Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal immigration statute does not require the government to hold a formal bond hearing for noncitizens detained after removal orders are reinstated — reversing a Third Circuit decision that had placed the burden on the government to justify continued detention.
The decision resolves only the statutory question, leaving open whether the Constitution's due process guarantees independently require such hearings — a question sent back to the lower courts.
How it got here: A federal district court ordered a bond hearing; the Third Circuit summarily affirmed; the government asked the Supreme Court to review and the Court agreed.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Antonio Arteaga-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, was detained by immigration authorities in 2018 after they reinstated an old removal order against him. He was held without any bond hearing while an immigration judge considered his claim that he would face persecution or torture if returned to Mexico. After four months in custody, he challenged the government's authority to hold him without a formal hearing at which the government would have to prove he was dangerous or likely to flee.
The question before the Court
Does the immigration law that lets the government hold a noncitizen after the standard 90-day removal window require a formal bond hearing after six months, with the government proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person is dangerous or a flight risk?
The Court's answer
No — the statute at issue does not require the government to hold a formal bond hearing after six months of detention, with the burden on the government to prove dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) says only that certain noncitizens with removal orders "may be detained beyond the removal period" and must comply with supervision terms if released. It says nothing about bond hearings, immigration judges, or standards of proof. Because only one clear reading of the text is possible, there is no room to use the constitutional-avoidance tool — the rule that courts read ambiguous statutes to dodge constitutional problems — to import procedures the text does not mention.
The Court did not decide whether the Constitution's due process guarantees independently require such hearings for someone detained as long as Arteaga-Martinez was. That question goes back to the lower courts. The government also retains the discretion to offer bond hearings even though the statute does not require them.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Federal immigration authorities are under no statutory obligation to provide a formal bond hearing before an immigration judge for noncitizens held under reinstated removal orders. People detained in this situation may still raise individual constitutional challenges to prolonged detention, and the government retains discretion to offer hearings — but no law forces it to do so.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, which must now decide whether the Constitution's due process protections independently require a bond hearing for someone detained this long under § 1231(a)(6) — a question the Third Circuit never addressed because it found a statutory right to the hearing. The Court also left open whether Arteaga-Martinez could argue entitlement to release under the Zadvydas rule that detention cannot continue when removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide whether prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing violates the Constitution's due process guarantees — that question is left for the lower courts. The ruling also does not prohibit the government from voluntarily providing bond hearings; it holds only that the statute does not require them.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's statutory conclusion but wrote separately to raise three additional points. First (joined by Justice Gorsuch on this point only), he argued the Court lacks jurisdiction over this type of immigration detention challenge under the INA's all-purpose review provision and would have dismissed the case. Second, he expressed doubt that the Constitution's due process guarantee applies at all to noncitizens contesting removal. Third, he called for overruling Zadvydas v. Davis entirely, arguing it was wrongly decided from the start and has encouraged lower courts to invent procedural rules with no grounding in statutory text — a problem he called 'jurisprudential whack-a-mole.'
Dissent in part — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority only that the 'clear and convincing evidence' burden-of-proof requirement is foreclosed by Jennings. On everything else, he would have affirmed: in his view, Zadvydas v. Davis controls because it interpreted the identical statutory provision, and nothing in Jennings disturbed it. He argued that because Arteaga-Martinez was detained not for criminal history but while awaiting a decision on his fear of persecution — and because a bail hearing (not outright release) was at stake — there was even less justification for detention without any hearing than there had been in Zadvydas.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The statute at the center of this dispute, § 1231(a)(6), says only that certain noncitizens with final removal orders 'may be detained beyond the removal period' and must follow supervision terms if released. On its face it says nothing about bond hearings, immigration judges, or who bears the burden of proving dangerousness — the three core procedural requirements the Third Circuit had imposed.
- The Court applied the rule from Jennings v. Rodriguez (2018) that the constitutional-avoidance canon — the principle that courts should read ambiguous statutes to sidestep constitutional problems — only applies when the statute genuinely has more than one plausible reading. Where the text is clear, courts cannot invoke constitutional avoidance to add procedures the text simply does not mention.
- Unlike § 1226(a), a neighboring immigration detention provision that explicitly uses the word 'bond,' § 1231(a)(6) contains no such language. The statute's reference to general 'terms of supervision' upon release is too vague and indirect to imply a mandatory formal bond hearing before an immigration judge.
- Arteaga-Martinez argued that Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) — which read § 1231(a)(6) to prohibit truly indefinite detention — also implicitly required the bond hearing procedures the Third Circuit ordered. The Court disagreed: the detailed procedural requirements imposed below go well beyond the narrow limitation on detention length that Zadvydas recognized, and Zadvydas cannot be stretched to mandate specific hearing procedures absent from the statutory text.
- Because the lower courts resolved the case on statutory grounds and never addressed Arteaga-Martinez's argument that prolonged detention without any hearing violates the Constitution's due process guarantee, the Court sent the case back for those constitutional arguments to be considered by the lower courts first.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Zadvydas v. Davis (533 U.S. 678)
The detailed bond hearing procedures ordered below go substantially beyond the narrow detention-length limit Zadvydas recognized, so Zadvydas does not require them.
Reaffirms Jennings v. Rodriguez (583 U.S. ___)
The Court follows Jennings' rule that constitutional avoidance cannot add procedural requirements absent from clear statutory text.