements, always require the government to prove the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?
- The elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery are: (1) the defendant intended to take property by means of actual or threatened force, and (2) the defendant took a 'substantial step' toward completing the robbery. Both parties agreed that a substantial step must be more than mere preparation, but need not itself be violent.
- The Court illustrated the gap with a hypothetical 'Adam,' who researches a store, buys a mask, plots his escape, writes a threatening note as a bluff, and walks through the door — only to be arrested before delivering any threat to anyone. Adam could lawfully be convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, yet he never used, attempted to use, or communicated any threat of force. This shows the offense does not categorically require force.
- The government's first argument — that because completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, any attempt to commit it must also qualify — failed because the elements clause asks whether the defendant 'did commit' a qualifying crime, not whether they tried to commit one. Congress could have written the clause to cover attempts explicitly, but did not.
- The government's second argument — that taking a 'substantial step' toward robbery constitutes an objective 'threatened use' of force even without communicating anything to a victim — also failed. In criminal law, 'threat' almost always means a communicated intent to harm someone. Reading it as an uncommunicated, abstract risk would make the elements clause replicate the work of the residual clause, which the Court had already struck down as unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Davis — and courts do not assume Congress put two separate clauses in the same law to do the same thing.
- The government's final fallback — that attempted Hobbs Act robbery prosecutions almost always involve a communicated threat in practice — failed because the elements clause does not ask how crimes are usually prosecuted. It asks whether force is required as a legal element, and it is not. The Court also distinguished Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, the case the government invoked, because that case involved matching one state crime's elements against a federal definition — a federalism problem not present here.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms United States v. Davis (588 U.S. ___)
The majority treats Davis — which struck down §924(c)'s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague — as settled, good law that frames the entire dispute.
Distinguishes Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez (549 U.S. 183)
The Court explains Duenas-Alvarez involved matching a state crime to a federal definition, a federalism concern absent here, so its reasoning does not apply.