Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The Court ruled that the First Amendment bars ministers from suing their churches under federal employment discrimination laws over decisions to fire them, recognizing for the first time a constitutional "ministerial exception."
Because a Lutheran school teacher who taught religion and led prayers counted as a minister, her retaliation lawsuit against the church that fired her had to be dismissed, regardless of the true reason for her termination.
“The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”
The Court's closing statement on why religious groups must control who serves as their ministers.
How it got here: A federal trial court granted summary judgment for the church; the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, finding Perich was not a minister; the Church sought and won Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Cheryl Perich taught at a small Lutheran school and was designated a "called," commissioned minister after completing religious training. She taught secular subjects but also led students in prayer and taught religion. After developing narcolepsy and taking disability leave, a dispute over her return to work led the congregation to fire her after she threatened legal action, prompting her to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC.
The question before the Court
Can a church be sued under a disability-discrimination law for firing someone it considers one of its ministers?
The Court's answer
No — the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses bar such a lawsuit when the fired employee qualifies as one of the church's ministers. The Court recognized, for the first time, a constitutional "ministerial exception" that keeps courts out of decisions about who a religious group chooses to have minister to its faithful, because forcing a church to keep or pay damages over an unwanted minister interferes with its control over its own faith and mission.
Applying that rule here, the Court found Cheryl Perich was a minister: she held the formal title of commissioned minister, completed significant religious training, accepted that religious calling herself, and her job included teaching religion and leading prayer and worship. Because she counted as a minister, her retaliation lawsuit had to be dismissed entirely, even though she sought only money damages rather than her old job back.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Religious schools, congregations, and other faith-based employers now have a clear constitutional shield against employment discrimination lawsuits brought by employees who count as ministers, even when the underlying claim involves disability, race, or other protected-class discrimination, so long as the employee's role centers on conveying the faith.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, so the Sixth Circuit's judgment is reversed and the case is dismissed rather than returned for further proceedings on the merits. The ruling establishes a binding constitutional rule that lower courts must now apply case-by-case to decide which religious employees qualify as ministers, but the Court expressly left open how the exception applies to other types of lawsuits, such as breach-of-contract claims.
What this does not decide
The Court said it was deciding only that the ministerial exception bars this employment discrimination suit brought by a minister challenging her firing. It expressly did not decide whether the exception would bar other kinds of lawsuits, such as breach-of-contract or personal-injury claims against religious employers.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas would go further than the majority and require civil courts to defer entirely to a religious organization's own sincere, good-faith determination of who qualifies as its minister, without any independent judicial inquiry into the facts. He argues that letting courts second-guess a church's characterization risks pressuring religious groups to conform their internal definitions of 'minister' to secular expectations.
Concurrence — Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, would downplay the importance of formal titles like 'minister' or ordination, noting many faiths do not use such terms at all. He argues courts should instead focus functionally on whether an employee leads the organization, performs worship or religious ceremonies, or serves as a teacher or messenger of the faith, regardless of formal title.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court examined the history of the Religion Clauses, tracing how they were designed to keep government out of decisions about who serves as clergy, unlike the English Crown's historical control over church appointments.
- Relying on earlier church-property disputes, the Court concluded that courts must accept a church's own determination of who qualifies to act as its minister rather than second-guessing that choice.
- The Court adopted a 'ministerial exception,' a First Amendment rule barring employment discrimination suits brought by ministers against their religious employers, reasoning that forcing a church to retain or pay damages over an unwanted minister interferes with both the church's free exercise rights and the Establishment Clause's bar on government picking religious leaders.
- The Court rejected the argument that ordinary freedom-of-association principles were enough, finding that the Religion Clauses give special protection specifically to religious organizations' authority over their ministers, distinct from any secular association's rights.
- Applying a fact-specific, non-formulaic approach rather than a rigid test, the Court weighed Perich's formal commissioned-minister title, her religious training, her own acceptance of that religious role, and her job duties conveying the faith, concluding she qualified as a minister.
- Because Perich was a minister, the Court held that even her retaliation claim seeking money damages rather than reinstatement would improperly penalize the church's decision to end an unwanted minister's service, so the suit was barred entirely.