Barton v. Barr
The Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that a Jamaican-born green card holder could be categorically barred from asking an immigration judge to halt his deportation, based on assault convictions from two decades earlier — even though those convictions had nothing to do with why the government sought to remove him.
The decision broadly interprets immigration law's 'stop-time rule,' meaning longtime permanent residents can be denied any chance at removal relief because of old criminal records from their early years in the country, regardless of how their lives have changed since.
How it got here: An immigration judge found Barton removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal; the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Andre Barton, a Jamaican national who became a U.S. green card holder as a child, accumulated three sets of criminal convictions over twelve years: assault and firearms charges in 1996, and drug possession charges in 2007 and 2008. The government sought to deport him in 2016 based on the firearms and drug convictions. Barton applied for cancellation of removal — a discretionary form of relief allowing a judge to let him stay — but the government argued his 1996 assault convictions, though not the basis for his deportation, made him ineligible.
The question before the Court
Can a green card holder be denied the chance to seek relief from deportation based on crimes committed during their first seven years in the U.S., even if those crimes were not the reason the government sought to deport them?
The Court's answer
Yes — a green card holder can be barred from seeking cancellation of removal based on crimes from their first seven years in the U.S., even if those crimes were not the basis for the deportation proceeding. The stop-time rule precludes cancellation when a person committed an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) — a category of crimes that can make a noncitizen legally "inadmissible" — during the initial seven years. The Court held that "inadmissibility" is a legal status that attaches upon conviction of a covered crime, not a formal finding made in a removal proceeding.
The statute works like a criminal recidivist law, requiring immigration judges to look beyond the deportation offense to the applicant's full criminal record. Because Barton committed aggravated assault during his first seven years — offenses involving moral turpitude that triggered inadmissibility status upon his later conviction — he was ineligible for cancellation, even though those assault offenses played no role in the government's original deportation case against him.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Green card holders who committed certain crimes during their first seven years in the United States — even crimes that never triggered deportation proceedings — can be permanently barred from asking an immigration judge to consider canceling their removal. This affects longtime permanent residents with substantial family ties and years of law-abiding life in the country following early offenses.
What changes now
Barton's application for cancellation of removal is rejected, and he faces deportation to Jamaica after spending most of his life in the United States. The decision resolves a circuit split: the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits' broader reading of the stop-time rule is confirmed, and the Ninth Circuit's narrower approach is effectively overridden. Congress could amend the statute to change the outcome for future applicants.
What this does not decide
The Court's discussion of whether the stop-time clock runs from the date an offense is committed versus the date of conviction was not disputed by the parties and was not the question presented. The dissent cautions this portion of the opinion should not be read as resolving a separate circuit split on that trigger-date question.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued that 'inadmissible' and 'deportable' are mutually exclusive legal terms of art in immigration law: inadmissibility applies only to people seeking admission, while deportability applies to those already admitted. Because Barton had been lawfully admitted and was not seeking readmission, he could not be found 'inadmissible,' and the stop-time rule's second clause simply did not apply to him. Under her reading, the rule's third clause — covering deportability — would have independent meaning, and Barton's assault offense (which didn't make him deportable) couldn't bar his cancellation eligibility. She also stressed that the immigration judge found Barton had a strong case for relief on the merits, with four young U.S.-citizen children and demonstrated rehabilitation.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court treated the cancellation-of-removal statute as functioning like a criminal recidivist law. Just as a sentencing judge considers a defendant's full criminal history beyond the crime charged, immigration judges at the cancellation stage must look beyond the offense that triggered deportation at the applicant's entire record — including crimes that were never a basis for removal.
- The critical 'stop-time rule' cuts off a green card holder's continuous-residence clock when the person committed an offense 'referred to in §1182(a)(2)' — a list of crimes, including crimes involving moral turpitude, that can make a noncitizen legally 'inadmissible' — during the initial seven years of residence. The Court read 'renders the alien inadmissible' as a legal status triggered by conviction, not as a formal procedural determination requiring an actual admissibility ruling.
- Barton's main argument — that the disqualifying offense must be the same offense that triggered the deportation proceeding — fell apart on the statute's own terms. Deportation of green card holders is ordinarily based on a different section (§1227(a)(2), which covers deportability), not §1182(a)(2) (which covers inadmissibility). If Congress had meant to limit the stop-time rule to deportation offenses, it would have referenced §1227(a)(2) as well — and Barton's counsel conceded at argument that the omission was 'a little hard to explain.'
- The Court acknowledged that its reading makes the statute's reference to §1227(a)(2) appear redundant — any offense that triggers deportability under §1227(a)(2) and is listed in §1182(a)(2) would already render the person inadmissible under §1182(a)(2). But the Court held that redundancy is common in statutory drafting and does not justify rewriting the statute's clear text to require a match between the disqualifying offense and the removal offense.
- Barton's fallback argument — that the government must at least have been capable of charging him with an inadmissibility offense — also failed. Because the statute is a recidivist bar, whether the disqualifying offense was charged or chargeable as a removal ground is simply irrelevant to the analysis.