Fulton v. Philadelphia
Headline: Court blocks Philadelphia from ending foster referrals to Catholic agency for refusing to certify same-sex couples, ruling the city’s contract enforcement violated the Free Exercise Clause and protects the agency’s religious accommodation.
Holding:
- Stops Philadelphia from cutting referrals to a religious foster agency for refusing to certify same-sex couples.
- Requires governments to use narrowly tailored reasons before denying religious exemptions to contractors.
- Leaves broader national rules unsettled because the Court did not overturn Smith.
Summary
Background
Catholic Social Services (CSS) is a religious foster agency that for decades helped place children with foster families in Philadelphia. CSS holds that marriage is between a man and a woman and therefore will not certify same-sex married couples as foster parents; other agencies in the city do certify same-sex couples. After a newspaper reported the agency’s position, Philadelphia froze referrals and said it would not renew CSS’s foster-care contract unless CSS agreed to certify same-sex couples.
Reasoning
The central question was whether the City’s decision to stop referring children to CSS unless the agency agreed to certify same-sex couples violated the First Amendment’s protection for religious exercise. The Court found the City’s rules were not generally applicable because the City’s standard contract (section 3.21) allowed individualized exceptions at the Commissioner’s discretion and the City’s public-accommodations law did not clearly apply to foster‑care certification. Because the contract created a system of discretionary exemptions, the Court applied the most rigorous test—strict scrutiny, meaning the City had to show a compelling reason and narrowly tailored means—and concluded the City failed to meet that burden.
Real world impact
The ruling prevents Philadelphia from cutting off a longstanding religious foster provider under these specific contract and ordinance circumstances. It protects faith-based agencies that seek narrow accommodations to continue serving children in ways consistent with their beliefs. The decision is narrow: the Court did not overrule the general free‑exercise precedent (Smith), and it did not decide the separate free-speech claim, so other disputes over nondiscrimination rules or different contract language may produce different results.
Dissents or concurrances
Several Justices wrote separately. Some joined the judgment while urging the Court to reconsider Smith; others said Smith should be overruled and would have done so, reflecting active debate about the scope of religious exemptions.
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