Torres v. Madrid
The Supreme Court ruled that police officers 'seize' a person under the Fourth Amendment the instant they shoot that person with the intent to stop them — even if the person escapes.
The decision resolves a split among lower courts and opens a path for people shot by police who manage to flee to bring federal civil rights lawsuits over excessive force, even when they were never physically captured.
“The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.”
The majority's core holding on when a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs during a police shooting.
How it got here: The federal district court granted summary judgment to the officers; the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that a suspect's continued flight after being shot negates a Fourth Amendment claim; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
New Mexico State Police officers arrived at an Albuquerque apartment complex to execute an arrest warrant. They approached Roxanne Torres, who was in a car and, believing them to be carjackers, hit the gas to escape. The officers fired 13 shots, striking Torres twice in the back. She drove 75 miles away and was not arrested until the next day. Torres later sued the officers under federal civil rights law, arguing the shooting was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Both the trial court and the appeals court ruled against her, holding that her continued flight after being shot meant no seizure had occurred.
The question before the Court
Does shooting someone who then drives away count as a Fourth Amendment "seizure," even if the person is never actually stopped or captured?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that shooting someone with the intent to stop them is a Fourth Amendment "seizure" even if the person escapes and is never brought under the officer's control. Drawing on centuries of English and American common law, the Court explained that an "arrest" — and therefore a Fourth Amendment seizure — was complete the moment an officer applied physical force to someone's body with the purpose of restraining them, regardless of whether the person submitted or was actually captured. The Court reasoned that a bullet accomplishes the same legally relevant "corporeal touching" as a hand, so the method of force does not change the analysis.
The Court was careful to cabin its ruling. A seizure by force lasts only as long as the force is applied — there is no ongoing "arrest during a period of flight." Whether the shooting here was unreasonable, what damages Torres might recover, and whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity — a protection that shields officers from personal liability unless they violated clearly established law — were all left open for the lower courts on remand.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People who are shot by police but manage to escape can now bring Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims in federal court. Before this ruling, several circuits — including the one below — dismissed such claims on the ground that no seizure occurred unless officers actually stopped and controlled the person. That defense is no longer available.
What changes now
The case is sent back to lower courts to resolve the questions the Supreme Court left open: whether the shooting was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, what damages Torres might be entitled to, and whether the officers qualify for qualified immunity. The ruling only establishes that a seizure occurred the instant the bullets struck Torres; those remaining questions — which could still result in dismissal — must be decided on remand.
What this does not decide
The Court decided only that a seizure occurred, not that the officers acted unlawfully. Questions of whether the seizure was unreasonable, what damages Torres can recover, and whether the officers have qualified immunity remain open. The ruling also does not address what kinds of force — pepper spray, flash-bang grenades, lasers — might count as a seizure under this framework.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch argued that 'seizure' has always meant taking possession of someone or something, not merely touching them. He contended the majority's 'mere touch' rule was drawn from a narrow, long-abandoned English debt-collection practice with no legitimate application to criminal arrests or the Fourth Amendment. In his view, the majority rewrote history, gave the same constitutional word two different meanings at the same time, and produced a rule that will generate new confusion while helping very few people — including, likely, Torres herself, who still faces qualified immunity on remand.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment's term 'seizure' of a person by consulting the common law of arrest — the historical practice that existed when the Amendment was adopted. Because arrests are the 'quintessential' seizure of a person, the Court looked to what counted as an arrest at the founding to define the constitutional term.
- At common law, a 'mere touch' rule held that any application of physical force to someone's body with the intent to restrain them completed an arrest — not a mere attempt — even if the person did not stop or was not subdued. English and American courts uniformly applied this rule from early cases through the founding era, holding that 'the slightest touch' was sufficient.
- The Court extended this rule to shootings. Because the Fourth Amendment protects the 'privacy and security of individuals' rather than regulating any particular form of governmental intrusion, a bullet can accomplish the same legally significant 'corporeal touching' as a hand. The absence of founding-era cases involving firearms for apprehension did not defeat this conclusion — handguns were not carried by law enforcement until well after the founding.
- A seizure by force requires that the force be applied with intent to restrain — not accidentally or for some other purpose. The governing test is objective: does the officer's conduct objectively manifest an intent to restrain, regardless of the officer's subjective motives or the suspect's subjective understanding? A shoulder tap for attention will rarely satisfy this; shots fired to stop a fleeing suspect clearly do. Crucially, a seizure by force lasts only as long as the force is applied — there is no continuing 'arrest during flight.'
- The officers' proposed alternative — requiring 'intentional acquisition of control' before any seizure occurs — would collapse two distinct categories. Seizures by a show of authority (like an order to halt) require actual submission before a seizure is complete. But seizures by force have always operated under a separate common law rule that requires no actual control. Merging the two categories would create unpredictable line-drawing problems about when exactly control is achieved, problems the centuries-old mere-touch rule was designed to avoid.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms California v. Hodari D. (499 U.S. 621)
The Court independently reaches the same conclusions about force-based seizures that Hodari D. articulated, treating those principles as good law.
Limits Brower v. County of Inyo (489 U.S. 593)
Brower's 'intentional acquisition of control' test correctly governs seizures by show of authority, but the Court holds it does not govern seizures by force.