Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper
The Supreme Court ruled that a pilot who hid his HIV diagnosis from federal aviation regulators, and whose medical and disability records were later shared between agencies, could not sue the government for emotional distress under the Privacy Act.
Because the Act only clearly allows the government to be sued for financial losses, not for humiliation or mental anguish, the Court held that Congress never clearly agreed to let people collect money for that kind of harm.
How it got here: A federal trial court found a Privacy Act violation but denied damages for emotional harm; the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the government asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A licensed pilot with HIV hid his diagnosis from the FAA for years while renewing his medical certificate, and separately obtained Social Security disability benefits based on that same diagnosis. Two federal agencies ran a joint investigation matching pilot records against disability records, uncovering his fraud. After his certificate was revoked and he pleaded guilty to a false-statement charge, he sued the agencies, claiming their unauthorized sharing of his medical information caused him emotional distress.
The question before the Court
If the federal government wrongly shares someone's private medical records, can that person collect money for the emotional distress it caused, or only for out-of-pocket losses?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the Privacy Act's promise of "actual damages" does not clearly cover emotional or mental distress, only provable financial losses. Because any waiver of the government's immunity from lawsuits must be spelled out clearly, and the text here could plausibly be read either way, the Court chose the narrower reading that favors the government.
The Court found support for this in the Act's history: Congress considered, but dropped, language that would have allowed recovery for presumed emotional harm, which suggested lawmakers meant to limit recovery to damages that could be proven with dollars-and-cents evidence. So the pilot's claim of humiliation and distress, without any accompanying financial loss, could not go forward.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People whose private government records are improperly shared can no longer sue the federal government for emotional or psychological harm under the Privacy Act unless they can also show a real financial loss. This narrows a major tool individuals have used to hold federal agencies accountable for mishandling sensitive personal information like medical or financial records.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the lower courts, but the pilot's claim for purely emotional distress cannot succeed because he alleged no financial loss. This is a final merits ruling that will govern how lower courts handle future Privacy Act damages claims nationwide, limiting recoveries to provable economic harm unless Congress amends the statute.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Congress could choose to authorize emotional-distress damages against the government, only that the current Privacy Act text does not clearly do so. It also did not disturb the government's liability for proven financial losses caused by Privacy Act violations.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued that 'actual damages' has an ordinary, well-established legal meaning covering all proven injuries, pecuniary or not, and that the majority's reliance on the sovereign-immunity canon was unwarranted because the statute's text, structure, purpose, and drafting history all clearly supported allowing emotional-distress recovery. She would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit and let the pilot pursue damages for mental and emotional harm.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the rule that any waiver of the government's sovereign immunity — its usual legal shield against being sued — must be stated clearly in the statute's text, with any unclear language read in the government's favor.
- Because the Privacy Act does not define 'actual damages,' the Court treated it as a legal term of art whose meaning depends on context, noting that courts have read the same phrase to include emotional harm in some statutes and to mean only financial loss in others.
- The Court compared the Privacy Act's remedy structure to old defamation law, where plaintiffs could get a guaranteed minimum recovery only after first proving 'special damages' (financial loss), with additional 'general damages' (emotional and reputational harm) available on top of that showing.
- Because Congress considered but ultimately declined to let Privacy Act plaintiffs recover 'general damages,' the Court inferred that Congress meant 'actual damages' in the Act to function like 'special damages' — that is, damages limited to proven financial loss.
- Since the statute could plausibly be read either way, the requirement that any waiver of immunity be unambiguous meant the narrower, government-favoring reading had to control.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Doe v. Chao (540 U. S. 614)
Relies on this earlier ruling's comparison of the Privacy Act's remedy scheme to old defamation-law damages rules.