Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky
The Court struck down Minnesota's ban on wearing political badges, buttons, or insignia inside polling places, ruling that the law's undefined use of the word "political" gave election officials too much unguided discretion to decide what counts as banned.
While the Court agreed states can keep some campaign-related messages out of polling places to preserve a calm voting environment, it held that Minnesota's vague standard—and the confusing examples the state offered to explain it—crossed the line from a reasonable restriction into an unworkable one.
“But that discretion must be guided by objective, workable standards.”
The majority's core objection to how Minnesota let election judges decide what counts as political.
How it got here: A federal district court dismissed the facial challenge and later granted summary judgment on the as-applied claim; the Eighth Circuit affirmed both, and the voters asked the Supreme Court to review the facial claim.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Minnesota law barred voters from wearing political badges, buttons, or insignia inside polling places. Andrew Cilek, an election-reform advocate, was twice turned away from voting for wearing a "Please I.D. Me" button and a Tea Party Patriots T-shirt before being allowed to vote after officials recorded his information. He and the Minnesota Voters Alliance sued, arguing the ban violated their free-speech rights.
The question before the Court
Could Minnesota bar voters from wearing political buttons, T-shirts, and similar items inside the polling place on Election Day?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that Minnesota's ban on wearing political badges, buttons, or insignia inside polling places violates the First Amendment, because the state never explained "political" clearly enough for election judges to apply the rule consistently. The Court agreed states may keep some campaign messages out of polling places to preserve a calm voting atmosphere, so the goal itself was fine.
But Minnesota's own guidance—banning "issue oriented material" and items "promoting a group with recognizable political views"—required election judges to track candidates' positions on dozens of issues and gauge which groups were "well known," an unworkable and inconsistent standard. Because the law gave officials too much unguided discretion, it failed even the lenient reasonableness test that applies to speech restrictions in government spaces like polling places.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling forces Minnesota and any state with similarly vague apparel bans to rewrite their rules with clearer, more specific standards, or risk having them struck down. Voters wearing buttons, T-shirts, or other political messages now have stronger First Amendment protection unless a state can draw a precise, evenly enforceable line.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts for further proceedings consistent with the ruling, though the core constitutional question is now resolved: Minnesota's ban as currently written cannot stand. Minnesota and other states may rewrite their apparel restrictions with clearer, more specific standards—several states already have narrower laws the Court cited as models—but broad bans on "political" items without objective guidance are now vulnerable to challenge.
What this does not decide
The Court did not rule that states can never restrict political apparel in polling places—it said states may still exclude some campaign-related messages to preserve order. It also did not decide the specific as-applied claims about Cilek's particular button and T-shirt, since only the facial challenge was before the Court.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor agreed that polling places are nonpublic forums and that Minnesota has weighty interests in keeping them free of partisan discord, but she objected to striking down the law without first asking the Minnesota Supreme Court to interpret it. She argued certification could have resolved the vagueness problems the majority relied on, and that the majority's reasons for declining to certify were unpersuasive.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court classified the interior of a polling place as a nonpublic forum—government property not historically open for public speech—meaning the state can restrict speech there as long as the restriction is reasonable and doesn't target particular viewpoints.
- Applying that reasonable standard, the Court found Minnesota had a permissible goal in banning some political apparel: keeping the polling place a calm space for voting rather than campaigning, drawing on the Court's earlier decision in Burson v. Freeman upholding a buffer zone around polling places.
- But a reasonable restriction in a nonpublic forum also requires a sensible, workable line between what's banned and what isn't, so the Court examined how Minnesota defined "political."
- The Court found the term undefined in the statute and the state's own guidance—covering "issue oriented material" and items "promoting a group with recognizable political views"—created standards so vague that enforcement would depend on each election judge's personal knowledge of candidates' positions and which groups were "well known."
- Because election officials had no objective, workable standard for deciding what apparel to bar, the Court concluded the law failed even the lenient reasonableness test that applies in a nonpublic forum.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Burson v. Freeman (504 U. S. 191)
The Court relied on this case's approval of campaign-free buffer zones to support Minnesota's goal of a calm polling place.