Terry v. United States
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a crack cocaine offender sentenced under a provision carrying no mandatory minimum is not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018, because the 2010 law that the First Step Act made retroactive never changed the penalties for that lower-tier offense.
Justice Sotomayor, while agreeing with the result, wrote separately to highlight that some offenders — particularly those convicted of small amounts but sentenced harshly as repeat offenders — were left behind by Congress's sentencing reforms and called on lawmakers to fix the gap.
“The question here is whether crack offenders who did not trigger a mandatory minimum qualify. They do not.”
The majority's plain statement of the case's central question and its answer.
How it got here: The federal trial court denied Terry's resentencing motion; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and appointed outside counsel after the new administration declined to defend the lower court's judgment.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty in 2008 to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. The amount — about 4 grams — was too small to trigger any mandatory minimum sentence under federal drug law. Because he had prior drug convictions, he was classified as a "career offender" and sentenced to 188 months. After Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, making earlier crack sentencing reductions retroactive, Terry sought a lower sentence, arguing his conviction qualified.
The question before the Court
Could a man convicted of possessing a small amount of crack cocaine — not enough to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence — receive a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018?
The Court's answer
No — an offender like Terry, convicted under the provision of federal drug law that carries no mandatory minimum and applies to any quantity of a controlled substance, is not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018.
The First Step Act limits eligibility to "covered offenses" — defined as violations whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. That 2010 law changed only the drug quantity thresholds that trigger mandatory minimum sentences for larger crack amounts. The penalties for the no-minimum offense Terry was convicted of — zero to twenty years — were identical before and after 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act changed nothing about that offense, Terry has no "covered offense," and the door to a reduced sentence is closed.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Crack cocaine offenders convicted of possessing an unspecified (small) amount — the category with no mandatory minimum — cannot use the First Step Act to ask a judge for a lower sentence, even if they were sentenced harshly under the old 100-to-1 crack-to-powder disparity. People already in prison in this category, like Tarahrick Terry, have no remaining legal avenue for relief absent new legislation.
What changes now
Terry remains serving his 188-month sentence with no avenue for reduction under the First Step Act. The ruling forecloses similar claims from all federal crack offenders convicted under the no-minimum, small-quantity provision of federal drug law. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence explicitly calls on Congress to act, noting it has tools available to extend relief to this group. Absent new legislation, those offenders — including career offenders sentenced before 2010 under subparagraph (C) — will serve out their original sentences.
What this does not decide
The Court does not address whether Congress should extend First Step Act relief to subparagraph (C) offenders, and it does not decide the fairness or wisdom of the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence explicitly invites Congress to remedy the remaining gap through legislation.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court's reading of the First Step Act and joined Part II of the opinion, but refused to join Part I, which she described as an incomplete and sanitized history of the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder sentencing ratio that glossed over its racially disparate impact and the pressure to pass the law quickly. She wrote separately to explain who gets left behind — particularly career offenders convicted of small crack amounts under subparagraph (C) — calling their exclusion from relief 'no small injustice' and urging Congress to act.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The First Step Act of 2018 allows courts to reduce a sentence only if the offender was convicted of a 'covered offense,' which the Act defines as a violation of federal law 'the statutory penalties for which were modified by' certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The central question is whether Terry's offense meets that definition.
- Federal drug law (21 U.S.C. § 841) sets out three tiers of penalties for crack cocaine. Two tiers — subparagraphs (A) and (B) — carry mandatory minimum sentences triggered by specific drug quantities (50 grams and 5 grams of crack, respectively, before 2010). The third tier — subparagraph (C) — has no mandatory minimum, no quantity threshold, and no distinction between crack and powder cocaine; it simply covers any amount of a controlled substance.
- The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the crack-to-powder sentencing disparity by raising the crack quantity thresholds that trigger the mandatory minimums — from 50 grams to 280 grams for the 10-year minimum, and from 5 grams to 28 grams for the 5-year minimum. This plainly changed the statutory penalties for subparagraph (A) and (B) offenses: someone charged with the same conduct that carried a 10-year minimum before 2010 now faces only a 5-year minimum.
- Subparagraph (C), however, was untouched. Before and after 2010, the statutory penalty for that offense remains exactly the same: 0 to 20 years, with no mandatory minimum. The Fair Sentencing Act addressed 'cocaine sentencing disparity,' and subparagraph (C) had never differentiated between crack and powder cocaine — so there was no disparity for that provision to correct.
- Terry argued the Court should instead focus on the broader 'penalty statute' or 'penalty scheme,' which did shift because prosecutors can no longer charge small-quantity crack cases under subparagraph (B). The Court rejected this reading as improperly rewriting the statutory text — 'statutory penalties' targets the specific penalties for Terry's particular offense, not the overall legislative scheme.
- Because the statutory penalties for subparagraph (C) were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, Terry's offense is not a 'covered offense,' and he is ineligible for resentencing under the First Step Act.