Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian
The Supreme Court ruled that Montana landowners can pursue state-court claims against the company that contaminated their properties with arsenic and lead, but cannot carry out their own cleanup plan without first getting EPA approval.
The decision settles a key question about federal Superfund law: even property owners whom the government has never pursued can still be required to seek federal sign-off before taking remedial action on their own land.
How it got here: A Montana trial court sided with the landowners on the key legal questions; the Montana Supreme Court affirmed via a writ of supervisory control; Atlantic Richfield sought Supreme Court review, which was granted.
The Case in Depth
What happened
For nearly a century, a copper smelter near Butte, Montana contaminated over 300 square miles with arsenic and lead, becoming one of the nation's first Superfund sites. EPA has managed a cleanup with Atlantic Richfield Company since 1983. In 2008, 98 nearby property owners sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court for nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, seeking restoration damages to fund a far more aggressive cleanup — costing $50–58 million — that went well beyond what EPA's plan required.
The question before the Court
Could Montana homeowners living on a federal Superfund site sue the company responsible for the pollution under state law — and if so, must they first get federal approval before carrying out their own, more aggressive cleanup?
The Court's answer
Partly. On the first question, the Court ruled that Montana state courts can hear the landowners' lawsuit. The Superfund law (CERCLA) channels cases "arising under" it to federal courts — but these claims arise under Montana common law, not CERCLA, so state courts retain jurisdiction. The company's argument that a separate provision stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over cleanup challenges also blocked state courts was rejected: that provision plainly applies only to federal courts.
On the second question, the Court ruled that the landowners must seek EPA approval before implementing their restoration plan. Under the statute, any owner of property where hazardous substances have "come to be located" is a "potentially responsible party" — and such parties cannot take remedial action at a Superfund site without federal authorization. The fact that the government can no longer sue the landowners because the limitations period has expired does not change their status as potentially responsible parties; that label turns on the condition of the property, not on whether a lawsuit remains possible.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People who own land near any of the nation's 1,300-plus Superfund sites retain access to state courts to sue polluters for damages. But they cannot implement their own cleanup without EPA permission — even if the government has never treated them as responsible for the contamination — potentially locking landowners into the federal cleanup timeline, which in this case stretches to 2025 and beyond.
What changes now
The case returns to Montana courts. Before proceeding with their restoration plan, the landowners must seek EPA approval. The Montana courts can either stay the case to allow time for that process or dismiss the restoration-damages claim without prejudice pending EPA review. Whether EPA — which has indicated the landowners' plan poses environmental risks — will approve a plan far exceeding its own standards is uncertain. Any remaining preemption questions are preserved for later if EPA does approve the plan.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly declined to decide whether the landowners' plan would be preempted by federal law if EPA were to approve it — that question awaits the outcome of the approval process. The Court also left open the difficult interpretive puzzles Justice Alito identified in CERCLA § 113's jurisdictional provisions, which future cases may need to resolve.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Alito
Justice Alito agreed that the landowners are potentially responsible parties who need EPA approval (Part III), and agreed the Court has jurisdiction to hear the case (Part I). He declined to join the majority's holding in Part II-B that state courts have jurisdiction over state-law challenges to EPA cleanup plans, arguing that question was unnecessary and premature to decide — the case would likely die if EPA (as expected) rejected the landowners' plan, making the state-court-jurisdiction issue academic.
Dissent in part — Justice Gorsuch
“Along the way, it strips away ancient common law rights from innocent landowners and forces them to suffer toxic waste in their backyards, playgrounds, and farms. Respectfully, that is not what the law was written to do; that is what it was written to prevent.”Justice Gorsuch's conclusion that the majority's reading transforms CERCLA from a law that supplements state remedies into one that prohibits them.
Justice Gorsuch agreed with Parts I and II (SCOTUS jurisdiction and state court jurisdiction) but dissented sharply from Part III's holding that innocent landowners are potentially responsible parties. He argued that the statutory phrase 'potentially responsible party' has a specific meaning — someone the government could actually hold liable — and that these landowners, who were never notified of liability and cannot be sued due to the expired limitations period, plainly do not qualify. He warned that the majority's reading effectively forces innocent homeowners to obtain federal permission before cleaning toxic waste from their own backyards, conflicting with CERCLA's repeated promises to preserve state law remedies.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first confirmed it had authority to review the Montana Supreme Court's ruling. Under Montana law, a 'writ of supervisory control' is a self-contained separate case — not a preliminary appeal — so the ruling counted as a final judgment that the Supreme Court is permitted to review.
- On jurisdiction in Montana courts: CERCLA's § 113(b) gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction only over cases 'arising under' CERCLA, echoing the familiar federal-question-jurisdiction meaning of that phrase. Because the landowners' nuisance, trespass, and strict-liability claims are based on Montana common law — not CERCLA itself — they do not 'arise under' CERCLA and state courts may hear them.
- Atlantic Richfield argued that § 113(h) — which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review 'challenges to removal or remedial action' — implicitly blocks state courts too. The Court rejected this: § 113(h) speaks only of 'Federal courts' and there is no textual basis to read it as also stripping state courts of jurisdiction over state-law claims. Taking such an extraordinary step by implication would require a clear congressional statement that simply isn't there.
- On the EPA-approval requirement: § 122(e)(6) of CERCLA bars any 'potentially responsible party' from taking remedial action at a Superfund site without EPA authorization. To identify who qualifies as a potentially responsible party, the Court looked to § 107(a), the Act's liability section, which includes any 'owner' of a 'facility' — defined as any site where a hazardous substance has 'come to be located.' Because arsenic and lead have contaminated the landowners' properties, those properties are statutory 'facilities' and the owners are potentially responsible parties.
- The landowners argued that the expired six-year limitations period — which means the government can no longer sue them — removed their PRP status. The Court disagreed: PRP status reflects what kind of property a person owns, not whether they currently face legal liability. Even landowners shielded by the statute's 'innocent landowner' defense remain PRPs under the statute's definitions, and the same logic applies to those the government simply cannot sue anymore.
- Because the landowners are PRPs, § 122(e)(6) requires them to get EPA approval before implementing their restoration plan. Montana law requires restoration damages actually to be spent on remediation, and that remediation cannot lawfully proceed without EPA's authorization. The landowners must therefore seek approval first; what happens to their claims after that process plays out remains open.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (551 U.S. 128)
Reaffirmed that PRP status under § 107(a) is broad and includes even parties who bear no actual liability for contamination.
Reaffirms Tafflin v. Levitt (493 U.S. 455)
Reaffirmed the deeply rooted presumption favoring concurrent state court jurisdiction, which requires a clear statement to displace.