Kisor v. Wilkie
The Supreme Court declined to overturn a decades-old doctrine, known as Auer deference, that tells courts to defer to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations. A veteran who had been denied earlier-dated disability benefits argued the doctrine should be scrapped entirely.
Instead of abandoning the doctrine, the Court narrowed and tightened it substantially, spelling out new conditions a regulation and an agency's interpretation must meet before deference applies. The veteran's case goes back to a lower court to apply these tighter rules, and the decision reshapes how courts across the country review agency rule-interpretations going forward.
“The deference doctrine we describe is potent in its place, but cabined in its scope.”
The majority's summary of how limited, but still surviving, Auer deference now operates.
How it got here: The VA's Board of Veterans' Appeals and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the benefits decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed by deferring to the VA's rule interpretation; the veteran asked the Supreme Court to overrule that deference doctrine.
The Case in Depth
What happened
James Kisor, a Vietnam veteran, first sought disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs in 1982 for post-traumatic stress disorder but was denied. In 2006 he reopened his claim with new medical evidence, and the VA granted benefits — but only starting from 2006, not from his original 1982 application. The dispute turned on the VA's interpretation of what counts as "relevant" military records under its own regulation.
The question before the Court
Should the Supreme Court get rid of the longstanding rule requiring courts to defer to a federal agency's reasonable reading of its own ambiguous regulations?
The Court's answer
Partly — the Court kept Auer deference alive but significantly narrowed it. A majority declined to overrule the doctrine, mainly out of respect for decades of settled precedent and Congress's continued acceptance of the framework, concluding that Kisor had not shown the "special justification" needed to abandon it.
At the same time, the Court tightened when deference actually applies: a regulation must be genuinely ambiguous even after a court exhausts every traditional interpretive tool, and the agency's reading must be reasonable, authoritative, expertise-based, and a fair, considered judgment rather than a convenient litigating position. Because the lower court hadn't done this full analysis, the case was sent back for reconsideration under these tighter standards.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Millions of regulated individuals, businesses, and government beneficiaries interact with agency rules whose meaning is sometimes unclear. This decision means courts will scrutinize agency interpretations more closely before deferring to them, giving people challenging an agency's reading of its own rule a better chance to win — but it does not eliminate agency deference altogether, so agencies retain real interpretive power in many disputes.
What changes now
The case returns to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must now apply the newly clarified framework: first determining, using every traditional interpretive tool, whether the VA regulation on 'relevant' records is genuinely ambiguous, and if so, whether the VA's interpretation is the kind of authoritative, expertise-based, fair judgment that merits deference. This is a final merits ruling on the deference question, though Kisor's individual benefits dispute remains unresolved pending that further proceeding.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the VA's interpretation of "relevant" records is actually correct — that question goes back to the lower court. The opinion also does not address Chevron deference, the related doctrine governing how courts review agency interpretations of statutes rather than regulations.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts joined the controlling parts of the majority opinion but wrote separately to argue that the gap between the majority's approach and Justice Gorsuch's rejection of Auer is smaller than it appears, since both require similar showings of genuine ambiguity, reasonableness, and considered judgment. He also stressed that the ruling does not address Chevron deference for statutes.
Concurrence — Justice Gorsuch
“It should have been easy for the Court to say goodbye to Auer v. Robbins.”Gorsuch's opening statement arguing the doctrine should have been overruled entirely.
Justice Gorsuch argued Auer should have been formally overruled, contending it conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act's command that courts determine the meaning of agency actions themselves, and that it improperly hands interpretive judicial power to the executive branch in violation of separation-of-powers principles. He called the majority's retooled version of Auer a 'zombie' doctrine that will generate confusion without meaningfully constraining courts.
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh agreed Auer should be formally retired but emphasized that rigorously applying the majority's 'exhaust all traditional tools' requirement should, in practice, lead courts to the same place as outright overruling, since a court that fully resolves ambiguity has no need to defer. He distinguished deference to an agency's genuine policy discretion under open-ended terms from Auer deference itself.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with stare decisis — the principle that departing from long-settled precedent requires a 'special justification,' not merely a belief that the precedent was wrongly decided.
- It explained that Auer deference rests on a presumption that Congress generally wants agencies, not courts, to resolve genuine ambiguities in their own rules, because agencies can better reconstruct a rule's original meaning, bring policy expertise to bear, and promote uniform national interpretation.
- The Court held that deference is available only when a regulation is 'genuinely ambiguous' after a court has exhausted every traditional tool of interpretation — text, structure, history, and purpose — and even then only if the agency's reading falls within the bounds of a reasonable interpretation.
- Beyond that, the Court added that deference is warranted only if the interpretation reflects the agency's authoritative or official position, draws on its substantive expertise, and represents its fair and considered judgment rather than a convenient litigating position or a surprise change in policy.
- Weighing Kisor's statutory, policy, and constitutional objections against these considerations, the Court found none of them supplied the kind of special justification needed to overcome stare decisis and overrule Auer and Seminole Rock.
- Turning to the case itself, the Court concluded the lower appeals court had jumped straight to deference without first exhausting its interpretive tools or asking whether the VA's rule-interpretation was the kind Congress would want courts to defer to.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Auer v. Robbins (519 U. S. 452)
Keeps agency deference alive but narrows it with new conditions courts must apply before deferring.
Reaffirms Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (325 U. S. 410)
Declines to overrule this 1945 case, keeping its deference principle as still-valid law.