Quarles v. United States
The Supreme Court ruled that a person commits generic "remaining-in" burglary whenever he forms the intent to commit a crime at any point while unlawfully staying inside a building, not just the instant he first stays there unlawfully.
That means a Michigan man's prior home-invasion conviction counted as a violent felony under the federal law that adds a mandatory 15-year sentence for repeat armed offenders, so his enhanced sentence stands.
“the crucial word 'remains' permits no connotation other than continuing presence.”
Explaining why unlawfully remaining in a building is a continuous act, not a single moment.
How it got here: A federal trial court sentenced Quarles under the enhanced penalty, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court took the case to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Jamar Quarles pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm. Because he had three earlier convictions, including a 2002 Michigan third-degree home-invasion conviction for chasing an ex-girlfriend into an apartment, prosecutors sought a mandatory 15-year sentence under a federal law aimed at armed repeat offenders. Quarles argued the Michigan crime was defined too broadly to count as "burglary" under federal law.
The question before the Court
If someone breaks into a home legally but only decides to commit a crime after already being inside, does that still count as "burglary" for a tougher federal prison sentence?
Why it matters
The ruling keeps a broad range of state burglary laws counting as predicate "violent felonies" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, meaning more people convicted of gun crimes with prior burglary-type records will face steep 15-year mandatory minimum sentences rather than escaping the enhancement on a technicality about timing.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision resolving the legal question nationwide, so lower courts must now apply the "any time while unlawfully remaining" standard when deciding whether state burglary convictions qualify as violent felonies under the federal sentencing enhancement. Quarles's own sentence, which the trial court and the Sixth Circuit already upheld, remains affirmed and there is no further remand in his case.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide the broader Sixth Amendment question, raised only in a concurrence, about whether judges rather than juries should be deciding if a past conviction qualifies as burglary. It also resolved only the timing of intent for "remaining-in" burglary, not other disputes about what counts as generic burglary.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority but argued the Court's entire "categorical approach" to comparing crimes for this sentencing law may be wrongly decided, calling it a misguided attempt to avoid Sixth Amendment issues rather than something the statute's text requires. He suggested juries, not judges, could determine whether a conviction actually matches federal burglary, which would avoid unconstitutional judicial fact-finding. He noted this wouldn't have helped Quarles here since he didn't raise that challenge and any error would be harmless.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court relied on its 1990 decision defining generic "burglary" under federal law as unlawful entry into, or remaining in, a building with intent to commit a crime, and had to decide exactly when that intent must form during a "remaining-in" burglary.
- Looking at ordinary usage and how courts have treated similar words elsewhere, the Court found that "remaining in" describes a continuous activity, not a single instant, drawing on a past case interpreting a law about visitors who "remain" in the country too long.
- Because unlawfully remaining in a building is a continuous act, the Court reasoned that a person's intent to commit a crime satisfies the burglary definition as long as it forms at any point during that continuous unlawful presence, not only at the first moment.
- The Court found this reading consistent with how most state courts had already interpreted similar remaining-in burglary laws as of 1986, when Congress enacted the sentencing law at issue.
- The Court also reasoned that a narrower reading would undercut Congress's purpose in treating burglary as dangerous, since the risk of a violent confrontation with an occupant does not depend on the precise moment the intent to commit a crime arose.
- Applying this broader definition, the Court concluded that Michigan's home-invasion statute matches or is narrower than the generic definition, so Quarles's conviction properly counted as a qualifying violent felony.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Taylor v. United States (495 U. S. 575)
The Court relies on and applies Taylor's definition of generic burglary and its categorical-approach framework.