OCTOBER TERM 2017 · DECIDED JUNE 4, 2018 · 7–2

584 U. S. ___ · No. 16-111 · Argued December 5, 2017

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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n

ReversedFinal ruling
religious libertyLGBTQ rightswedding cakesanti-discrimination lawfree exercise of religion

Opinion of the Court by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Roberts, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch

The Court ruled that Colorado's Civil Rights Commission had violated a Christian baker's right to free exercise of religion when it punished him for refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, because commissioners showed open hostility toward his religious beliefs during the case.

The decision does not settle the broader question of when businesses can refuse service based on religious objections to same-sex marriage; instead, it focuses narrowly on the unfair way this particular baker's case was handled, leaving the larger conflict between anti-discrimination laws and religious liberty for future cases.

How it got here: A state agency and administrative judge ruled for the couple; the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed; the baker asked the Supreme Court to review the case.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Jack Phillips, a devout Christian who owns Masterpiece Cakeshop in Colorado, refused to make a wedding cake for Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a same-sex couple, because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. The couple filed a discrimination complaint under Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act, which bars businesses open to the public from denying services based on sexual orientation.

The question before the Court

Could Colorado punish a baker for refusing, on religious grounds, to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple?

The Court's answer

Yes — but only because of how Colorado handled this specific case. The Court ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated Jack Phillips' free exercise rights when it punished him for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, because commissioners showed clear hostility toward his religious beliefs, comparing his objection to justifications for slavery and the Holocaust, and treated his case inconsistently compared to other bakers who refused, on secular grounds, to make cakes with anti-gay messages.

The Court did not rule broadly that religious business owners can refuse service to same-sex couples. It stressed that states can generally require equal treatment of gay customers under neutral public accommodations laws, and left open how future, similar disputes should be resolved once a government agency handles them without showing hostility to religion.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Business owners with religious objections gained a narrow shield: a state agency enforcing anti-discrimination law must treat religious objections neutrally and can't disparage them. Same-sex couples retain protection from discrimination generally, but this particular baker's punishment was undone, and how similar disputes will be resolved elsewhere remains unresolved.

What changes now

The Commission's order against Phillips is set aside, but the Court expressly left open how future disputes between anti-discrimination laws and religious objections should be resolved, since this ruling turned on the specific unfair treatment Phillips received rather than a general rule favoring religious objectors. Similar conflicts will likely be litigated case by case in lower courts.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether business owners generally have a constitutional right to refuse services for same-sex weddings, nor did it resolve whether creating a wedding cake counts as protected free speech. The ruling is limited to the specific hostility shown toward Phillips' religious beliefs during this particular proceeding.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Kagan

Justice Kagan agreed the Commission acted with impermissible hostility but argued a neutral, principled basis for treating Phillips differently from the other bakers actually existed: Colorado law bars refusing service based on a customer's protected trait, and Phillips refused a cake he'd sell to opposite-sex couples, while the other bakers refused a cake-message they'd refuse anyone. She stressed this distinction had nothing to do with religious bias.

Concurrence — Justice Gorsuch

Justice Gorsuch argued the cases were legally identical because in both instances the bakers refused to make a particular product for anyone, regardless of customer identity, so the Commission's differing treatment reflected an inconsistent and result-driven double standard rather than a principled distinction based on customer versus product.

Concurrence in part — Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas agreed the Commission violated Phillips' free exercise rights, but wrote separately to argue that creating a custom wedding cake is also protected expressive speech under the First Amendment, and that requiring Phillips to make cakes celebrating same-sex weddings unconstitutionally compelled him to affirm a message contrary to his beliefs.

Dissent — Justice Ginsburg

Change Craig and Mullins’ sexual orientation (or sex), and Phillips would have provided the cake. Change Jack’s religion, and the bakers would have been no more willing to comply with his request.Ginsburg's explanation of why the baker's case differed from the other bakers who refused offensive messages.

Justice Ginsburg argued the Commission's differing outcomes were justified because the other bakers refused a message they'd refuse for any customer, while Phillips refused to sell a couple the very cake he'd sell heterosexual couples, meaning his refusal turned on the couple's sexual orientation. She found the commissioners' comments too diffuse across multiple independent decisionmakers to taint the whole process, and would have affirmed the ruling against Phillips.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court recognized that while states can generally require businesses to serve gay customers on equal terms under neutral public accommodations laws, any government enforcement of such laws must remain neutral toward religion rather than expressing hostility to a person's religious viewpoint.
  2. The Court applied factors from Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah for judging government neutrality toward religion, including the history of the decision, the specific events leading to it, and statements made by the decisionmakers themselves.
  3. Applying those factors, the Court found that some commissioners at public hearings had described Phillips' faith as 'despicable' and compared his religious objection to justifications for slavery and the Holocaust, statements that went unchallenged by other commissioners and were never disavowed in later proceedings.
  4. The Court also found that the Commission treated Phillips' case inconsistently compared to three cases where other bakers refused, on secular grounds, to make cakes with anti-gay messages: the Commission let those bakers decline service but rejected the same reasoning for Phillips.
  5. Because these two forms of disparate and hostile treatment showed the Commission's consideration of Phillips' religious objection was not neutral, the Court concluded that the government had failed the constitutional duty to treat religious objections without official hostility or one-sided judgment about their legitimacy.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

First Amendment Free Exercise Clause

Constitutional protection against government hostility toward or interference with religious belief and practice.

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act

State law banning discrimination, including based on sexual orientation, by businesses open to the public.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (508 U. S. 520)

The Court relied on this case's factors for judging whether government action shows hostility toward religion.

Reaffirms Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith (494 U. S. 872)

The Court left in place the rule that neutral, generally applicable laws can burden religious exercise without violating the Constitution.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n | SCOTUS Reporter