Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a retirement plan participant does not legally 'know' about investment decisions simply because disclosure documents were sent to him — he must actually have read or been aware of the information before the shorter three-year deadline to sue begins.
The decision means plan administrators cannot automatically rely on the fact that they sent disclosures to cut off a participant's right to sue; they must show the participant genuinely learned of the problem.
How it got here: A federal trial court granted summary judgment to Intel's plan administrators; the Ninth Circuit reversed; the administrators asked the Supreme Court to step in and the Court agreed to hear it.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Christopher Sulyma participated in two Intel retirement plans from 2010 to 2012. After leaving Intel, he sued in October 2015, claiming the plan administrators had recklessly loaded his retirement funds with high-fee alternative investments like hedge funds and private equity. The administrators argued his suit was filed too late because investment disclosures had been available on a website he visited many times. Sulyma testified he did not remember reviewing those specific disclosures and was unaware of the alternative-asset investments while he worked at Intel.
The question before the Court
Does an ERISA pension plan participant automatically "know" about investment decisions the moment he receives disclosure documents, even if he never reads them — triggering the shorter three-year deadline to sue?
The Court's answer
No — a retirement plan participant does not automatically have "actual knowledge" of investment information just because disclosure documents were sent to him or made available online. ERISA's three-year deadline to sue only begins when the participant genuinely becomes aware of the relevant facts, not merely when access to them is provided.
The Court gave "actual knowledge" its plain meaning: being in fact aware of information. Because Congress explicitly added language covering what plaintiffs "acquired or should have acquired" knowledge of in other ERISA time-limit provisions — but never added it to the three-year provision at issue — the Court concluded Congress deliberately confined this deadline to genuine awareness only. Showing that disclosures were delivered is not enough on its own to start the clock.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Retirement savers who receive but never read plan disclosures keep more time to sue plan administrators over bad investment decisions — the three-year clock doesn't start until they actually learn of the problem. For plan administrators, the ruling means disclosure alone is not enough to trigger the shorter deadline; they must establish the participant genuinely became aware of the relevant facts.
What changes now
The case returns to lower courts with Sulyma's suit surviving: his testimony that he did not recall reading the investment disclosures created a genuine factual dispute about when he actually learned of the problem. The administrators may still try to prove actual knowledge through circumstantial evidence — such as electronic records of his website visits or actions he took in response to the disclosed information — or through a "willful blindness" argument, but they cannot rely on disclosure alone.
What this does not decide
The decision does not address what specific facts a participant must actually know about a fiduciary's conduct — such as how much detail is needed — to start the three-year clock. It also does not prevent defendants from proving actual knowledge through circumstantial evidence, electronic access records, or arguments that a plaintiff deliberately avoided learning the facts.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court started with the plain text of ERISA § 1113(2), which triggers a three-year filing deadline from the date a plaintiff had 'actual knowledge' of a fiduciary breach. Looking at ordinary and legal dictionaries, the Court found the meaning unmistakable: 'actual' means existing in fact or reality, and 'knowledge' means awareness. Together, they require a plaintiff to genuinely know about the breach — not merely to have received information about it.
- The Court contrasted 'actual knowledge' with 'constructive knowledge' — the legal concept that treats a person as if they knew something because a reasonably diligent person would have found out. The word 'actual' signals that Congress wanted something more than this hypothetical standard; a participant who could have learned the facts by reading his disclosures has not yet satisfied the requirement.
- The Court looked at how Congress wrote comparable time-limit provisions elsewhere in ERISA. Several other provisions explicitly use the phrase 'acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge,' covering both genuine and constructive knowledge. Section 1113(2) uses only 'actual knowledge.' Under the basic rule of statutory interpretation that deliberate omissions carry meaning, the Court concluded Congress intentionally left out constructive knowledge from this provision.
- ERISA's legislative history reinforced that conclusion: an earlier version of § 1113(2) expressly included a constructive-knowledge clause covering information filed with the Secretary of Labor, but Congress later removed it. Because a statutory amendment is presumed to have real effect, the current version's silence on constructive knowledge is not an accident.
- The Court rejected the administrators' policy argument that plan administrators deserve protection from suits over old investment decisions. While enforcing the plain meaning may reduce § 1113(2)'s usefulness to administrators, the choice between that outcome and reducing beneficiaries' rights is one for Congress to make — not the courts. The six-year statute of repose in § 1113(1) remains available to provide some outer limit on administrators' exposure.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Merck & Co. v. Reynolds (559 U. S. 633)
Reaffirmed its distinction between 'actual knowledge' and the broader knowledge a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have.