Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo
The Supreme Court blocked New York's Governor from enforcing tight numerical caps on attendance at religious services, finding that capping churches and synagogues at 10 or 25 people while leaving many secular businesses uncapped likely violates the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom.
The ruling, issued as an emergency order during the COVID-19 pandemic, reversed the Court's earlier reluctance to second-guess state public health officials and signaled that strict constitutional review applies even in a crisis.
How it got here: Federal district courts and the Second Circuit denied emergency injunctions pending appeal; the Second Circuit scheduled a full merits hearing for December; the Diocese and Agudath Israel applied directly to the Supreme Court for emergency relief.
The Case in Depth
What happened
New York's Governor designated COVID-19 hot spots as "red" and "orange" zones, limiting attendance at religious services to 10 and 25 people respectively — hard caps that applied regardless of the building's size or the precautions taken. Many secular businesses in the same zones faced no comparable numerical caps. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America, a Jewish organization, argued that singling out houses of worship for uniquely harsh treatment violated the First Amendment.
The question before the Court
Could New York enforce strict numerical caps on attendance at religious services — as few as 10 people — while allowing many businesses to operate with no comparable attendance limits?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court blocked enforcement of the caps while the case continues through the courts. It found that the Diocese and Agudath Israel are likely to win on the merits because New York's rules single out religious services for far harsher treatment than many secular activities: in a red zone, a church or synagogue was limited to 10 people while hardware stores, acupuncturists, and liquor stores could admit as many customers as they wished. Laws that are not neutral toward religion must satisfy strict scrutiny — the highest constitutional standard — requiring the government to show both a compelling reason and the most limited restriction possible.
New York's interest in curbing COVID-19 spread is compelling, but the caps fail strict scrutiny: they are more severe than pandemic restrictions in any other state the Court had seen, less tailored than obvious alternatives like tying capacity to building size, and unsupported by evidence that the applicants' services had caused any outbreaks. The Court also rejected the argument that relief was premature because the areas had just been reclassified to a less restrictive zone — the Governor could reimpose tighter limits at any time without notice, keeping the threat of harm live and ongoing.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Churches, synagogues, mosques, and other houses of worship facing government-imposed attendance limits gained a significant legal tool to challenge those limits in court. States must now be prepared to justify why secular businesses that draw large crowds are treated more leniently than religious services, and must show their restrictions are as narrow as possible — not just that a public health crisis exists.
What changes now
The injunction blocks enforcement of the 10- and 25-person caps while the case proceeds to the Second Circuit (which had scheduled a full hearing for December) and, if certiorari is timely sought, to the Supreme Court again. The order terminates automatically if certiorari is denied. This is not a final ruling on the merits; the Second Circuit and, potentially, the full Supreme Court will still decide whether the restrictions permanently violate the First Amendment.
What this does not decide
The order is explicitly not a final decision on the merits. It does not determine whether the Free Exercise Clause forbids all numerical limits on religious services, or how states may regulate houses of worship during a pandemic more generally. It also does not address New York's less severe "yellow zone" restrictions, which the applicants did not challenge.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch wrote separately to insist that ordinary constitutional standards — including strict scrutiny for laws that single out religion — must apply during a pandemic, not a relaxed form of deference. He criticized the earlier South Bay concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts for invoking Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), arguing that Jacobson applied rational-basis review to a different right (bodily integrity) under entirely different circumstances and provides no warrant for loosening First Amendment protections during a health crisis. He declared it 'past time' to make clear that color-coded edicts reopening liquor stores while shuttering churches are unconstitutional.
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the Court's order and analysis but wrote to emphasize two points: the injunctions are temporary, not final merits rulings, and courts should still afford substantial deference to state officials on pandemic policy generally. He disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts only on timing — he saw no reason to wait until houses of worship were back in a red or orange zone before issuing relief, because the threat was imminent and clarity for both sides was valuable now.
Dissent — Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts would not issue the injunction because the areas in question had already been reclassified to yellow zones, meaning none of the applicant houses of worship were currently subject to the challenged caps. He agreed the 10- and 25-person limits seem unduly restrictive and may violate the Free Exercise Clause, and he agreed the current restrictions are distinguishable from South Bay and Calvary Chapel. But he believed the applicants had not yet demonstrated entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of an injunction, and could quickly refile if restrictions were reimposed.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer argued there was no practical need for an immediate injunction since the affected areas had been reclassified and the applicants could quickly refile if restrictions returned. He stressed that the constitutional question was far from clear given the severity of the pandemic — over 250,000 Americans dead, with a second surge underway — and that courts owe substantial deference to state health officials acting under rapidly changing, scientifically uncertain conditions. He would have waited for the Second Circuit's scheduled December hearing.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued that New York's rules actually treat religion more favorably than comparable secular gatherings: concerts, theaters, and sporting events must close entirely in the regulated zones, while houses of worship can still operate. She contended that liquor stores and bike shops — cited by Justice Gorsuch as comparators — do not share the same risk profile as indoor religious services where large groups gather, speak, and sing in close proximity for extended periods. She warned that the majority was playing a 'deadly game' by substituting its judgment for that of public health experts.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the four-factor test from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council for emergency injunctions: the applicants must show they are likely to succeed on the merits, that they will suffer irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of hardships favors them, and that an injunction serves the public interest.
- On likelihood of success, the Court asked whether New York's order is 'neutral' toward religion and 'generally applicable' — the baseline requirements from Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993). A law that treats comparable secular activities more leniently than religious ones is neither neutral nor generally applicable, and must satisfy strict scrutiny.
- The Court found the order plainly non-neutral: in red zones, religious services were capped at 10 people while 'essential' businesses — a category covering acupuncturists, liquor stores, and microelectronics factories — could admit unlimited customers. The disparity was even sharper in orange zones, where non-essential businesses could also set their own limits.
- Strict scrutiny — the strictest test in constitutional law, requiring a compelling government interest pursued through the most narrowly tailored means available — was applied. Stopping COVID-19 spread is unquestionably compelling, but the hard numerical caps failed the narrow-tailoring requirement: they are more severe than restrictions in California and Nevada, inconsistent with the applicants' clean safety records, and ignore obvious alternatives like capacity-based limits tied to building size.
- On irreparable harm, the Court invoked the principle from Elrod v. Burns (1976) that any loss of First Amendment freedoms — even for a short time — constitutes irreparable injury. Worshippers barred from Mass on Sunday or synagogue on Shabbat cannot fully substitute remote viewing, and some religious traditions require in-person participation.
- The Court rejected the dissenters' argument that relief should be withheld because the areas had been reclassified to yellow zones after the applications were filed. Because the Governor had changed zone designations repeatedly and without advance notice, the applicants faced a live and imminent threat of re-imposition — making the injunction necessary to prevent the same harm from recurring before courts could act.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (590 U. S. ___)
New York's far stricter hard-number caps are held distinguishable from California's percentage-based limits upheld in South Bay.
Distinguishes Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak (591 U. S. ___)
New York's 10- and 25-person caps are held far more severe than Nevada's 50-person limit considered in Calvary Chapel.