Lafler v. Cooper
The Court ruled that a defendant can show his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated when bad legal advice caused him to reject a favorable plea offer, even though he later received a completely fair trial.
The decision means the right to competent counsel extends to plea bargaining itself, not just to the trial, and it requires courts to fashion a remedy — usually ordering the plea offer to be renewed — when that right is violated.
“If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”
The core holding on when a rejected plea offer can support a Sixth Amendment claim.
How it got here: A federal habeas court and the Sixth Circuit ruled for Cooper on his ineffective-assistance claim; Michigan's prison warden asked the Supreme Court to review that decision.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Anthony Cooper was charged in Michigan with assault with intent to murder after shooting a woman multiple times. Prosecutors offered a plea deal with a lighter sentence, but Cooper rejected it twice on his attorney's advice that the shooting couldn't support an intent-to-murder charge because the victim was hit below the waist. He was convicted at trial and received a far longer mandatory sentence than the plea would have carried.
The question before the Court
If a lawyer's bad advice causes a defendant to turn down a favorable plea deal and he's convicted at a fair trial, can he still claim his Sixth Amendment rights were violated?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that a defendant can show his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when a lawyer's deficient advice causes him to reject a favorable plea and go to trial instead, even if that trial was completely fair. The right to effective counsel applies throughout plea bargaining, not just at trial, so a fair trial does not automatically erase harm caused by bad advice earlier in the process.
To prove this kind of harm, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, without the bad advice, he would have accepted the plea, the court would have approved it, and the result would have been less severe than what he actually got. Because Cooper met that standard here — receiving a sentence three and a half times longer than the plea would have carried — the Court sent the case back so Michigan could reoffer the original plea, leaving it to the trial judge's discretion how to proceed from there.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling gives defendants a real legal tool to challenge convictions when a lawyer's bad advice caused them to miss out on a better plea deal, even if their trial was otherwise fair. Prosecutors and trial judges now have to navigate reoffering rejected plea deals and deciding what sentence, if any, a defendant should ultimately receive.
What changes now
The case goes back to the state trial court, where prosecutors must reoffer Cooper the original plea deal. If he accepts, the judge has discretion to resentence him under the plea terms, adjust only some of his convictions, or leave his trial conviction and sentence in place. This is a final merits ruling on the constitutional question, though the exact remedy in Cooper's case is left to the lower court's discretion.
What this does not decide
The Court did not spell out the full boundaries of a trial judge's discretion in fashioning remedies for these claims, leaving that to be worked out case by case. It also did not decide whether judges must ignore new information about a defendant's guilt discovered after a plea offer was rejected.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Scalia
“Anthony Cooper received a full and fair trial, was found guilty of all charges by a unanimous jury, and was given the sentence that the law prescribed.”Scalia's central objection that no constitutional violation occurred despite the fair trial.
Justice Scalia argued the Court's ruling has nothing to do with the Sixth Amendment's real purpose, which he said is solely to guarantee a fair trial. Since Cooper received a fair trial, Scalia would find no constitutional violation at all. He also argued the ruling violates the federal habeas statute (AEDPA) because it announces a brand-new rule not clearly established by prior Supreme Court cases, and he criticized the remedy as an incoherent, unprecedented grant of unguided discretion to trial judges over a supposedly constitutional violation.
Dissent — Justice Alito
Justice Alito joined Parts I and II of Justice Scalia's dissent on the merits and AEDPA issue, agreeing there was no constitutional violation or basis for habeas relief. He focused separately on criticizing the Court's vague remedy, arguing that requiring lower courts to figure out the boundaries of their own discretion invites unjust results, and he identified two situations where reoffering a plea would clearly be an abuse of discretion.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, which requires a defendant to show his lawyer's performance was deficient and that this deficiency caused prejudice — a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different with competent advice.
- Because both sides agreed the lawyer's advice was deficient, the only question was how to measure prejudice when that bad advice causes a defendant to reject, rather than accept, a plea offer and then go to trial.
- The Court rejected the argument that a later fair trial automatically wipes away any harm from pretrial errors, explaining that the right to effective counsel covers critical stages of a criminal case beyond the trial itself, including plea negotiations, appeals, and sentencing.
- The Court also rejected the claim that Lockhart v. Fretwell required defendants to show they were denied some other specific legal right beyond a favorable outcome, holding that Fretwell involved a defendant seeking a windfall from an incorrect legal rule, unlike Cooper's situation.
- Applying this framework, the Court found Cooper had shown prejudice: he would have accepted the plea, the court would have approved it, and his sentence at trial was three and a half times longer than the plea would have carried.
- The Court then crafted a remedy requiring the prosecution to reoffer the original plea, after which the trial judge would have discretion to decide whether to resentence Cooper under the plea, adjust his convictions, or leave the trial verdict and sentence undisturbed.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Lockhart v. Fretwell (506 U.S. 364)
The Court said Fretwell involved a windfall from an incorrect legal rule, unlike Cooper's valid claim for a lost favorable plea.
Reaffirms Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668)
The Court applied Strickland's two-part deficient-performance-and-prejudice test to the plea-rejection context.