Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper

Background

Stanmore Cooper, a private pilot, had HIV and did not tell the Federal Aviation Administration when he renewed his medical certificate. He later disclosed his condition to the Social Security Administration when applying for disability benefits. Federal agencies compared records during a joint investigation, learned of the omission, revoked his pilot certificate, and Cooper pleaded guilty to making a false official writing. He sued the FAA, DOT, and SSA under the Privacy Act, alleging the unlawful sharing of his medical records caused humiliation, embarrassment, and severe emotional distress. The district court found a Privacy Act violation but denied money damages because Cooper alleged only emotional harm; the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Reasoning

The central question was whether the Privacy Act’s phrase “actual damages” includes mental or emotional distress. The majority explained that waivers of the Federal Government’s immunity must be clearly expressed in the statute, and that “actual damages” can mean different things in different laws. Because Congress expressly left out recovery for “general damages” and set a $1,000 minimum tied to proof of actual harm, the Court concluded the text and context support reading “actual damages” to mean proven pecuniary or economic loss, not nonpecuniary emotional harm. The Court therefore held that the Act does not authorize money awards for purely mental or emotional distress and reversed the Ninth Circuit.

Real world impact

The ruling narrows who can collect money under the Privacy Act: individuals who suffer only emotional or mental harm from agency disclosures cannot recover damages unless they can show actual economic loss. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with this narrower view. That outcome limits the scope of Privacy Act lawsuits seeking money damages against federal agencies.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented. The dissent argued the statute’s text, structure, and purpose support allowing proven nonpecuniary harms like mental anguish, and warned the majority’s rule undermines the Act’s privacy protections.