National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra
The Supreme Court ruled that California likely violated the First Amendment by forcing pro-life pregnancy centers to advertise the state's abortion services, rejecting the idea that 'professional speech' gets less constitutional protection.
The decision blocks California from enforcing both the licensed-clinic notice about abortion access and the unlicensed-clinic disclosure requirement while the case continues, and it narrows the tools states have to compel speech from professionals.
How it got here: A federal trial court denied a preliminary injunction against the notices; the Ninth Circuit affirmed; the centers asked the Supreme Court to review that decision.
The Case in Depth
What happened
California passed the FACT Act to regulate crisis pregnancy centers, which are pro-life organizations offering pregnancy-related services. Licensed centers had to notify women about free or low-cost state services, including abortion. Unlicensed centers had to disclose that they weren't licensed medical facilities. Two pregnancy centers and an association of such centers sued, claiming both notices violated their free-speech rights.
The question before the Court
Could California require pro-life pregnancy centers to tell patients about the state's free or low-cost abortion services, and require unlicensed clinics to disclose they aren't licensed?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled California likely violated the First Amendment with both notice requirements. For licensed clinics, forcing them to advertise the state's abortion services was a content-based compelled-speech mandate that failed even a middle level of scrutiny because it was riddled with exemptions and California had less restrictive alternatives, like running its own awareness campaign. The Court also rejected treating "professional speech" as a special category deserving weaker protection.
For unlicensed clinics, the Court found California hadn't shown a real (non-hypothetical) need for the disclosure and that the requirement was unjustifiably burdensome — it applied no matter what the clinic actually said, and it singled out pregnancy-related unlicensed providers while exempting similar unlicensed businesses. Both requirements were therefore likely unconstitutional, at least at this preliminary stage.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Pregnancy centers and other licensed professionals gain stronger protection against government mandates to deliver messages they disagree with. States seeking to require professionals — doctors, lawyers, counselors — to disclose government-drafted information will face tougher constitutional scrutiny unless the disclosure is purely factual, uncontroversial, and tied to their own services.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts for further proceedings, but because the Supreme Court found the clinics likely to succeed on the merits, California's notice requirements are unlikely to be enforced against the challengers going forward absent a different showing by the state. This is a final ruling on the preliminary-injunction question, not a permanent resolution of the underlying lawsuit, which continues below.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide whether the notices amount to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, leaving that claim unresolved. It also said it was not questioning the legality of longstanding, purely factual health and safety disclosure laws generally, and left open whether some other justification could support treating professional speech differently.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court's opinion in full but wrote separately to stress that California's law also appears to reflect viewpoint discrimination, forcing pro-life centers specifically to promote a message — abortion access — that contradicts their core beliefs. He argued this history of targeting a disfavored viewpoint deserved serious constitutional concern even though the majority didn't need to resolve it.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer argued both notices were likely constitutional. He said the majority's broad 'content-based' test would threaten countless ordinary disclosure laws, and that under Planned Parenthood v. Casey states may require medical professionals to disclose information — including about abortion or adoption — as part of regulating the practice of medicine. He would have denied the preliminary injunction entirely.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court identified the licensed notice as a content-based regulation of speech, since it forces clinics to speak a specific government message about abortion — the very thing many of the clinics oppose — which counts as altering the content of their speech.
- The Court rejected treating 'professional speech' as its own First Amendment category deserving lesser protection, explaining that reduced scrutiny has applied only in two narrow situations: purely factual disclosures tied to a professional's own commercial services, and regulations of professional conduct that only incidentally touch speech.
- The Court found neither exception fit here: the abortion-related disclosure wasn't purely factual and uncontroversial information about the clinic's own services, and the notice wasn't an informed-consent rule tied to any medical procedure — it applied regardless of whether any procedure was ever discussed.
- Because the notice was content-based and outside those exceptions, the Court held it had to survive at least intermediate scrutiny, and found the notice 'wildly underinclusive' because it exempted many other clinics serving similar low-income populations, undermining California's stated informational interest.
- The Court also concluded California had less restrictive ways to spread the same information, such as its own public-awareness campaign, meaning the clinics were likely to succeed on their challenge to the licensed notice.
- Turning to the unlicensed notice, the Court found California had shown no more than a hypothetical justification for it and, separately, that its speaker-based design — applying regardless of what a facility actually said and exempting similar providers — made it unduly burdensome under the disclosure standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (505 U. S. 833)
The Court said Casey's approval of abortion informed-consent disclosures does not apply because this notice isn't tied to any medical procedure.
Distinguishes Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio (471 U. S. 626)
The Court said Zauderer's lenient disclosure rule doesn't apply because the licensed notice isn't purely factual or tied to the clinic's own services.