Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid
The Supreme Court ruled that California's regulation allowing union organizers onto private agricultural property for limited periods is a physical taking of property under the Fifth Amendment — meaning the state must pay the farm owners just compensation if it wants the rule to stand.
The decision significantly strengthens private property rights against government-mandated access and sets a new national benchmark for when regulations granting third parties the right to enter private land cross the line into a compensable government seizure.
How it got here: A federal district court dismissed the growers' lawsuit; a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company are California farms that employ hundreds of workers, none of whom live on the property. A California regulation let union organizers from the United Farm Workers enter both farms — for up to three hours a day during four months a year — to talk with workers about joining the union. In 2015, organizers entered Cedar Point's property unannounced before dawn, disrupting operations; organizers also attempted to enter Fowler's property. The growers sued to block enforcement of the regulation, arguing it seized their property without paying them anything for it.
The question before the Court
Does a California regulation that grants union organizers the right to enter private farm property for up to three hours a day, 120 days a year, count as a government "taking" of property that requires the state to pay the owners compensation?
The Court's answer
Yes — California's regulation granting union organizers a formal right to physically enter private farm property is a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment, and the state must pay the owners just compensation.
The Court held that the core question is not whether a government action is labeled a "regulation" but whether it physically appropriates property — whether for the government itself or for a third party. The right to exclude others is a fundamental element of owning property. When the government grants outsiders a formal entitlement to invade private land, it has appropriated that right to exclude, and the government must pay for what it takes. The fact that the intrusion here was limited to certain hours and days affects only how much compensation is owed, not whether a taking occurred at all.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Farm owners and other private property holders now have a stronger constitutional basis to demand payment when government rules force them to allow outside access to their land. California must either compensate the affected growers or repeal the access rule. Similar state and federal labor-organizing access regulations may face fresh legal challenges, and governments will need to restructure rules that require third-party entry onto private property.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings. On remand, California can choose to pay the growers just compensation — which would allow the access regulation to remain in effect — or face an injunction blocking enforcement. Because the growers sought only injunctive and declaratory relief (not money damages), the state retains the option to convert the regulation into a compensated taking rather than abandon it entirely. The amount of compensation, if any is pursued, would be determined in further proceedings.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not automatically invalidate government health and safety inspections, law enforcement searches, or requirements to allow access as a condition of receiving a permit or license — the Court carved out all three categories. It also does not decide how much compensation the growers are owed, or whether the access regulation must be struck down rather than compensated.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court's opinion fully but wrote separately to highlight that the Court's 1956 decision in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox — which held that the National Labor Relations Act does not require employers to allow union organizers on their property except in rare cases where employees have no other reasonable way to be reached — also strongly supports the growers' position. He argued that the California access regulation intrudes on property rights far more than Babcock allows, and that a California Supreme Court dissent from 1976 had correctly identified the regulation as unconstitutional.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer argued that the majority mischaracterizes the regulation. It does not 'appropriate' anything; it temporarily limits the growers' right to exclude, which under the Court's own precedents — especially Loretto and PruneYard — triggers Penn Central balancing rather than a per se taking rule. He contended that only permanent physical occupations are per se takings, while temporary invasions require a 'goes too far' analysis. He also warned that the majority's new rule, with its vague exceptions, threatens a wide range of ordinary government regulatory programs that require brief entry onto private property.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment) requires 'just compensation' when the government physically takes private property. Two standards apply: physical appropriations are subject to a simple per se rule — the government must pay — while regulations that only restrict how an owner uses their property are analyzed under the Penn Central balancing test, which weighs economic impact, interference with investment expectations, and the character of the government action.
- The essential distinction is whether the government physically appropriated property (for itself or a third party) or merely restricted the owner's use of it. A regulation can trigger a per se physical taking just as surely as a formal condemnation. The form of the government action — statute, ordinance, or regulation — is irrelevant; what matters is what it does.
- The right to exclude others from one's property is a 'fundamental element of the property right.' The Court's prior decisions — including military overflights in Causby (1946), the marina in Kaiser Aetna (1979), the cable-TV installation in Loretto (1982), and the beachfront easement in Nollan (1987) — all treated government-authorized physical invasions as per se takings because they appropriated the owner's right to exclude, regardless of how limited the intrusion was.
- California's regulation does the same: it grants union organizers a right to physically enter the growers' land and uses it, appropriating for third parties the owners' right to exclude. The fact that access is capped at 120 days per year and limited to union organizing does not convert a physical appropriation into a mere use restriction. Duration of an appropriation bears only on how much compensation is owed, not on whether a taking occurred in the first place.
- The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reading that only 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year access qualifies as a per se taking. It also distinguished PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980), where Penn Central balancing applied — because the PruneYard was a privately owned center open to 25,000 daily visitors. Restricting how a business open to the public may treat people on its premises is fundamentally different from granting outsiders the right to invade property that is closed to the public.
- The Court cabined its ruling with three limits: (1) isolated trespasses not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access are torts, not takings; (2) government access consistent with longstanding common law privileges — such as reasonable law enforcement searches or entry to avert necessity — does not require compensation, because owners never had a right to exclude those entries in the first place; and (3) the government may require access as a condition of a permit or license without causing a per se taking, which means routine health and safety inspections tied to a license generally will not trigger the rule.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (447 U.S. 74)
PruneYard applied only to businesses open to the public; it does not govern regulations invading property closed to the public.
Reaffirms Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (458 U.S. 419)
Permanent physical occupation is a per se taking; temporary duration affects only compensation owed, not whether a taking occurred.
Reaffirms Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (483 U.S. 825)
Government appropriation of an easement to physically access private property is a per se physical taking.
Reaffirms Horne v. Department of Agriculture (576 U.S. 351)
Physical appropriation of private property by the government is a per se taking regardless of regulatory form.