Gundy v. United States
Headline: Court upholds law letting the Attorney General decide how and when federal sex‑offender registration applies to people convicted before SORNA, affirming a pre‑Act offender’s failure-to-register conviction.
Holding: The Court held that Congress validly authorized the Attorney General to determine how and when SORNA’s registration rules apply to people convicted before the law, and affirmed Gundy’s conviction.
- Affirms federal enforcement of registration rules for many pre‑SORNA offenders.
- Lets the Attorney General set timing and detailed rules for pre‑Act registrations.
- Maintains criminal penalties for failing to register under the Attorney General’s rules.
Summary
Background
A man convicted of a sex crime before Congress passed SORNA (Herman Gundy) failed to register after moving to New York and was later charged under a federal law that penalizes knowing failures to register. SORNA set a national registration system and required initial registration before completing a prison sentence, but §20913(d) said the Attorney General “shall have the authority to specify the applicability” of those requirements to people convicted before the law. The Attorney General issued rules applying SORNA to all pre‑Act offenders; Gundy argued that Congress had unlawfully given away its legislative power by doing so.
Reasoning
The Court’s majority (Kagan, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) first read the statute in context and relied on Reynolds, concluding Congress intended SORNA to cover pre‑Act offenders but recognized practical problems in immediate implementation. Interpreting §20913(d) in light of SORNA’s purpose and text, the Court held the Attorney General’s role was limited: he may address feasibility and transition issues but must apply SORNA to pre‑Act offenders “as soon as feasible.” Given that meaning, the delegation supplies an intelligible principle and does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, so the Court affirmed Gundy’s conviction.
Real world impact
The ruling leaves in place the Attorney General’s rulemaking power over how SORNA reached people convicted before the law, and it sustains criminal enforcement against at least some pre‑Act offenders who do not register. The decision relies on statutory interpretation rather than creating a new rule limiting executive power; one Justice concurred only in the judgment and another strongly dissented, signaling this area could be revisited.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but said the Court should reconsider the long‑standing approach to delegation in a future case. Justice Gorsuch (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas) dissented, arguing the statute improperly lets one executive official write criminal rules for hundreds of thousands of people and warning of accountability and separation‑of‑powers problems.
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