Sessions v. Dimaya
Headline: Justices strike down the 'residual' part of the federal crime‑of‑violence definition, blocking its use to deport lawful permanent residents and narrowing when past convictions trigger removal.
Holding: The Court held that the INA’s incorporation of Section 16(b)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and cannot be used to classify prior offenses as aggravated felonies for deportation purposes.
- Prevents use of §16(b) residual clause to deport lawful permanent residents.
- Requires immigration officials to use different legal grounds for removal.
- Raises uncertainty where prosecutions reference §16(b) to escalate immigration consequences.
Summary
Background
The case involved the Government, acting through the Attorney General, and James Dimaya, a lawful permanent resident with two California first‑degree burglary convictions. The Government sought to remove him because the Immigration and Nationality Act treats an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” as deportable, and that term incorporates the federal definition of a “crime of violence.” An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals treated California burglary as such a crime under the statute’s so‑called residual clause. The Ninth Circuit relied on this Court’s earlier decision in Johnson and ruled for Dimaya, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the question.
Reasoning
The central question was whether the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in the same way the Court found ACCA’s similar clause vague in Johnson. The majority explained that §16(b) combines two features that make it unclear: a requirement that judges imagine the crime’s “ordinary case,” and a hazy risk threshold—here “substantial risk”—to decide when force is involved. The Court concluded those features together create too much unpredictability. The Government’s textual arguments (for example, the clause’s phrase “in the course of committing the offense,” its use of “physical force,” and its lack of an exemplifying list) did not cure the fundamental indeterminacy. The Court therefore held the clause void for vagueness and affirmed the Ninth Circuit.
Real world impact
The decision prevents immigration officials and courts from using §16(b)’s residual clause to label prior convictions as aggravated felonies that automatically trigger deportation. It follows Johnson and narrows one route by which prior criminal convictions can lead to removal. The ruling will affect lawful permanent residents facing removal and will require the Government to rely on other, clearer statutory grounds when seeking to deport noncitizens.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Gorsuch agreed with the judgment and emphasized historical due‑process and separation‑of‑powers principles. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas dissented, arguing §16(b) can be applied with sufficient clarity and criticizing the majority’s reliance on Johnson.
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