Currier v. Virginia

2018-06-22
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Headline: Defendant who agreed to split his criminal case cannot later block a second trial on double jeopardy grounds, as Court affirmed conviction and allowed retrial of severed firearm charge.

Holding:

Real World Impact:
  • Allows prosecutors to retry severed charges when a defendant agreed to separate trials.
  • Reduces double jeopardy defenses for defendants who choose severance.
  • May lead some courts to limit or discourage severance requests.
Topics: double jeopardy, severance of charges, criminal procedure, evidence of prior convictions

Summary

Background

A man named Michael Currier was charged after police recovered a stolen safe with guns and missing cash. He faced burglary, grand larceny, and a separate charge for unlawful possession of a firearm because of past felony convictions. Worried that proof of his prior convictions would bias jurors, he and the prosecutor agreed to split the case into two trials: the burglary and larceny first, then the firearm charge. The first jury acquitted him of burglary and larceny. The state went ahead with the second trial and convicted him on the gun-possession count.

Reasoning

The Court addressed whether a defendant who agrees to a severance can later claim the second trial violates the Double Jeopardy Clause (the protection against multiple prosecutions for the same offense). The majority explained that longstanding cases let a defendant’s voluntary choice to seek separate trials remove the constitutional bar to a later prosecution of related charges. The Court relied on earlier decisions saying consent, mistrial motions, or requests for separate proceedings typically prevent double jeopardy objections. The Court also rejected importing civil issue-preclusion rules into criminal law to broadly block relitigation of factual issues.

Real world impact

The decision means people who accept or request separate trials usually cannot stop a later trial for the related charge by invoking double jeopardy. Prosecutors may retry severed charges and may introduce evidence permitted by ordinary rules of evidence. States may change how readily they grant severances; victims and witnesses may face longer proceedings. Because the Court decided consent matters here, the ruling narrows one path for blocking second trials.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Kennedy agreed with Parts I–II that consent resolves this case; Justice Ginsburg (joined by three Justices) dissented, arguing that an acquittal should preclude relitigation of issues it necessarily decided and that Currier’s consent should not strip that protection.

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