PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that a private pipeline company with federal approval can sue a state in court to take the state's land for a pipeline — because states surrendered their right to block such proceedings when they joined the Union.
The decision resolved a fundamental question about the federal government's power to build infrastructure through private companies, and it means states cannot use sovereign immunity to stall federally approved pipeline projects on land they own.
How it got here: The district court ruled for PennEast; the Third Circuit reversed on sovereign immunity grounds; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
PennEast Pipeline Company, a joint venture of several energy companies, received federal approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to build a 116-mile natural gas pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey. The pipeline route crossed land in which New Jersey held an interest — including conservation easements on roughly 40 parcels. When PennEast filed court proceedings to seize those land interests under the Natural Gas Act's eminent domain provision, New Jersey argued that it, as a sovereign state, could not be dragged into court by a private company without its consent.
The question before the Court
Can the federal government authorize a private pipeline company to sue a state in court to seize the state's land for a pipeline right-of-way, even if the state refuses to consent?
The Court's answer
Yes — a private company with a federal pipeline certificate can sue a state in court to take state-owned land for the pipeline. The Court held that the Natural Gas Act's eminent domain provision gives certificate holders the categorical power to condemn any necessary land, including land in which a state holds an interest, without the state's permission.
The constitutional barrier was state sovereign immunity — states' general protection against being sued without their consent. The Court held that protection does not apply here because the states surrendered their immunity from the federal eminent domain power when they ratified the Constitution. That power has always included the ability to bring condemnation proceedings in court, and it can be exercised by either the federal government directly or a private company the government has authorized. Allowing states to block a private delegatee's condemnation suit would effectively let states "diminish" the federal eminent domain power, which the founding-era plan of the Constitution does not permit.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Pipeline companies and other federally authorized infrastructure builders — including bridge, telecommunications, and electric transmission developers — can now drag states into court to seize state-owned land without the state's agreement. States can no longer simply refuse to negotiate and expect sovereign immunity to protect their property from federally delegated condemnation proceedings.
What changes now
The case returns to the Third Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling. The D.C. Circuit proceedings reviewing FERC's certificate order — held in abeyance while this case was decided — may now move forward. Justice Gorsuch's separate dissent flagged a potential Eleventh Amendment textual issue (whether that Amendment independently bars diversity suits against states as a jurisdictional matter) that the lower courts must consider on remand before reaching any remaining merits questions.
What this does not decide
The Court did not address whether the Eleventh Amendment's text independently strips federal courts of jurisdiction over diversity suits filed against states by out-of-state private plaintiffs — Justice Gorsuch flagged this unresolved question for the lower courts on remand. The decision also does not address which specific condemnation procedures (beyond traditional court proceedings) are available to private federal delegatees.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett argued that the Natural Gas Act is simply an exercise of Congress's commerce power, and the Court's longstanding rule — reaffirmed in Seminole Tribe — is that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to authorize private suits against nonconsenting states. The majority's escape route, that states surrendered immunity to private condemnation suits in the plan of the Convention, has no textual, structural, or historical support: no founding-era or early cases involve a private party suing a state in a condemnation proceeding. Barrett would have allowed New Jersey to assert sovereign immunity, leaving the federal government itself as the proper party to condemn state land rather than a private pipeline company.
Dissent — Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch joined Justice Barrett's dissent entirely but wrote separately to clarify a persistent confusion between two distinct state immunities. He distinguished 'structural immunity' — rooted in the Constitution's structure, waivable by consent — from proper 'Eleventh Amendment immunity,' which he read as a hard, unwaivable Article III subject-matter jurisdiction bar on certain diversity suits against states. Because PennEast (a Delaware citizen) sued New Jersey in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment's text may independently forbid the suit, and Gorsuch urged the lower courts to address this threshold jurisdictional question on remand.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Natural Gas Act's eminent domain provision (§717f(h)) allows a pipeline certificate holder to condemn 'necessary rights-of-way' if it cannot reach an agreement with the property owner. The Court read this delegation as categorical — covering state-owned land as well as private land — and noted that Congress specifically enacted the provision in 1947 to solve the problem of states blocking pipeline development.
- The Court traced a long history of the federal government exercising eminent domain through private delegatees — railroads, bridge companies, and pipeline operators — and found that courts had consistently allowed those delegatees to condemn land within state boundaries, including state-owned land. Cases such as Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. (1894) and Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co. (1890) confirmed that private companies exercising the federal eminent domain power do not need a separate, concurrent act of the state in which the lands lie.
- On sovereign immunity: states are normally protected from being sued without their consent, but the Court recognized that this protection is not absolute. States can be subjected to suit when they implicitly agreed to it in the 'plan of the Convention' — meaning the constitutional structure itself — as the Court has held for bankruptcy proceedings, suits by other states, and suits by the federal government.
- The Court held that when states ratified the Constitution, they surrendered immunity from the federal eminent domain power, including when that power is exercised by private federal delegatees. The eminent domain power and the ability to bring a condemnation proceeding in court are inseparably linked — you cannot delegate the power without also delegating the mechanism for enforcing it. Allowing a state to block only the courtroom step would let states impermissibly 'diminish' the federal eminent domain authority, which Kohl v. United States (1876) said a state 'can neither enlarge nor diminish.'
- Respondents argued that because no founding-era examples of private condemnation suits against state-owned land exist, states never consented to such suits. The Court rejected this logic, pointing to United States v. Texas (1892), where the Court held — without requiring founding-era examples — that states consented to being sued by the federal government based on constitutional structure alone. The same structural reasoning applies here: the plan of the Convention gave the federal government a superior eminent domain power, exercisable through delegatees, over state objections.
- Finally, on the clarity-of-delegation question: respondents argued that Congress must use 'unmistakably clear' language to authorize suits against states. The Court found no such requirement applies here, because the issue is not Congress delegating its own exemption from state sovereign immunity — it is Congress delegating the eminent domain power itself, which the states already consented to in full. No extra statutory clarity is required.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Kohl v. United States (91 U.S. 367)
Reaffirmed that the federal eminent domain power extends within state boundaries and cannot be enlarged or diminished by a state.
Distinguishes Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida (517 U.S. 44)
Distinguished on the ground that this case involves states' consent in the constitutional plan, not congressional abrogation of immunity under Article I.
Reaffirms Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co. (135 U.S. 641)
Reaffirmed that private delegatees of federal eminent domain power may condemn property without a concurrent state act.
Reaffirms United States v. Texas (143 U.S. 621)
Reaffirmed that structural constitutional considerations — not founding-era examples — can establish that states consented to suit in the plan of the Convention.