Fulton v. Philadelphia
Headline: Court blocks Philadelphia from cutting off a Catholic foster agency unless it certifies same-sex couples, ruling the city’s contract condition violates religious freedom and lets the agency continue serving children.
Holding: The Court held that Philadelphia violated the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to contract with a Catholic foster agency unless it agreed to certify same-sex couples, because the City’s policies were not neutral and generally applicable.
- Prevents Philadelphia from cutting off a religious foster agency solely for its certification policy.
- Requires cities to justify denying religious exceptions when contracts allow individualized exemptions.
- Keeps the agency able to continue serving children while preserving its religious beliefs.
Summary
Background
A Catholic foster agency in Philadelphia has long believed marriage is between a man and a woman and therefore declined to certify same-sex married couples as foster parents. The City learned of that policy, froze referrals to the agency and said it would not renew the agency’s foster contract unless the agency agreed to certify same-sex couples. The agency sued, arguing the City’s actions violated its right to practice religion and its free-speech rights. Lower courts denied emergency relief and upheld the City’s view that generally applicable non-discrimination rules allowed the City to cut referrals and condition contract renewal.
Reasoning
The Court focused on the Free Exercise claim and held that Philadelphia’s actions burdened the agency’s religious exercise and were not covered by the ordinary “neutral and generally applicable” rule. The Court found the City’s standard contract created a formal system of discretionary exemptions (it let the Commissioner grant exceptions at “sole discretion”), so the non-discrimination rule was not generally applicable. The City’s separate anti-discrimination ordinance also did not apply because foster certification is a selective, private licensing process and not a public accommodation in the ordinary sense. Because the City’s approach was subject to strict scrutiny, the City failed to show a compelling reason to refuse an accommodation that would let the agency continue serving children consistent with its beliefs. The Court did not decide the free-speech claim.
Real world impact
The ruling means Philadelphia cannot refuse to contract with the Catholic agency simply because it won’t certify same-sex married couples under the City’s present contract scheme. The decision applies specifically to the City’s facts: the contract’s exemption mechanism and the selective nature of foster certification were central. The case goes back to the lower courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Dissents or concurrances
Several Justices wrote separate opinions: some joined the majority, while others agreed with the result but wrote separately about broader questions, including whether this Court should revisit the long-standing Smith decision about religious exemptions.
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